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This thesis aims to examine Xunzi’s thesis “Human nature is evil (Xing e 性惡),” which is 
meant as a critique of Mencius’ thesis “Human nature is good (Xing shan 性善),” by 
building on the works of Shun Kwong-Loi, Chong Kim Chong, and Bryan Van Norden. 
Shun and Chong give a meticulous analysis of Xunzi’s distinction between having the 
capacity (keyi 可以) and having the ability (neng 能) in the context of self-cultivation, 
which attacks Mencius’ conflation of the two concepts, and contend that their 
disagreement centers significantly on whether our natural emotional dispositions are 
already structured in a congenial way for practicing and attaining the ethical ideal. In a 
separate line of examination, Bryan Van Norden suggests that Xunzi’s opposition to 
Mencius stems from his outlook on moral agency, and argues that the semantics of their 
conflicting labels on xing will be filled with essentially different flavors if we explore 
their disparate views on moral agency.  
 While others may have commented on these three writers’ views separately, no 
one has systematized or appreciated fully the connection between Xunzi’s criticism of 
Mencius based on the distinction between keyi and neng and his views on moral agency. 
By combining their analyses as a whole, with the intent of drawing out the linkages 
between their arguments and claims, I shall provide a detailed diagnosis of the 
background of Xunzi’s critique of Mencius, and make better sense of its texture and 
design by revealing some particular concerns Xunzi has with Mencian self-cultivation. 
This will set the ground for the central aim of my thesis, which is to defend Mencius from 
Xunzi’s critique by resolving these concerns.  
 iv
 v
 The thrust of my defense lies in showing Xunzi’s confusion with Mencius’ view 
of the “congeniality” of our natural emotional dispositions for practicing and attaining the 
ethical ideal with their being “sufficient,” and his misconception of Mencius’ view of 
moral agency as a matter of passively following our spontaneously occurrent desires. A 
large part of this portion of my thesis concerns itself with reviewing, analyzing, and 
synthesizing modern commentarial work on Mencius and Xunzi, such as Alan Chan, 
D.C. Lau, James Behuniak, David Nivison, Philip J. Ivanhoe, Janghee Lee, Manyul Im, 
Franklin Perkins and others, which is geared towards an explication of Mencius’ idea of 
the cultivating act in relation to his usage of the term “neng.” The progression and 
culmination of this defense shall better our understanding of the substantive differences 
between Mencius and Xunzi’s views on moral development and achievement, 
particularly as regards how they think the heart-mind in terms of its directedness (zhia 志) 








It is well-known that Xunzi’s thesis “Human nature is evil” (Xing e” 性惡) is meant as a 
critique of Mencius’ position “Human nature is good”(Xing shan” 性善)and his 
concomitant views on moral development and achievement. Much interpretative and 
investigative work has been done on both eminent philosophers to illuminate different 
Confucian approaches to thinking about the ethical life in relation to the human condition. 
 Nevertheless, the nature of Xunzi’s disagreement with Mencius has never been 
established incontrovertibly, making the locus and degree of the distinction between their 
claims on xing somewhat equivocal. Some writers contend that Xunzi’s issue with 
Mencius is largely terminological in nature,1 and that his thesis against Mencius 
invariably assumes an aspect of xing that is good.2 Others have highlighted many points 
                                                 
1 By pointing out that Xunzi and Mencius mean different things by “xing” (I am using hanyu pinyin 
throughout this thesis), D. C. Lau has argued that the differences between the two thinkers lie largely in the 
arena of definition. See D.C Lau, “Introduction” in Mencius (New York: Penguin Books, 1970), 21. A.C 
Graham writes that even though Xunzi’s theory is “as coherent in terms of its definitions as Mencius in 
terms of his,” but because there is a “shift” in the sense of xing in Xunzi’s “Xing e” chapter, they are really 
speaking at cross purposes. As such, Xunzi’s critique never really engages with Mencius’ theory in a 
substantive way. See A.C Graham, “The Background of the Mencian Theory of Human Nature” in Studies 
in Chinese Philosophy and Philosophical Literature (Singapore: The Institute of East Asian Philosophies, 
1986), 56. Henceforth, referred to as “Background.” Paul Rakita Goldin agrees with Graham and states that 
Xunzi’s disagreement with Mencius comes about because of his heavy emphasis on human artifice (wei 僞). 
Paul Rakita Goldin, Rituals of the Way: The Philosophy of Xunzi (Chicago: Open Court, 1999), 11 & 13. 
David Nivison argues that Xunzi resorts to “linguistic legislation” in his attack on Mencius by enforcing a 
strict lexical divide between “xing” and “wei.” See David Nivison, The Ways of Confucianism: 
Investigations in Chinese Philosophy, ed. Bryan Van Norden (La Salle: Open Court, 1996), 212. We must 
however take note that these distinguished scholars do think that there are some points of difference 
between Xunzi and Mencius. For such discussions, see especially Lau, Mencius, 21-22; A.C. Graham, 
Disputers of the Tao: Philosophical Argument in Ancient China, (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1989), 246 & 
250-51. Hereafter, referred to as Disputers of the Tao. For a good account of other commentators who share 
this perspective of looking at Xunzi’s issue with Mencius, see Kwong-Loi Shun, Mencius and Early 
Chinese Thought (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1997), 226-29. 
 
2 Nivison writes that by acknowledging that human beings have the capacity for moral education, and that 
we have feelings and desires for bettering ourselves morally, Xunzi exposes himself to a plausible Mencian 
retort that these amount to admitting the goodness of our xing. I discuss Nivison’s interpretation at more 
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of agreement between the two Confucian philosophers,3 and/or have argued that their 
views are consistent and complementary with, rather than antithetical to, each other.4
 However, another camp of interpreters uses various approaches with which to 
explicate Xunzi’s polemics against Mencius, and point out that there are indeed 
fundamental and substantive differences between their thoughts. Most notably, Shun 
Kwong-Loi and Chong Kim Chong give a meticulous analysis of Xunzi’s distinction 
between having the capacity (keyi 可以) and having the ability (neng 能) to do something 
or be someone in the ethical context, which attacks Mencius’ conflation between the two 
concepts, and argue that their disagreement centers significantly on whether our natural 
emotional dispositions are already structured in a congenial way for practicing and 
attaining the ethical ideal.5 In a separate line of examination, Bryan Van Norden suggests 
that Xunzi’s opposition to Mencius stems from his outlook on moral agency, and argues 
                                                                                                                                                 
length later in the thesis. See Nivison, The Ways of Confucianism, 212. Graham also argues that when 
Xunzi attributes to man an inherent equipment by which to become good, his line of thinking parallels 
Mencius’ way of thinking about xing, i.e. he inadvertently admits that we can look at xing in a morally 
good way.  See Graham, “Background,” 56-57. For Lau, Xunzi’s contention that morality is an invention of 
certain capacities of the heart-mind does not necessitate that we cannot denote “xing” as  inclusive of what 
the heart-mind devises, particularly when Xunzi himself considers the heart-mind and its capacities as part 
of xing. See D. C Lau, “Theories of Human Nature in Mencius and Xunzi” in Virtue, Nature, and Moral 
Agency in the Xunzi, 208.  
 
3 See for example, Donald Munro, The Concept of Man in Early China (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1969), 77-78. Munro also argues that painting a picture of human “xing” as “e” should not be taken 
as Xunzi’s fundamental concern as he highlights many innately positive traits that humans have. Donald J. 
Munro, “A Villain in the Xunzi,” in Chinese Language, Thought and Culture, ed. Phillip J. Ivanhoe 
(Chicago: Open Court, 1996), 198.  
 
4 See for example, Antonio Cua, “The Conceptual Aspect of Hsün Tzu’s Philosophy of Human Nature,” 
Philosophy East and West (PEW) 27.4 (1977): 77. Cua argues that Xunzi and Mencius’ views can be 
reconciled as highlighting different aspects of a common ethical experience.  
 
5 Shun, Mencius and Early Chinese Thought, see 216-31 et passim; Chong Kim Chong, “Xunzi’s 
Systematic Critique of Mencius,” PEW 53.2 (2003), 215-33.  
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that the semantics of their conflicting labels on xing will be filled with essentially 
different flavors if we explore their disparate views on moral agency.6 
 As implied by what is outlined, the issue of making sense of Xunzi’s critique of 
Mencius remains as a problematic in Chinese philosophy. While agreeing that Xunzi’s 
critique of Mencius does rely to some extent on how he legislates the scope and meaning 
of xing, and that Xunzi and Mencius share many similar views, I believe however that we 
should not let such terminological plays and similarities mislead us into de-emphasizing 
substantive differences underlying their respective claims on xing, which pertain to their 
views on our natural emotional dispositions and moral development. In other words, I am 
convinced by the various reasons and arguments given by Shun, Chong, and Van Norden 
that we will yield more philosophical fruits if why we focus on a “substantive” approach 
in analyzing Xunzi’s critique of Mencius. Shun, for example, argues cogently that even if 
there is “a difference in emphasis in Mencius and Hsün Tzu’s [Xunzi’s] understanding of 
hsing [xing],” “it does not follow that their opposing claims about xing do not reflect 
substantive differences” regarding self-cultivation, a point that those who charge Xunzi 
with having no real difference of opinion from Mencius on the constitution of xing 
agree.7 Also, Van Norden reasons that even if Xunzi shares with Mencius the view that 
we are naturally endowed with moral-making emotional impulses, there is a need to 
                                                 
6 Bryan Van Norden, “Mengzi and Xunzi: Two Views of Human Agency,” in Virtue, Nature, and Moral 
Agency in the Xunzi, ed. T.C Kline III and Philip J. Ivanhoe (Indianapolis, Hackett Publishing Company 
2000), 103-34. 
 
7 Shun, Mencius and Early Chinese Thought, 229 & 262 n. 105.   
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ascertain and explain why Xunzi puts forth the claim that xing is “e,” rather than the 
claim that xing is morally neutral to show his opposition to Mencius.8  
 In addition, I submit that we need to channel Xunzi’s critique of Mencius away 
from a process of inquiry that aims at elucidating nomenclature manipulation and finding 
unifying threads so as not to obscure Xunzi’s own interpretation of and principal 
concerns with Mencian moral cultivation, which is what drive and shape his 
philosophical agenda against Mencius. As I see it, examining these concerns and issues 
Xunzi has with Mencius—which derive from Xunzi’s own substantive view on our 
emotional predispositions and moral agency—would offer us a better appreciation of the 
sophistication and sense of his critique of Mencius. The key to illuminating and 
addressing these concerns, I think, lies in showing how both Xunzi and Mencius’ 
understanding of our natural emotional dispositions underpin their views on moral 
agency, and how their views on moral agency tie in with their application of the terms 
“keyi” and “neng.” With these reasons and considerations as a point of departure, I will 
now proceed to elaborate on Shun, Chong, and Van Norden’s respective analysis of 
Xunzi’s critique of Mencius. 
To begin, Mencius explicitly explains his dictum “Xing9 shan” as the claim that 
with respect to our qing10 情 (what is genuinely so about something, emotions),11 human 
                                                 
 
8 Van Norden, “Mengzi and Xunzi: Two Views of Human Agency,” 104. 
 
9 There is an ongoing debate between Roger Ames and Irene Bloom on the interpretation of Mencian 
“xing” as “human nature,” due to the essentialist baggage that the Western tradition brings to the term 
“human nature.” See Roger Ames, “The Mencian Conception of Ren Xing: Does it mean ‘Human 
Nature’?” in Chinese Texts and Philosophical Contexts: Essays Dedicated to Angus C. Graham, ed. by 
Henry Rosemont, Jr. (LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court, 1991), 143-75, and “Mencius and a Process Notion of 
Human Nature” in Mencius: Contexts and Interpretations, 72-90;  Irene, Bloom, “Human Nature and 
Biological Nature in Mencius,” PEW 41.1 (1997): 21-32, “Mencian Arguments on Human Nature (Jen-
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beings have the capacity to become good (ke yi wei shan 可以為善).12 Mencius elaborates 
on what he means by underscoring four modes of the heart-mind (xin 心)13—the xin of 
compassion (ce yin zhi xin 惻隱之心), the xin of shame and self-loathing (xiu wu zhi xin 
羞惡 之心),14 the xin of respectfulness and reverence (gong jing zhi xin 恭敬之心), and the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Hsing),” PEW 44.1 (1994): 19-53, and “Biology and Culture in the Mencian View of Human Nature” in 
Mencius: Contexts and Interpretations, 91-102. I shall leave this debate aside for it falls outside the scope 
of this thesis.  Nevertheless, to safeguard against the association of xing as an essence, I shall stick with the 
transliteration xing, and suggest that we follow Shun in thinking of “xing” as the characteristic tendencies 
of human beings.  See Shun, Mencius and Early Chinese Thought, 186-87. 
 
10 Shun argues that xing and qing are closely related concepts in the Mencius, and in 6A: 6, they seem to be 
synonymous. This does not mean however that xing and qing are always interchangeable in early Chinese 
texts. See Shun, Mencius and Early Chinese Thought, 183-86 & 215-16. 
 
11 Some commentators translate “qing” as “what is genuinely so,” while others translate it as “emotions.” 
While scholars such as Graham have rigorously defended the former translation, the latter has gained force 
with interpretative work done on the Guodian texts. The Guodian texts are a collection of bamboo texts 
excavated from a tomb in 1992 that shed new light on early Chinese philosophy, and suggest a closer link 
between qing and human emotions. It in not conclusive therefore whether qing in the Mencius generally 
denotes what a thing is genuinely like or human emotions. For this particular passage of the Mencius, 
however, the meanings underlying both translations seems to be combined, since I read Mencius as backing 
up his thesis about the goodness of xing by pointing out actual facts about our affective/cognitive 
dispositional profile, i.e. actual emotional experiences that human beings generally will have under certain 
conditions. For further discussion on qing, see Graham, “The Background,” 33 & 59-65; Graham, 
Disputers of the Tao, 98-99; Shun, Mencius and Early Chinese Thought, 183-87; Chad Hansen, “Qing 
(Emotions) in Pre-Buddhist Chinese Thought,” in Emotions in Asian Thought, ed. Joel Marks and Roger 
Ames (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995), 181-212; Ning Chen “The Ideological 
Background of the Mencian Discussion of Human Nature” in Mencius: Contexts and Interpretations, ed. 
Alan K. L. Chan (University of Hawai’i Press, 2002), 17-41; On Cho, Ng, “Is Emotion (qing) the Source of 
a Confucian Antinomy?,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 25 (June 1998): 237-45. 
 
12 See Mencius 6A: 6 in D.C Lau, trans., Mencius, v. 1 & 2 (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1984), 
228-29. All citations of the Mencius are based on this bilingual edition of Lau, unless otherwise stated, with 
some modification based my interpretation of the original text. For specific terms, I rely often on Shun’s 
work in Mencius and Early Chinese Thought. 
 
13 In early Chinese thought, xin is regarded as the seat or office of both affective and cognitive tendencies. 
It has been translated as “heart” or “mind,” but recent literature favors the translation of “heart-mind” to 
express the integral emotional and intellectual operations of xin.  For a relevant discussion on this matter, 
see Harold H. Oshima, “A Metaphorical Analysis of the Concept of Mind in the Chuang-tzu,” in 
Experimental Essays on Chuang-tzu, ed. Victor H. Mair Honolulu (University of Hawaii Press, 1983), 63-
84. 
 
14 I.A. Richards interprets the xin of shame-and-self loathing as close to the meaning of “guilty 
compunction” or “bad conscience,” “with probably a strong flavor of being socially and demonstrably in 
the wrong.” It also seems to suggest an internal sense of what Richards calls “a point of honor” (equally 
applicable are terms like recognition, esteem, exaltation, respect etc), which is gained from social (rather 
than private) judgments. See I.A (Ivor Armstrong) Richards, Mencius on the Mind: Experiments in Multiple 
Definition (London: K. Paul, Trench, Trubner & co., ltd., 1932), 19. Thus, within such a sensibility, we 
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xin of affirming and denying (shi fei zhi xin 是非之心)15 as “stirrings within regular 
patterns of the human experience,”16 which are respectively the “sprouts” (duan 端)17 of 
the moral attributes of benevolence (ren 仁), propriety (yi 義),18 observance of rites (li
禮),19 and wisdom (zhi 智).20 The capacity to be shan in the Mencian framework is 
therefore dependent on the possession of these four xins, which are collectively the 
                                                                                                                                                 
desire not to do socially wrong and inappropriate things so as not to feel below others in terms of status and 
stature. As Mencius says, “If a man is not shamed of being inferior to other men, how will he ever become 
their equal.” See Mencius 7A: 7; cf. 7A: 6. 
 
15 Due to the lack of textual reference in the Mencius, commentators have found it hard to put their fingers 
on what this xin amounts to exactly. What seems to be certain is that it does not imply that Mencius 
subscribes to some kind of ethical intuitionism, whereby we draw moral knowledge from a comprehensive 
content inherent in the human heart-mind. As Richards puts it, it may simply be no more than making 
judgments of “what is the case,” and “what is not the case.” See Richards, Mencius on the Mind, 70. In my 
reading, shi-fei seems to refer to a state of readiness to make evaluations, and to follow and learn from the 
evaluations one has made in response to the stimulus of the external environment. From this, I argue later 
in the thesis that shi fei zhi xin denotes that part of the human experience to be drawn to follow and learn 
from our positive or negative evaluations of concrete situations, people, issues etc. 
 
16 I borrow this phrase from Ames in “Mencius and a Process Notion of Human Nature,” 78 
 
17 The term “duan,” which according to Shun paints “a picture of a sprouting plant with roots,” is 
significant for it shows that Mencius does not think that human beings are already morally mature, and at 
the same time, highlights the “organic” nature of Mencian moral development. See Shun, Mencius and 
Early Chinese Thought, 138.  
 
18 “Yi” generally refers to doing what is appropriate with respect to the concrete situation that one faces. 
 
19 Mencius also relates the moral attribute of observance of the rites to the ci rang zhi xin 辭讓之心 (heart-
mind of declining and yielding to others.). See Mencius 2A: 6. Though Mencius does not elaborate more on 
this xin, commentators like Lau and Richards have tried to provide some insight into its contents. For Lau, 
having this xin prompts us to be considerate of other people, to put others first or make way for them by 
keeping ourselves back. See Lau, “Theories of Human Nature in Mencius and Xunzi,” 195. According to 
Richards, the heart-mind of declining-and-yielding renders us capable of being aware of one’s place in the 
social hierarchy, and to act fittingly in accordance with it. It relates to “concrete problems of precedence 
and decorum” regarding shifting superior-inferior relationships that constitute oneself.  See Richards, 
Mencius on the Mind, 19-20. As Franklin Perkins argues, this heart-mind should not be taken to denote 
some “intuitive ceremoniousness…. [or some] innate grasp of certain rules of ritual.” Instead, it is “an 
innate responsiveness to others, a fundamental susceptibility to ceremony, which comes out of a feeling of 
respect or reverence for superiors.”  See Franklin Perkins, “Mencius, Emotion, and Autonomy,” Journal of 
Chinese Philosophy 29.2 (2002): 221.  
 
20 Ibid., 66-67. 
 6
foundation for directing us towards goodness so as to practice and attain the Confucian 
ethical ideal.21 
In his reading, Shun writes that the four xins, which are certain emotional 
dispositions22 that humans have, are the duan of ren, yi, li, and zhi in the sense that, just 
as a sprout contains within it a direction of growth towards being a mature plant,23 they 
contain within them a developmental direction towards these ethical attributes. It is in this 
way the four sprouts (siduan 四端) provide the capacity24 or resources of ethical 
orientation that we can draw upon for cultivating the ideal human character. From this, 
Shun submits that Mencius’ thesis about xing, or the characteristic tendencies that make 
us human (jen 人), is “a substantive claim that involves two components—that human 
beings share certain emotional predispositions in the direction of the ethical ideal, and 
that it is the possession of such predispositions that makes us capable of cultural 
accomplishments that makes one a jen.”25 Indeed, Shun contends that Mencius’ view on 
                                                 
 
21 I follow Shun’s reading of the Mencian idea of shan or goodness as  intricately linked with the patterns 
of ren, yi, li, and zhi, which in turn indicate the various dimensions of the Confucian ethical ideal. See Shun, 
Mencius and Early Chinese Thought, 210-11 & 48. 
 
22 Shun does not define what he means by an “emotional disposition.” To suggest a definition consistent 
with his thinking, I read it as involving psychosomatic responses of the heart-mind subjectively 
experienced as feelings such as joy, love etc, which incline the self towards certain courses of action, under 
a given set of circumstances. 
 
23 See Shun, Mencius and Early Chinese Thought, 137-38. 
 
24 Shun points out that Mencius’ explanation of “Xing shan” in terms of ke yi wei shan poses a 
hermeneutical problem if we do not bulk it up with more semantic substance. For one thing, thinking that 
we have the capacity to become good in and by itself does not necessitate a subscription to the “Xing shan” 
doctrine, which is why Mencius’ philosophical peer, Gaozi, can argue against Mencius that xing is neither 
good nor bad, even though he also thinks that we have the capacity to become good. To rectify this problem, 
Shun argues that xing for Mencius relates asymmetrically to shan- the capacity to become good depends 
significantly on having certain emotional predispositions that direct us towards the ethical ideal. In 
contradistinction, Gaozi thinks that xing has a symmetrical relationship with goodness or badness because 
our emotional dispositions are directionally neutral. See Shun, Mencius and Early Chinese Thought, 213.  
 
25 Quoted from Kwong-Loi Shun, “Mencius on Jen-Hsing,” PEW 47.1 (1997): 14. 
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the appositeness of human emotional dispositions for directing us to goodness for 
practicing and attaining the ethical ideal explains why, in the context of countering 
prevailing skepticism on the feasibility of the Confucian Way (Dao 道),26 Mencius often 
switches from speaking in terms of keyi27 to neng.28  
For example, in 1A: 7, King Xuan asks Mencius how one acts as or becomes a 
true king,29 and whether he keyi do so. In reply, Mencius brings up the incident of King 
Xuan’s sparing an ox from being sacrificed because he cannot bear (bu ren 不忍)30 to see 
it shrinking with fear, which shows that King Xuan already has the neng for acting as a 
true king. Mencius then claims that King Xuan’s not acting a true king is not because he 
lacks ability (bu neng 不能), but because he refuses to act (bu wei 不爲). In short, King 
                                                 
 
26 Though not capturing all its aspects, the Dao in the Mencius can be defined briefly as “an optimal path 
that is the most productive course for civilized human beings to advance,” on both an individual and a 
societal level. Taken from James Behuniak, “Disposition and Aspiration in the Mencius and Zhuangzi,” 
Journal of Chinese Philosophy 29:1 (2002): 67. 
 
 
27 As Shun points out, the use of “keyi” in early Chinese texts implicates that one keyi or has the capacity 
for something only when certain conditions are met. Ibid., 216. As I see it, this implies that humans are 
disposed towards the ethical directions of ren, yi, li, and zhi only under certain given circumstances (A 
discussion of what these circumstances are in Mencius’ view will be given later in the thesis). This makes 
the understanding of the four xins as (emotional) “dispositions” more apt, for according to McKitrick, a 
disposition has “circumstances of manifestation.” In other words, the manifestation of a disposition is tied 
to certain provisos or contexts, even though the disposition itself might be said to be a persistent feature of 
a thing. For more on the nature of a disposition, see Jennifer McKitrick, “A Case for Extrinsic 
Dispositions,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81:2 (2003): 156-58. 
 
28 According to Shun, Mencius, like his philosophical adversary Mozi, wants to defend the practicability of 
following the moral Dao against certain naysayers. In order to do so, they argue for the fit between the 
directions that our emotions dispose us to and the proper moral Dao (one must note that they differ 
significantly on what the proper Dao constitutes), and use the concept of neng to show this fit. Thus, to 
have the neng to practice a proposed Dao or ideal way of life is to possess at least some emotional 
dispositions that direct us towards that Dao. See Shun, Mencius and Early Chinese Thought, 216-18. 
 
29 Mencius defines a true king as one protects and tends to the interests of his people (bao ming 保民) 
 
30 The term “bu ren” also appears in 2A:6 before Mencius introduces the siduan. According to Mencius, 
every person possesses the “bu ren ren zhi xin” 不忍人之心 (the heart-mind that cannot bear the suffering 
of others), which is why the Former kings can practice “bu ren ren zhi zheng” 不忍人之政  (compassionate 
government). Thus, having a heart-mind that can “buren” for Mencius is a pre-requisite for being able to do 
things in the ethico-political sphere.  
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Xuan refuses to make the effort to utilize his neng.31 Also in 6B: 2, Cao Jiao asks 
Mencius whether people in general keyi become a Yao or a Shun—a sage-like character 
or person (sheng 聖). Mencius replies in the affirmative, and then goes on to state that the 
problem is not due to a lack of neng but to a lack of effort.  
As Shun contends, Mencius’ subtle conceptual shift from keyi to neng in his 
discussion with his interlocutors shows that his idea of “ke yi wei shan” does not denote 
some bare capacity, or mere possibility of becoming good.32 Rather, to the extent that 
neng for Mencius depends on having certain emotional dispositions of the heart-mind 
(exemplified by the siduan) for navigating us to the path of goodness and away from 
badness, keyi would similarly be so dependent. Hence, from Mencius’ standpoint, both 
the capacity and ability to engage in shan deeds for cultivating the ethical ideal implies 
the endowment of certain emotional dispositions structured in a way congenial for 
directing us towards goodness. 
In applying the methodology of furthering our understanding of Mencius by 
contrasting his views with Xunzi, Shun writes that Xunzi’s emphasis on the distinction 
between keyi and neng in the Xing e chapter33 highlights his disagreement with Mencius’ 
view on our natural emotional dispositions. Shun analyzes that in Xunzi’s conceptual 
                                                 
 
31 To address King Xuan’s question of the difference between bu neng and bu wei, Mencius refers to the 
feat of carrying Mount Tai and crossing the North Sea as an illustration of what is truly beyond the limits of 
human neng, i.e., to an enterprise that one would not realize regardless of how much effort one puts in. 
Mencius then points out that “not massaging an elder’s joints,” like not acting as a true king, is a matter of 
bu wei, rather than bu neng, for such a deed is something realizable within the bounds of one’s neng so 
long as one chooses to put in the effort to do so. 
 
32 Shun, Mencius and Early Chinese Thought, 218-19. 
 
33 Xunzi: Human Nature is Evil (Xing e 性惡) 23.14. Passage numbers and references to the Xunzi will be 
from John Knoblock, trans. (English); Zhang Jue, trans. (Modern Chinese), Xunzi, v. 1 & 2 (Hunan: 
Foreign Languages Press, 1999), unless otherwise stated, with modifications of my own based on my 
reading of the text. For a different English translation of the Xunzian text, see Burton Watson, Hsün Tzu: 
Basic Writings (New York; Columbia University Press, 1963). 
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framework, the distinction between ke and bu ke 不可 (lack of capacity) is not the same as 
the distinction between neng and bu neng.34 The fact that human beings ke yi direct 
themselves towards goodness and practice the ethical ideal, i.e. sageliness, does not entail 
that everyone neng act as or become a sage. Only certain people like Yu have been able 
to follow the path of sageliness. Conversely, the lack of ability, whether it is to do 
something or be someone sagely, does not implicate the lack of, or prevent one from 
having the capacity. It follows that for Xunzi, keyi and neng are not equivalent concepts, 
and should not be used interchangeably (能不能之與可不可， 其不同遠矣，其不可以相為
明矣).35 This raises the question of how Xunzi conceptually construes keyi and neng. 
 According to Shun, while Xunzi’s notion of neng is similar to Mencius, in the 
sense of having appropriately structured emotional dispositions for directing us towards 
shan so as to practice and attain sageliness, his idea of ke is different. In Shun’s treatment, 
Xunzi’s claim that every person ke become a Yao or Yu, and ke become a Jie and Zhi,36 
shows that his sense of ke refers to some unfilled capacity that can be directed either 
towards goodness or badness. Therefore, unlike Mencius, Xunzi does not posit anything 
ethically substantial or influential in our affective capacity for becoming good; our 
natural emotional constitution does not point towards goodness and away from badness, 
or towards badness and away from goodness. Instead, we have to impose external 
structures on our emotional dispositions before we are directed towards good behavioral 
patterns in order to engage in the process of cultivating sageliness.  
                                                 
 
34 Shun, Mencius and Early Chinese Thought, 222-30 et passim. 
 
35 This is Chong’s translation. See Chong, “Xunzi’s Systematic Critique of Mencius,” 218-19.  
 
36 Xunzi: Of Honor and Disgrace (Rongru 榮辱). In the Confucian tradition, Yao and Yu are held as 
exemplars of human relationships, while Jie and Zhi personify their antitheses.  
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Thus, as I understand Shun, Xunzi’s distinction between keyi and neng is meant to 
debunk Mencius’ claim of human beings “ke yi wei shan” as “neng wei shan,” for the fact 
that we ke yi does not mean that we neng, although we ke yi neng—i.e. to have the 
capacity to acquire the appropriate emotional dispositions on which one’s ability to direct 
ourselves towards goodness for practicing and attaining ethical ideal depends. For Shun, 
Xunzi’s distinction between ke yi and neng shows substantive differences in his views 
from Mencius on the content of our emotional dispositions, particularly with regards to 
their developmental bearings. 
Following Shun’s lead, Chong also thinks that Xunzi’s distinction between ke yi 
and neng has a significant role to play in his criticism of Mencius, for careful analysis of 
what drives Xunzi to make this distinction reveals his disagreement with Mencius to be 
“more systematic and substantive than it is usually thought to be.”37 To condense 
Chong’s analysis of Xunzi’s reading of Mencius, Mencius assumes that the emotional 
dispositions of the heart-mind are already “morally packaged” to the extent that they 
sufficiently avail to us the power to effectuate forms of goodness. Following goodness is 
only a matter of making the effort to exercise and nurture these emotional dispositions, or 
to recover their utility. On the other hand, becoming bad is due to the failure to foster or 
to lose these dispositions. For Xunzi, this is an overly simplistic view of moral cultivation, 
as goodness itself has a certain systematic rationale that we need to know and implement 
(using certain cognitive and conative faculties of the heart-mind) before we come to 
possess the aforementioned power. To explain further, it is only through acquiring an 
understanding and application of such a rationale that our emotional dispositions can be 
                                                 
 
37 Chong, “Xunzi’s Systematic Critique of Mencius,” 215. Chong’s account also aims at defending Xunzi 
against the charge that his view of xing and moral cultivation  ineluctably assumes the goodness of xing. 
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coordinated, transformed, and shaped over time to translate into good forms of 
expressions and activities. The affective leanings of the heart-mind—in terms of certain 
emotions and desires—therefore serve only as “raw material” for the cultivating process, 
which must undergo extensive structuralization and refinement to acquire moral forms of 
manifestation. 
Furthermore, Xunzi thinks that only those who acquire a comprehensive 
discernment and mastery of the moral rationale will arrive at a qualified refinement of 
one’s inborn dispositions for effecting forms and patterns that accord with the ethical 
ideal. Such a stage of cultivation requires a prodigious amount of personal exertion, 
dedication, and focus. However, due to the lack of various combinable developmental 
factors, such as a suitable environment (in particular, one’s pedagogical surroundings) 
and personal merits like strength of character, not everyone will put in or sustain such 
efforts. In fact, Xunzi thinks that only very few individuals will achieve the terminal 
point of sagehood and its distinctive dimensions of moral power and experience.  
From this, Chong submits that for Xunzi, our capacity for becoming good 
depends instead on having certain faculties of the heart-mind for learning and practicing 
the rationale of morality in order to structure and direct our emotional predispositions 
towards moral-cultural forms of expressions and activities. The impact of the utilization 
of this capacity on our emotional predispositions will fructify into a formal and structural 
ability to manifest the ethical ideal only when one understands and is proficient in the 
rationale of morality in its totality. In Chong’s reading, Xunzi’s critique of Mencius on 
this conceptual issue of keyi and neng aims to expose an overall naïveté to Mencius’ 
thoughts on xing and his model of self-cultivation by showing the significant gulf 
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between the characteristic manifestation of our natural emotional dispositions and the 
characteristic manifestation of what we consider as good. Put in another way, taking into 
account Mencius’ conflation between keyi and neng, Xunzi thinks that Mencius’ view 
“Xing shan” amounts to the claim that our natural emotional dispositions are prefigured 
for translating into morally good forms of expression and activities, and seeks to 
undermine Mencius by showing their deficiency in manifesting such forms by arguing for 
the distinction between keyi and neng. 
In his examination of Mencius’ phrase, “Xing shan,” and its explanatory averment 
that human beings “ke yi wei shan,” Van Norden states that what Mencius means is that 
our emotional predispositions can be relied upon as the primary means of self-
cultivation.38 According to Van Norden, Mencius’ assessment of our emotional 
predispositions is fundamentally predicated on his view of human agency, which is that 
human beings must seek that which they desire the most or have the strongest desire for, 
whereby our strongest desire springs from our stimulated emotional states at a given time. 
Hence, what move us to act or behave morally pertains to our most powerfully felt 
emotions and desires of the moment. For Mencius, our emotional predispositions are the 
cardinal sources of moral development and achievement, as they avail to us the driving 
motivating force behind all moral actions.  
As Van Norden argues, Xunzi’s thesis “Xing e” stems subtly from his denial of 
Mencius’ view of moral agency, which can be seen not in the Xing e chapter itself but 
from a certain passage in the “Rectification of Names (Zhengming 正名)” chapter. For 
Xunzi, what we desire the most cannot be the primary source of motivation towards 
seeking actions and behavior that are shan. Rather, to seek actions that are shan or good, 
                                                 
38 Van Norden, “Mengzi and Xunzi: Two Views of Human Agency,” 127. 
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we must follow what one approves (cong suo ke 從所可). “Approval,” in Van Norden’s 
interpretation of Xunzi’s term “ke,” is a different mechanism of human agency, and is of 
a higher motivational potency, than yu 欲 (what we most desire). Indeed, as Van Norden 
points out, Xunzi thinks that overriding what we yu via what we ke is fundamentally what 
human beings need to do if they are to embark on a process of moral practice and 
cultivation. In Van Norden’s view, the core difference between Mencian and Xunzian 
thought pivots on the issue of moral agency.   
From the discussion presented, we see that all three writers share the perspective 
that (a) the contrastive catchphrase-like claims of Mencius and Xunzi, “Xing shan” and 
“Xing e,” reflect a significant disagreement on the way in which our emotional 
predispositions technically facilitate the project of self-cultivation, and therefore (b) 
Xunzi’s criticism of Mencius hinges on a substantive argument rather than, as some 
commentators contend, mere nomenclature disputation.39 While Shun and Chong suggest 
that the variance in Mencius and Xunzi’s thinking can be discerned from their usages of 
keyi and neng, Van Norden traces it to their differing ideas on the basic operation of 
moral agency.  
Several interesting philosophical questions come to mind: What is the full 
relationship between Xunzi and Mencius’ respective views on our emotional 
predispositions, moral agency, and their conceptual usage of keyi and neng in the context 
of self-cultivation? Does Xunzi’s critique connect directly with or address adequately 
Mencius’ own views, or is it based on certain misunderstandings of Mencius? If one 
attempts to combine the interpretations of Shun, Chong, and Van Norden to yield a fuller 
                                                 
39 See Shun, Mencius and Early Chinese Thought, 226-31; Chong, “Xunzi’s Systematic Critique of 
Mencius,” 215 & 228 n. 1; Van Norden, “Mengzi and Xunzi: Two Views of Human Agency,” 103-04. 
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picture of the substantive differences between Mencius and Xunzi, what will this picture 
tell us about Xunzi’s critique of Mencius with respect to the previous question? And will 
the combined picture suffice as a referential framework for comparing Mencius and 
Xunzi? Are there further significant points of variance that underpin Mencius and 
Xunzi’s contrastive claims on xing?   
In this thesis, I want to first build on the readings of Shun, Chong, and Van 
Norden by reviewing Xunzi’s explicit criticism of Mencius using the capacity and ability 
distinction in relation to his more implicit conflict with Mencius on the issue of moral 
agency. While Shun, Chong, and Van Norden each points to something important in 
Xunzi’s critique of Mencius, and has contributed significantly to understanding Xunzi’s 
concerns with Mencius’ views on moral development and achievement, I believe that 
synthesizing their respective analysis would still fall short of doing full justice to the 
question of Xunzi’s issues with Mencius. Some exposition needs to be done with respect 
to Xunzi and Mencius’ views on how the heart-mind in terms of its directedness (zhia 志)  
can be set and nurtured to a unified, total focus on comporting with proper forms of 
behavior, where such a state of the heart-mind is indicative of having the ease and 
intrinsic joy that sages experience in seeking the good of any situation, and their 
unrelenting commitment to following the Confucian Way. Such a philosophical venture 
will allow us to understand better the tenor of Xunzi’s criticism of Mencius using the 
distinction between keyi and neng, in particular, his interpretation of and misgivings with 
Mencius’ view on moral agency and how human beings realize the neng to become or act 
as a sage. 
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As such, in light of modern exegetical scholarship on the Mencius and the Xunzi, 
such as those of Alan Chan, D.C. Lau, James Behuniak, David Nivison, Philip J. Ivanhoe, 
Janghee Lee, Manyul Im, Franklin Perkins and others, I shall adjoin an analysis of Xunzi 
and Mencius’ standpoints on how zhia is focused and nurtured for according with the 
ethical ideal to the composite insight of Shun, Chong, and Van Norden on Xunzi’s 
critique of Mencius. What follows this is a defense of Mencius from Xunzi’s criticisms, 
which I believe are ultimately misguided. My strategy for this is to argue that Xunzi’s 
critique of Mencius is based on a misconception of (1) Mencian moral agency as an 
operation of passively following our spontaneous desires, and (2) and the way “neng” is 
employed in the Mencian framework as a hortatory locution that implies that we need not 
rely on the authoritative wisdom of the sage (transmitted in some paradigmatic 
framework) for managing our emotional dispositions in order to be directed and driven 
towards goodness. These two misconceptions, as I shall show, lead Xunzi to interpret 
Mencius as saying that our emotional predispositions sufficiently empower us for 
practicing and attaining the ethical ideal, and impel him to write the “Xing e” chapter. 
Although my main concern here is to defend Mencius from Xunzi’s criticisms, my 
analysis will extend our understanding of the substantive differences between Mencius 
and Xunzi on xing, the function of the heart-mind in relation to self-cultivation, as well as 
the role of the sage in our moral education. 
To keep the thesis in focus, I shall not concern myself with defending or attacking 
the various claims and arguments that Xunzi raises to build up his own system of thought 
per se (or Mencius for that matter), but only those which Xunzi advances to criticize 
Mencius’ views (as Xunzi sees it). It is therefore not an objection to the subject of this 
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academic exercise if one thinks, for example, that Xunzi’s view of moral agency is not 
expedient for the cultivating process. Also, I shall not address the issue of whether the 
Mencian or Xunzian position is more plausible as a schema of moral cultivation, or more 
congruous with Confucian thinking.   
In Chapter 1, I provide a detailed exposition of Chan’s analysis of Mencius’ view 
of relationship between vital energy (qi 氣), zhia, and the “unmoved” heart-mind 
(budongxin 不動心), which generates a greater depth in understanding the role of qi and 
qing, and the operation of setting and nurturing zhia in Mencian self-cultivation. In 
Chapter 2, I relate these insights to Van Norden’s reading of Mencian moral agency, 
supplementing the discussion with the contention that for Mencius, the heart-mind’s 
power to “think (si 思)” facilitates the proper concentration of zhia so that we would be 
motivated to seek shan courses of relating with others. The sum of these two chapters 
will show that even though Mencius thinks that human beings have certain natural 
emotional dispositions that embody a source of direction towards goodness, it is through 
active efforts at si that channel our spontaneous emotions and desires into effective forces 
of agency for practicing and attaining sageliness.  
 In Chapter 3 and 4, I discuss Xunzi’s views on qi, qing, and moral agency in 
relation to his emphasis on learning and implementing the Confucian ritual principles for 
engendering the cultivating act and process. What shall be rendered to the reader is how 
for Xunzi, in contradistinction to Mencius, the heart-mind in terms of its zhia becomes set 
and fixed on leading qi and the person as a whole towards engendering and expressing 
sage-like characteristics. Also, I shall make apparent Xunzi’s concerns with Mencius’ 
views on the utilization of emotional dispositions for directing and driving ourselves 
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towards goodness, as well as how his disregard of ritual principles (which embody the 
accumulated wisdom of sages) for cultivating ourselves and following the moral Dao. 
This will set the ground for my reading of Xunzi’s distinction between keyi and neng in 
Chapter 5, which I submit is an extension of his criticism of Mencius that direct, mere 
responses to our passively stimulated emotions and desires suffice for engagements in 
moral forms of activity and expression. 
In Chapter 6, I give my interpretation of how “si” and “tui 推 (extend)” operate in 
Mencian thought, and contend that unlike Xunzi, Mencius does not view the management 
of our emotional responses and the setting and nurturance of zhia as dependent on 
understanding and deliberating on certain principles. A substantial discussion on Im’s 
disagreement with Nivison on Mencius’ idea of “tui” will be provided to support my 
argument. From this, I shall defend Mencius from Xunzi’s criticism that we need not 
engage in an active management of our emotions and desires for directing and driving 
ourselves towards goodness so as to practice and attain the ethical ideal. In Chapter 7, I 
conclude this defense by arguing for Mencius that his idea of being neng to practice and 
attain sageliness does not deny the importance and indispensability of learning the 
strategies and ways of concrete sages to execute and survey our emotional responses, and 
secure the proper utilization of our emotional dispositions. 
 
Chapter 1 
      
Mencius: Moral Orientation and the Four Xins  
1.1  Introduction 
Previously, we advert that in Shun’s reading, Mencius’ thesis “Xing shan” amounts to the 
claim that certain emotional predispositions of the heart-mind (exemplified by the four 
xins,1 also known as the siduan) have the power to direct us to the ethical attributes of ren, 
yi, li, and zhi. In this chapter, I shall examine the orientational2 powers of the four xins by 
explicating Mencius’ views on how our ethical bearings are shaped for moral 
development. As an important preliminary to this, we need to discuss Alan Chan’s 
treatment of the three-fold and dynamic relationship between vital energy (qi 氣), the 
heart-mind and its aims or directedness (zhia 志), and the “unmoved” heart-mind 
(budongxin 不動心) in the Mencian framework, which impacts on our understanding of 
why Mencius refers to the four xins as the synchronic and diachronic basis for guiding 
the cultivating process.3 
 
                                                 
1 For the rest of the thesis, I am using the English term “heart-mind” to denote the organ or center of 
affective and cognitive functions that is inseparably and intimately related to all our other organs, while 
using the transliteration “xin” to refer to that organ in a particular emotional state or mode such as 
compassion.  
 
2 By “orientational,” I mean a change of direction of thought, inclination, or interest in response to the 
external stimuli of an existing situation or environment.  
 
3 Lu argues that the four xins should not just be seen as a mere temporal point of departure or foundation 
for the cultivation of ethical attributes, but as constitutive modes of the entire moral developmental process 
that would evolve through time and space. They embody certain suitable patterns of thought and awareness 
for each cultivating episode, patterns that would grow through time if consistently developed. See Zhaolu 




1.2  Qi, the Heart-mind and Zhia 
According to Chan,4 Mencius follows the established view of his time in 
conceiving qi5 as a flux of vital energy that constitutes and shapes human beings as a 
whole. 6 This includes the center of our affective and cognitive processes,7 and of control 
                                                 
4 Through an in-depth examination of Mencius 2A: 2 and its commentaries, as well as the Guodian texts, 
Chan gives a very insightful account of the relationship between the heart-mind and qi, and their respective 
functions in the Mencian self-cultivation process. See Alan K. L. Chan, “A Matter of Taste: Qi (Vital 
Energy) and the Tending of the Heart (Xin) in Mencius 2A2” in Mencius: Contexts and Interpretations, 42-
71. Henceforth referred to as “A Matter of Taste.” I have also consulted Nivison’s reading of 2A: 2 in 
“Philosophical Voluntarism” in The Ways of Confucianism, 121-32. 
 
5 The concept of qi is widely discussed in both ancient and modern Chinese philosophical discussion and 
has many meanings and implications. It is generally conceptualized as the vital vapor of the body 
associated with psychobiological states, and is linked to aqueous metaphors like water, rather than wind or 
air. A more detailed and extensive discussion of the concept of qi will be out of the scope of this thesis. To 
read more on qi, see A.C Graham, “The Early History of Yin-Yang and the Five Phases,” in Yin-Yang and 
the Nature of Correlative Thinking (Singapore: Institute of East Asian Philosophies, 1986), 70-92; See n. 
24 in Jeffrey Riegel, “Reflections on an Unmoved Mind” in Studies of Classical Chinese Thought: Papers 
Presented at the Workshop on Classical Chinese Thought held at Harvard University, August 1976, ed. 
Henry Rosemont Jr. and Benjamin I. Schwartz (Chico, Calif.: American Academy of Religion, 1980), 453. 
6As Xu Fuguan writes, “For the ancient Chinese qi meant not only the breath of respiration, but also the 
synthetic function of the human physiological body. It was the force that emanated from this global 
function. Qi is therefore the vital force. This is how qi in the human being becomes a spiritual and moral 
force, a driving and creative force for all human activities. It is through and by qi that life manifests itself 
(psychosomatic, intellectual, affective and ethical). Human life is thus “a life of qi.” Quoted from Kwong 
Lai Kuen, “The Qi in the Ethical, Social and Spiritual Domain” in Qi Chinois et Anthropologie Chrétienne, 




7 One must note that emotions in early Chinese context are not thought of as mere feelings; they are also 
some kind of cognitive/noetic perceptions. It is in this sense that the English terms “emotion,” “affective,” 
and “feeling” should be understood in this thesis. Fundamentally, affective and cognitive processes are seen 
as integrally connected, i.e., emotions go hand in hand with and structure our cognitive awareness of the 
world. In view of this, Antonio Cua suggests that four xins are akin to what we call “sentiments”—
judgments accompanied with feelings. See Antonio Cua, “Xin and Moral Failure: Notes on an Aspect of 
Mencius’ Moral Psychology” in Mencius: Contexts and Interpretations, 126-150. Chong argues that the xin 
of compassion (and presumably for other xins as well) is “not a concomitant part of the cognition, but may 
be said to constitute the mode in which the situation is registered or perceived.” See Chong Kim-Chong, 
“Mencius and the Possibility of Altruism in Early Chinese Philosophy”, in Altruistic Reveries: Perspectives 
from the Humanities and Social Sciences, ed. Basant K. Kapur and Kim-Chong Chong (Boston: Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, 2002), 28. For discussions on the relationship between affective and cognitive 
processes in early Chinese and Mencian thinking, see chapter 2 in Donald Munro, The Concept of Man in 
Contemporary China; David Wong, “Is there a Distinction between Reason and Emotion in Mencius,” 




of our behavioral patterns—the heart-mind. Thus, qi is deemed as substantively and 
functionally responsible for how we feel and act. The concept of qi is therefore of great 
import in Mencian theory for it forms and configures not only our bio-somatic 
dispositions, but in interconnection, also our psycho-behavioral ones. Said another way, it 
is conceived as an all-permeating creative and vivifying force that is commingled with 
our xing8 and qing.9  
 In furthering our understanding of the relationship between qi and our psycho-
behavioral dispositions in Mencian thought, Chan states that human qi forms the source 
of six major qing, the most fundamental of which is the qing of likings (hao 好) or 
dislikings (wu惡),10 which connotes the tendency to be attracted to, or be repulsed by 
certain things (As we shall see later, this particular qing is significant to understanding 
the psychology underlying Mencian self-cultivation). This qing of likes and dislikes (in 
short, our endowed “tastes” in life), which naturally gives rise to emotions like joy, anger, 
                                                 
8 With support from the Guodian text, Chan writes that for Mencius, “xing was understood primarily in 
terms of the affective/cognitive tendencies generated by qi…. The qi of pleasure, anger, sorrow, and grief is 
xing… Collectively these are referred to as xing; in relation to things, they are qing, the most prominent of 
which are the emotions.” See Chan, “A Matter of Taste,”54. Based on early Chinese texts such as the Nei 
Yeh 内業 chapter of the Guanzi 管子 Riegel also argues for the claim of qi as intricately bound up with our 
xing. He points out that the concept of qi in these texts was denoted as “the substance which determines the 
natural dispositions (qing),” which are intimately connected with what was conceived of as xing. Further, 
he contends that the relationship between qi and xing should not simply be thought of as causal in nature, as 
the cosmological theories in these literature did not distinguish between qi and the elements that it formats 
and determines, as well as the activities that it result in. As Riegel contends, when both Gaozi and Mencius 
use the terms “qi” and “xing,” they must have adopted the established usage in these literature in seeing qi 
and xing as formatively linked. Hence, qi and xing should be thought of as being bound up in a constitutive 
relationship. See n. 25 in Riegel, “Reflections on an Unmoved Mind”, 453-54.  
 
9 In this thesis, qing, when it is a term by itself, shall denote what is thought of as de facto about the human 
condition and experience, which includes our emotions, senses, appetites etc.  
 
10 As Chan writes, the Zuozhuan affirms that there are six “qi” (identified as yin, yang, wind, rain, darkness, 
and light) that lay the foundation of the cosmos, including the nature of things. With regard to the nature of 
man, these six qi form and structure six main affective/cognitive tendencies that can move the heart-mind 
in different directions, the most basic of which is the tendency to like and dislike certain things. See Chan, 
“A Matter of Taste”, 51 & 57. 
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compassion etc,11 underlies the setting of zhia. Zhia   has been translated by many as 
“direction (or directedness),” or “intentionality” of the heart-mind,”12 which can be 
rendered as the aims we have in relating and interacting with the world and particular 
others, and which are manifested in terms of behavior, action, and words.13  
Based on Chan’s reading, we can trace out a sequential order in which qi 
influences zhia; qi informs us with a certain taste, which when galvanized by the 
stimulation of certain happenings, will converge to set the heart-mind into a certain zhia 
of seeking (or avoiding) certain things, which we experience phenomenologically as 
certain emotional states. To give a concrete illustration, we can posit that a taste for being 
esteemed by others informs the qing of human beings.14 Thus, when a person perceives 
himself as being disregarded by another, his qi, in giving rise to emotions such as anger 
or indignation, may move the heart-mind into a certain zhia, such as one that aims at some 
form of verbal or physical redress against his antagonist.  
                                                 
 
11 According to Chan, the Zuozhuan stated that “pleasure or gladness is born of likes, and anger is born of 
dislikes…. The things one likes [referring especially to life] bring joy, and the things one dislikes 
[especially death] bring sorrow.” This is backed up by one of the Guodian bamboo texts, the Yucong er, 
which stated that dislikes arise from xing, which in turn give rise to anger. Ibid., 51.   
 
12 Some scholars have translated zhia as “will,” which seems to suggest a component within the human 
constitution, which is separate from the functions of the heart-mind and sensory/appetitive organs, and 
specifically designed for organizing and determining our orientation and aims. Others, such as Shun and 
Van Norden, argue that zhia just is the heart-mind in some direction or aiming at something. See Shun, 
Mencius and Early Chinese Thought, 66-67; Bryan Van Norden, “Mengzi and Xunzi: Two Views of Human 
Agency,” 115-16. Due to the fact that passages in the Mencius provide no evidence of another faculty 
besides our heart-mind and senses/appetites, I follow Shun and Van Norden’s translation and interpretation 
of zhia.  
 
13 According to Shun, zhia  “can refer to general aims in life as well as more specific intentions, and they 
can be established, nourished, altered, and attained.” See Shun, Mencius and Early Chinese Thought, 66. 
 
14 Consider Mencius 6A: 7, where Mencius says that “All men share the same desire to be exalted.” As I 
understand Mencius from this passage, his view is that human beings in general are endowed with a taste 
for being held in at least some regard by others. This idea is similar to John Dewey, who writes that “it is a 
desire of every individual for some acknowledgement of himself…. and the deepest urge of every human 
being to feel that he does count for something with other human beings and receives a recognition from 
them as counting for something.”  See “Individualism, Old and New” in John Dewey, The Later Works of 
John Dewey, 1925-1953, v.5, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press), 239. 
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Chan’s treatment also points out that Mencius, like many others of his time, 
deems qi as highly dynamic and responsive to almost every happening in our life. To 
explain more clearly, because of our myriad qing of likings and dislikings, virtually every 
aspect of human activity and experience will stimulate and influence qi movements. For 
example, when we feel hungry, see beautiful people, exercise, solve crossword puzzles 
etc. To quote Chan, “dongxin is simply part of the human condition.”15 The irregular and 
constant-shifting motion of qi implies that the heart-mind is frequently consolidated into 
different zhia. The heart-mind, in being set by the mere motility of qi, therefore does not 
have a fixed set of directions or aims.  
Nonetheless, zhia can also determine qi’s movement if it is devoted to or focused 
on a single thing (zhuanyi專一). As Chan writes, qi and zhia are mutually influential with 
an interchangeable leader-follower relationship. If one is concentrated, blocked (yi 壹),16 
it would assume control and the other would follow its commands. Chan’s reading is 
based on what Mencius says in 2A: 2: “If zhia is concerted or concentrated, then it moves 
qi. If qi is concentrated, then it moves zhia (志壹則 動氣，氣壹則動志也).”17 Ideally 
though, in the context of Mencian self-cultivation, the heart-mind through its zhia should 
always be at the helm to govern the movement of qi. The reason for this will be explained 
later. 
                                                 
15 Ibid., 51. 
 
16 The notion of yi has been taken to mean “being blocked” or “concentrated.” Most commentators follow 
one interpretation or the other with some variations. However, Chan suggests that the two interpretations 
are not really that different. As he argues with support from the Shuowen, yi is connected with the character 
hu 壺, a flask-like container, and this projects the imagery of qi being bottled up or blocked. When blocked, 
qi converges into a single focal point. See Chan, “A Matter of Taste,” 48. 
 
17 Translation from Chan. Ibid., 47. 
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The discussion presented so far shows Mencius sharing with his contemporaries a 
certain picture of “qi” and its effects on patterns of human thought and action. 
Nevertheless, Chan submits that Mencius departs from them in viewing qi as not just as 
psychosomatic conception,18 but as “a source of moral excellence” as well. It is for this 
reason that Mencius allocates to qi a more expansive role in his theory of self-cultivation, 
making it significantly distinctive from his philosophical peers, one of which is Gaozi. In 
the next section, I shall discuss Mencius and Gaozi’s differing views on human qi and 
how these views impact their understanding of the mechanics of self-cultivation. 
1.3  The Issue of Moral Directedness:  Internal versus External 
In Gaozi’s view, “xing does not show any preference for either good or bad just as 
water does not show any preference for either east or west (人性無分於善不善也， 猶水之
無分於東西也),”19 that “appetite and sex is xing (食色，性也),”20 and that “yi is external, 
not internal (義，外也，非内也).”21 Most likely, as Chan thinks, these interconnected 
claims of Gaozi are based on his view on qi, identified as essentially the stirrings of the 
                                                 
18 Riegel notes that Mencius may referred to the Nei Yeh in his treatment of qi and its relationship to other 
concepts of self-cultivation, but “nowhere adopts the purely physiological conceptualization found” in it. 
See Riegel, “Reflections on an Unmoved Mind,” 449. 
 
19 Mencius 6A:2. 
 
20 Mencius: 6A:4. 
 
21 Ibid. In 6A:4, Gaozi also writes that “Benevolence is internal, not external (仁, 內也, 非外也).” Some  
commentators find Gaozi’s characterization of xing as appetitive and sensory in nature to be incongruous 
with this claim. Shun reduces this incongruity by suggesting that Gaozi’s idea of benevolence does not 
point to anything ethically inherent in us, as it seems to denote love for only our immediate kin and not 
towards others. As Gaozi writes in the same passage, “My brother I love, but the brother of a man from 
Ch’in I do not love. This means that the explanation lies in me. Hence I call it internal (吾弟則愛之，秦人
之弟則不愛也∶ 是以我為悅者也，故謂之內).” From a classical Confucian viewpoint, as Shun submits, 
Gaozi’s idea of benevolence does not seem to have any substantive ethical connotation. See Shun, Mencius 





“blood qi (xueqi 血氣),”22 which is responsive to the stimuli of phenomena pertaining to 
our survival and sensory/appetitive gratification. The likes and dislikes emanating from 
such qi are neither moral nor immoral; the blood qi by itself will only set the heart-mind 
into amoral directions, such as seeking objects like food and beauty that maintain or 
augment the efflorescence of life. 
With this view of qi and its effects on the heart-mind, Gaozi thinks that we cannot 
rely on the spontaneous, indeterminate movement of qi to set the heart-mind into a zhia 
that is congenial for self-cultivation. And it is probably based on such a view that Gaozi 
avers that to make morality (ren yi 仁義) out of xing is like making cups and bowls out of 
the willow (以人性爲仁義，猶以杞柳爲桮棬).23 In seeing a strong analogy between 
channeling our characteristic tendencies towards ethical courses and configuring the 
willow into the shapes of cups and bowls, what Gaozi wants to convey is that we have to 
use exogenous means to manipulate the movement of qi and the directional gravitation of 
the heart-mind towards goodness. 
Most likely, the exogenous means that Gaozi refers to is yan 言, as can be inferred 
from his maxim on the goal and method of self-cultivation (conveyed to us by Mencius in 
2A: 2): “If one does not get it from yan, one does not seek it in the heart-mind; if one 
does not get it from the heart-mind, one does not seek it in qi (不得於言，勿求於心；不得
                                                 
22 See Chan, “A Matter of Taste,” 55.  The compound term “xueqi” can be understood as the basal qi that 
constitutes our organic nature, which drives the sustenance and maintenance of our vital activities. It is also 
linked to our temperament, and its movement can excite us into excessive emotionalism. Consider what 
Confucius says in 16.7: “There are three things the gentleman should guard against. In youth when the 
blood and qi are still unsettled he should guard against the attraction of feminine beauty. In the prime of life 
when the blood and qi have become unyielding, he should guard against bellicosity. In old age when the 
blood and qi have declined, he should guard against acquisitiveness.” See D.C. Lau, trans., Confucius: The 
Analects (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1979), 140 
 
23 Mencius: 6A: 1. 
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於心， 勿求於氣).” 24 According to David Nivison and Jeffery Riegel, yan for Gaozi does 
not refer to “speech” or “ordinary talk” as in modern Chinese parlance.25 Rather, it refers 
to the doctrinal instructions or formal teachings of some ethical tradition or school of 
thought. As Shun contends, Gaozi’s idea of yan pertains primarily to doctrines regarding 
yi.26 Since Mencius goes on in the passage to criticize Gaozi for failing to understand yi 
because he regards yi as external (wai 外), it follows that Gaozi’s axiom concerns yan’s 
influence on our seeking of yi. 
In Chan’s treatment, the first part of Gaozi’s maxim (“If one does not get it from 
yan, one does not seek it in the heart-mind”) is predicated on his view that ethical aims 
and directions are to be obtained specifically from learning and understanding yan. As 
Chan points out, this pedagogical process occurs by the utilization of our 
“consciousness,” i.e. the heart-mind’s capacity to know (zhijue 知覺). 27 What Gaozi 
wants to say then by the first part of his maxim is that we must utilize this capacity of the 
heart-mind to attain knowledge of yi from yan so as to set zhia towards yi. For Gaozi, it is 
only through implanting into the heart-mind knowledge of yi and its standard 
requirements from sources of yan that zhia will be established properly. By conforming to 
                                                 
 
24 I am following Chan’s translation here. See Chan, “A Matter of Taste,” 46. 
 
25  See Nivison, The Ways of Confucianism, 104 & 127; Riegel, “Reflections on an Unmoved Mind,” 439. 
One must note that for Nivison and Riegel, this sense of “yan” pertains specifically to how Gaozi uses it. It 
might not necessarily pertain to how Mencius uses it. 
 
26 See Shun, Mencius and Early Chinese Thought, 116. Shun supports his contention with the observation 
that after proclaiming his proficiency over Gaozi in knowing yan, Mencius criticizes Gaozi for not 
understanding yi. Also, in the context of 2A: 2, Mencius’ idea of yan concerns the understanding of yi. 
Thus, it is likely that “yan” in Gaozi’s axiom refers to doctrines about yi. For Shun’s discussion of Gaozi’s 




27 Chan agrees with Huang Zongxi that “for Gaozi, qi is essentially the operation and movement of xin- 
consciousness or one’s capacity to know.” See Chan, “A Matter of Taste,’ 53. 
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yan, we know determinatively what we should aim at in our practice of yi. Extrapolating 
from this interpretation of Gaozi’s axiom, Chan submits that what Gaozi means by his 
claim “yi is external” is that we need to artificially impose directedness towards yi in our 
patterns of thought and action by rigorous adherence to the dictates of certain ethical 
doctrines.  
According to Chan, the second part of Gaozi’s maxim (“If one does not get it 
from the heart-mind, one does not seek it in qi”) supports the first by asserting the 
erroneousness in thinking that the orientation of the heart-mind towards yi can be sought 
from the influence of qi motility on the workings of the heart-mind. In other words, 
Gaozi thinks that that “the ‘internal’ operation of xin [the heart-mind] and qi cannot by 
itself establish the proper course that one should take.”28 For Gaozi, the heart-mind’s 
capacity to know is ultimately dependent on yan to be filled up in the right way. Left to 
its own devices without input from yan, it would not acquire any knowledge that can set 
us towards yi. And since qi requires “external” ethical guidance itself, we should not 
think that qi can move the heart-mind into the proper zhia; its stirrings can only influence 
the heart-mind towards amoral directions. 
As written in 2A: 2, Mencius rejects the first part of Gaozi’s maxim (though he 
accepts the second part for reasons to be clarified later). According to Chan, Mencius 
thinks that Gaozi is mistaken about the source of yi directedness. For Mencius, yi is 
“internal (nei 内)” as the natural workings of the heart-mind can establish us into a zhia 
that pertains to yi.29 As Chan suggests, Mencius’ claim on the internality of yi30 is linked 
                                                 
28 Quoted from Chan. See Chan, “A Matter of Taste,” 53. 
 
29 This is probably related to what Mencius says in 6A: 6 “Seek and you will get it; let go and you will lose 
it (求則得之，舍則失之),” and 7A: 3:  “Seek and you will get it; let go and you will lose it. If this is the 
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to his distinctive view on the nature of man’s qi, which certain qing distinctive to man 
emanates from.  
In Chan’s treatment, Mencius holds that the qing of liking yi—i.e. an attraction to 
things related to yi—arises from certain spontaneous movements of qi. Put in another 
way, the human palate is naturally informed with a preference for such objects. Chan 
substantiates his view with Mencius 6A:7. Here, Mencius writes that just as our common 
organs share certain relishes, such as the eyes’ zest for beauty, there is also a flavor that 
naturally pleases our heart-mind: “Thus lia 理 (pattern, principle) yi 31 please my heart in 
                                                                                                                                                 
case, then seeking is of use to getting and what is sought is within yourself  (求則得之。舍則失之；是求
有益於得也，求在我者也).” For a different interpretation of Mencius’ debate with Gaozi on the 
internality/externality of yi, see Chong Kim Chong, “Mengzi and Gaozi on Nei and Wai” in Mencius: 
Contexts and Interpretations, 103-25. 
 
30 Chan also considers two possibilities for Mencius’ assertion of the internality of yi. The first is that there 
are certain ethical dispositions within the heart-mind that are formed from a different substance from qi. 
These dispositions, when cultivated, would transform qi and regulate it into the zhia of seeking yi. The 
internality of yi here would refer to the role of the heart-mind’s own constitutive tendencies, independent of 
qi, which can be harnessed to galvanize qi into the proper direction. As Chan argues, this interpretation of 
the internality of yi seems highly implausible for it posits a separation of heart-mind and qi. As he writes, 
the heart-mind is itself qi, and any ethical disposition would itself be formed by qi.  
The second interpretation moves from a constitutive account into a functional one. Here, the heart-
mind can be thought of as a qi-constituted organ or faculty that can think (si 思).  Si here is interpreted as 
the deliberation or reflection of the heart-mind to generate and get an understanding of yi (A different 
function of si will be given in chapter 2 and elaborated in chapter 5). In other words, the activity of si can 
generate notions of rightness and wrongness, which indicate the ethical directions that we should take. With 
its thinking ability, the heart-mind is different from, though interrelated with, other qi-constituted organs, 
which cannot think and are thus passive with respect to the kind of objects that attract them and which they 
would seek. When the heart-mind activates its thinking powers, it is able to know what is yi or not yi.  With 
this knowledge, it can seek objects of yi nature. Hence, with its powers to achieve yi knowledge, the heart-
mind can “internally” set qi into the proper zhia.  
For Chan, this interpretation works insofar as it does not see the qualities of the heart-mind for 
commanding qi into proper zhia as being constituted by another substance than qi itself. Nevertheless, it 
opens itself to Gaozi’s criticism that in the final analysis, yi is still external. According to Chan, Gaozi can 
agree with Mencius that the heart-mind is distinct from other organs because it can think, and that the 
thinking of the heart-mind is crucial for garnering an understanding of yi so as to direct qi into the zhi of 
seeking yi. Nevertheless, the thinking of the heart-mind can neither take function in an a priori manner, nor 
take place within an epistemological vacuum; it must rely on the experiences within and sources from the 
external world to produce ethical knowledge. From this, Gaozi can argue that many of the essential 
experiences and sources for ethical knowledge come from learning doctrines and teachings. Thus, the 
understanding of the heart-mind cannot be sought from solitary deliberation, but from a deliberation of 
what one has learnt from yan. In other words, Mencius has to adhere to Gaozi’s maxim— “If you do not 




the same way as meat pleases my palate (故理義之悅我心， 猶芻豢之悅我口).” What 
Mencius is saying is that we naturally like human affairs (as well as other states of the 
world) to accord with orderly and harmonious patterns; we are naturally pleased by 
consonance and balance in the dynamics of our interactions and interrelatedness with 
others. And due to this liking, the heart-mind in certain emotional states is predisposed to 
favor the rectification or setting right of situations that are perceived as falling short of 
such consonance and balance. In other words, the heart-mind forms intentions pertaining 
to yi because of its attraction to liayi. 
 Accordingly, Chan contends that for Mencius, the directedness of the heart-mind 
towards yi emanates from the natural movement of qi. Indeed, it is most likely that 
Mencius also thinks that the operation of qi in terms of generating our qing of likes and 
dislikes and their accompaniment of emotions, is also responsible for directing the heart-
mind towards other ethical attributes, such as ren. That said, I follow Chan in contending 
that insofar as the four xins are certain emotive modes of the heart-mind, their emanation 
must also be based on qi and the qing of likes and dislikes.32  
To explain further, it is due to the distinctive workings of human qi that heart-
mind is endowed with an inherent taste for things (such as states of affairs and relational 
patterns) pertaining to lia yi. It is because of such a taste that the heart-mind possesses 
certain sensitivities, and it is because of such sensitivities that qi will move it into 
compassion, shame etc. in response to (at least some of) certain phenomena we perceive. 
For example, in 2A:6, Mencius writes that  “no man is devoid of a heart sensitive to the 
                                                                                                                                                 
31 Lia has also been translated as “order” or “reason.” Generally, it refers to a rationale principle or pattern 
that structures the cosmos into an orderly and harmonious pattern either on a universal basis, or in a 
specific context.  
 
32 Chan, “A Matter of Taste”, 71 n. 71. 
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suffering of others (ren jie you bu ren ren zhi xin人皆有不忍人之心)”. With such a 
prefigured sensitivity, the heart-mind will vibrate empathetically and compassionately (at 
least momentarily) to the perception of a child about to fall into a well, presumably 
because it becomes aware and is averse to the pain and suffering the child will go through. 
In its compassionate mode, the heart-mind will converge into certain aims, such as the 
aim of doing something that concerns the child’s welfare, which evidently for Mencius, 
are aims that pertain to ren, and aims that guide episodes of our cultivating process.  
Hence, Mencius’ registration of the four xins as part of our shared experience of 
having aims pertaining to aspects of the ethical ideal can be traced to his view of qi and 
the qing of likes and dislikes. The natural operation of our qi-aroused qing of likes and 
dislikes renders possible self-cultivation, as they can move the heart-mind into emotions 
that are modes of intentionality directed towards the seeking of ren, yi, li and zhi. For 
Mencius, our moral orientation is therefore set by our natural attraction to certain states 
of affairs and patterns in certain emotional states.33  
Nevertheless, one can ask why Mencius disapproves of yan as setting the proper 
directedness of the heart-mind. To answer this, we need to discuss the concept of 
budongxin, which is an important part of both Gaozi and Mencius’ theory of self-
cultivation. 
 
                                                 
33 Even though Mencius believes that all heart-minds share an incipient preference for ethical things, he 
does not state that they naturally share equally strong preferences.  In other words, Mencius might not think 
that we are equally sensitive to compassion (shame etc.), though the “thicker” ones can exert effort to 
control their feelings into being as responsive as others. There is some support for this in 7A: 30 (cf. 7B: 
33), where Mencius says, “the sages Yao and Shun have it (benevolence) as their nature; Tang and Wu 
embody it.” As I surmise, whereas the extremely strong moral tastes of Yao and Shun make it easier for 
them to be benevolent, Tang and Wu have to work harder to achieve it because their preferential radar are 




1.4  Budongxin and the Nourishment of Qi 
In 2A: 2, Mencius enlightens Gongsun Chou on how to attain the ideal budongxin 
by discussing the courage (yong 勇) of Beigong You, Meng Shishe, Zixia and Zengzi.34 
For the purpose of this discussion, it suffices to say that Mencius’ explication of 
budongxin in relation to the courage displayed by these figures indicates that (a) the 
notion of budongxin is generally concerned with managing the heart-mind from being 
unstirred by qi by emotional modes such as fear (ju 懼), the root of which has to do the 
heart-mind being in a state of unease caused by confusion, doubt, or perplexity (huo惑), 
(b) the affective absence of perplexity, fear etc in the heart-mind gives it the potency to 
execute an aim it is set on, i.e. its zhia, (c) the ideal budongxin does not just denote a 
heart-mind that has a firm and determined zhia, but also one that focuses on ethical aims 
i.e., it is centrally directed to things which are moral, (d) the attainment of budongxin 
                                                 
34 According to Mencius, Beigong You is regarded as courageous because he will go on the offensive 
against anyone whom he feels has undermined or humiliated him in the slightest way, irrespective of that 
person’s social status or backing. Meng Shishe is thought of as courageous because he overcomes whatever 
fear he has to become unwavering in pursuing his goals, to the extent that even if he were to be defeated, he 
would still regard his endeavor as a victory. In Chan’s treatment, the courage of Beigong you and Meng 
Shishe depends on exerting and manipulating the blood qi. While Beigong you freely allows his blood qi to 
stir him into a vehement mood so as to achieve his aim (be it the avoidance of social disgrace or to gain 
victory over others), Meng Shishe reins in and guards his blood qi so as to secure fearlessness towards 
reaching his goals. Nonetheless, Mencius cannot decide which form of courage is superior, since both kinds 
of courage are not guided by any ethical concern. (Consider Confucius says in Analects XIV.4: “A 
courageous man does not necessarily possess benevolence.” See Lau, Confucius: The Analects, 124). 
Mencius then likens Meng Shishe to Zengzi, who purportedly hears from Confucius that “great courage” 
consists of this: “If on looking within oneself (zi fan 自反), one finds oneself to be in the wrong, then even 
though one’s adversary be only a common fellow coarsely clad, one is bound to tremble with fear. But if 
one finds oneself in the right, one goes forward even against men in the thousands.” Mencius then claims 
that even though Meng Shishe is like Zengzi in that their courage depends on guarding (shou 守) qi, his 
method of shou qi pales in comparison to Zengzi because Zengzi guards qi in a more important and 
essential manner (shouyue守約). For Mencius, talking about how these figures seek courage serves the 
rhetorical purpose of indicating that budongxin does not mean a heart-mind that is ethically pococurante, 
but a heart-mind that is stabile in its pursuit of ethical aims, and that the development of budongxin depends 
on guiding and nourishing qi towards furnishing support for such pursuits. For this reading of Mencius 2A: 
2, I have consulted Chan, “A Matter of Taste,” 43-49; Shun, Mencius and Early Chinese Thought, 72-76; 
Jeffrey Riegel, “Reflections on an Unmoved Mind,”436-46. See also Xinyan Jiang, “Mencius on Human 
Nature and Courage,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 24.3 (1997): 283-87.  
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depends on a process of nurturing (yang 養) qi as a source of motivational strength 
dedicated to supporting and executing the moral directedness of the heart-mind, and from 
(c) and (d), a simultaneous cultivation of both zhia and qi. Despite the basic concurrence 
of Mencius and Gaozi on (a) to (d), Mencius’ approach to realizing budongxin is not the 
same as Gaozi as their conceptions of budongxin differ in crucial respects. 
For Gaozi, budongxin refers to the heart-mind that is “unmoved” as a result of 
being well molded by ethical doctrines. In short, it is the heavily indoctrinated heart-mind. 
As discussed, Gaozi’s route of self-cultivation begins by inculcating into the heart-mind a 
pre-established set of aims concerning yi endorsed by some yan. To develop budongxin, 
the heart-mind in terms of its zhia must be focused on these aims to gain leadership over 
qi. Qi will then yield to the commands of zhia towards the execution of yan imposed 
“oughts.” Gaozian budongxin therefore depends on making qi obedient to a yan-
controlled zhia. As Chan writes, Gaozi’s proposed method of achieving budongxin is 
some kind of “force-feeding in the sense that the heart-mind must be given its direction 
based on an objective assessment of what ought to be the case.”35 In Gaozi’s view, qi 
must be categorically guided by directions extrinsic to its natural movements. Not only 
should qi not stir up mental disquiets like perplexity that will affect zhia, but also it 
should not be given any leeway in terms of influencing zhia. In Mencius’ view, Gaozian 
self-cultivation is fundamentally unsustainable as a program for nurturing qi and realizing 
budongxin for reasons that will be provided soon. 
In order to reach budongxin, Mencius writes that we must nourish the “flood-like” 
qi (haoranzhiqi浩然之氣 ).  Though Mencius finds it hard to put it in exact terms, he 
                                                 
35 Chan, “A Matter of Taste,” 59. 
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describes this flood-like qi as vast and unyielding (zhida zhigang 至大至剛), and if well 
sustained by uprightness and not harmed (yi zhi yang er wu hai以直養而無害), will “fill 
the space between heaven and earth (ze se yu tian di zhi jian則塞于天地之間).” Unless it 
“unites with yi and the Way (pei yi yu dao配義與道),” it will collapse. Also, it is attained 
through “accumulated rightness and cannot be appropriated by anyone through a sporadic 
show of rightness (是集義所生者，非義襲而取之也),”36and “will collapse if one’s 
behavior is found to be dissatisfying (qian 慊)37 to one’s heart-mind.”38  
As mentioned earlier, Mencius thinks that the source of the heart-mind’s 
directedness towards yi stems from the qi that underlies our taste for liayi. Thus, the 
flood-like qi is most likely the result of the nurturance of such a qi through a certain 
program.39 As Chan writes, “qi must be guarded and carefully nourished so that its 
natural preference of rightness would tower all over likes and dislikes and thus be in a 
position to direct the heart in all its activities.”40 In other words, the stage at we attain the 
                                                 
36 In Analects VI. 7, Confucius says of his disciple Yen Hui that, “in his heart for three months at a time 
Hui does not lapse from benevolence. The others attain benevolence merely by fits and starts.” See Lau, 
Confucius. The Analects, 82. Like Confucius, Mencius thinks that genuinely progressive moral cultivation 
depends on consistency in following the moral path.  
 
37 “Qian”  has been also been interpreted and translated by some commentators as “measuring up to the 
standards” of the heart-mind.  I prefer the translation of qian  as “dissatisfying” because of Mencius’ 
emphasis on our moral taste as the source of moral cultivation. Nevertheless, in order to satisfy the moral 
taste on an adequate level, it seems that we do need to conform to some standard. This will become 
apparent later in the thesis. 
 
38 Mencius 2A: 2. 
 
39 Mencius does not give any concrete account of how one comes into possession of the haoranzhiqi. 
According to Chan, there are some commentators who argue that Mencius views every human being as 
being already endowed with haoranzhiqi. I follow Chan’s interpretation that human beings, as a result of 
having a heart-mind, share a qi that can move one into seeking liayi, but whether our qi becomes haoran 
(directed to and supportive of moral pursuits at a great magnitude) is the result of a life-long process of a 
mode of self-cultivation, what Chan calls, in a general sense, “nourishing qi and tending the heart.”  Ibid., 
62.  
 
40According to Chan, this does not mean that the heart-mind rejects or neglects other human likings, such 
as good food and lovely homes etc., but that the way in which we seek them should always be supervised 
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flood-like qi is the stage where in all aspects of the human life, the qi that underlies our 
taste for ethical things has predominant power and influence in its motility to support the 
direction in which it moves the heart-mind into. It is in this way that the heart-mind can 
brim with resoluteness and potency in seeking yi in response to every situation; it finds 
itself “not moved” from and capable of executing aims concerning yi, even in the face of 
adverse circumstances such as the endangerment of one’s life. 
Hence, not only is the flood-like qi a powerful constitutive source for setting the 
heart-mind properly, it is at the same time a tenacious source of strength for driving and 
supporting the execution of the proper zhia. Chan describes it best when he says that “at 
this level, there is a sense in which the distinction between leader and follower breaks 
down.”41 In other words, zhia and qi become complementary and firmly supportive of 
each other. In developing a highly discriminating taste towards ethical patterns and 
attaining the flood-like qi, a person will no longer suffer from any discomfiture in 
seeking the ethical life due to the happy union of zhia and qi. 
Manifestly, the nurturance of qi to achieve budongxin in Mencius’ view does not 
mean that qi has to become a servile follower of zhia. To put it anthropomorphically, qi 
has a say in how it should be expended in its relationship with zhia. Furthermore, it 
should be allowed to grow cumulatively and fortify in good time to become a hardcore 
supporter of one’s moral endeavors. We cannot nourish qi into becoming flood-like all at 
once. The nurturance of the flood-like qi is slow and gradual. This means that Mencian 
moral development cannot be rushed by artificially manipulating and pressurizing qi. 
                                                                                                                                                 
and be supportive of our moral preferences. Mencian moral cultivation therefore does not necessitate the 
avoidance of other human goods, or the failure to enjoy them, but to align their procurement and enjoyment 
in accordance with a striving towards moral excellence. Ibid, 59-61.  
 
41 Ibid., 61. 
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This objection to artificial manipulation and pressurization of qi is most likely the 
point (or at least one amongst others) that Mencius wants to convey in his parable of a 
farmer who deliberately pulls at his plants to aid their growth, but ends up withering 
them.42 For Mencius, we simply cannot force-feed qi as it does more harm than good for 
qi nourishment and thus self-cultivation. As suggested by the parable, this happens when 
we pattern our life after some fixed schema of what is judged to be proper, to plan our 
activities to meet some presupposed ethical goals and compel ourselves to its demands. 
Such contrived and taxing exertions would result in us feeling “un-energized” and turned 
off when it comes to moral activities at some point in time. From Mencius’ perspective, 
Gaozi is advocating precisely this detrimental approach to self-cultivation. In teaching 
one to acquiesce to externally pre-determined aims, and making the reason and 
fulfillment for moral performances outside of and remote to one’s immediate awareness 
and concrete experiences, Gaozi resorts to a tense and suppressive mobilization of qi to 
seek and follow the ethical life. As Gaozi claims, one’s aim in respecting the elderly and 
according with yi is not to cause joy (yue 悦) to oneself, but to merely conform to 
exogenously accepted codes of yi conduct to please others.43 To use Alfie Kohn’s words, 
                                                 
 
42 Mencius: 2A: 2: “You must work at it [yi] and never let it out of your mind. At the same time, you must 
not forcibly help it grow either. You must not be like the man from Song. There was a man from Song who 
pulled at his rice plants because he was worried by their failure to grow. Having done so, he went on to his 
way home, not realizing what he had done. “I am worn out today,” said he to his family. “I have been 
helping the rice plants to grow.” His son rushed out to take a look and there the plants were, all shriveled 
up.” 
 
43 In Mencius 6A: 4, Gaozi says: My younger brother I love; the younger brother of a person from Qin I do 
not love. In this case, it is I who feels happy [because of my love for my brother]. Hence, I say that it is 
internal. I treat as elderly an elderly person from Chu, and I also treat as elderly my own elderly. In this 
case, it is the elderly person who feels happy. Hence I say that it is external (曰∶吾弟則愛之， 秦人之弟
則不愛也∶ 是以我為悅者也， 故謂之內。長楚人之長， 亦長吾之長∶ 是以長為悅者也， 故謂之
外也). As trans. in Readings in Classical Chinese Philosophy, ed. by Philip J. Ivanhoe, Bryan W. Van 
Norden (New York, NY: Seven Bridges Press, 2000), 142. D.C In understanding “yue” as explanation in 
the sense of shuo 说 (tell),  Lau translates  “shi  yi wo wei yue ze ye是以我為悅者也” as “This means that 
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“response to the other is therefore mediated and indirect, the act of meeting others’ needs 
being only a means to achieving the ultimate goal of acting in accordance with the 
[objective] principle.”44 For Mencius, this manner of applying qi to follow yi and other 
ethical patterns will eventually desiccate and damage qi as a force for moral practice and 
cultivation. 
Against Gaozi, Mencius thinks that we should not rely on an artificial import of 
principles with which to set ethical directives. Instead, any ethical direction or aim must 
be an outgrowth of our natural taste “buds”— the stimulation and galvanization of our 
distinctive qi in response to others under the right kind of environment.45 It is only then 
                                                                                                                                                 
the explanation lies in me” and “yi zhang wei yue ze ye以長為悅者也” as “This means that the explanation 
lies in their elderliness.” I suppose the two translations of yue may not be that far apart. In accepting that 
respect is due to the elderly irrespective of any emotional ties to them by virtue of the fact human 
elderliness is a quality that deserves respect, my reason for respecting the elderly is “external” in the sense 
that it is based on a decision to conform to an objectively established good (respect the elderly so to please 
and make them happy), rather than to realize some personally determined aim. In loving my younger 
brother and not someone else’s younger brother, because of my affection to the former and not the later, my 
reason for loving one’s younger brother is “internal” because it is based on a decision to realize some 
personally determined aim, and thus to do what I want and what will bring joy to me. See also n. 21in 
Chong, “ Mencius and Gaozi on Nei and Wai,” 123. 
 
 
44 Alfie Kohn, The Brighter Side of Human Nature: Altruism and Empathy in Everyday Life (New York: 
Basic Books, 1990), 260. 
 
45 Much has been said about how the Mencian moral development is an “organic” model and can be 
associated with agricultural images of growth. Though this is an apt (though incomplete) characterization, 
we must, as I believe, be more specific about what “organic” means in tagging it to the Mencian cultivation 
program.  
Firstly, an organic model posits that a certain nourishing force within the constitution of a thing 
will direct and drive its growth to a flourishing state only if certain environmental conditions are met. Thus, 
though a plant of a crop has its own natural qi force that directs and drives its survival, growth, health, 
aesthetics, etc, the nourishment of this force still depends on controlled, non-injurious environment of 
adequate water, fertile soil, right amount of pesticides etc. Similarly, the qi of human beings will direct and 
drive us towards our growth and flourishing only if it is nourished under the right environment. One, we 
need to be given access to basic economic and material goods to nourish the blood qi and prevent it from 
stirring excessively and ensnaring (xian ni 陷溺) the heart-mind into executions of “animal-like” behavior, 
such as engaging in violent (bao 暴) acts (Mencius 6A: 7). Two, we need to dwell and move in social 
surroundings (the starting point of which is the family) that continuously stimulates awareness of and 
attunement to others’ concrete needs and desires in an open fashion. This will stir up the qi that underlies 
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that seeking the ethical life is not regarded as having an end, but rather, it emerges as 
being an end, i.e., an end that realizes one’s own concrete fulfillment.46 Ends of such a 
kind will naturally impassionate oneself towards moral performances, and bring a sense 
of enjoyment in their engagement. And as Nivison argues, it is the enjoyability of 
morality that is the sine qua non of one’s continuation in moral participation and 
advancement.47 Put differently, the satisfaction gained in seeking following ethical 
directions that are “internally” set upbears and promotes the sustenance and growth of qi. 
                                                                                                                                                 
the heart-mind’s likes and dislikes, and keeps the heart-mind responsive to executing aims of negotiating 
others’ ever-shifting needs and desires, thus construing and reconstructing the significance and meaning of 
our relationship with others. To the extent that the provision of an appropriate environment is so vital to the 
nourishment of qi, whether the organic growth can proceed with ease and success depends on the caretakers 
of the environment. A crop of plants would be good if there is good farmer who knows how to attend and 
manage the right agrarian conditions. Likewise, human beings would grow towards the direction of 
goodness if and only if there are sages (in the role of kings) that care for the people by distributing food and 
other resources equitably among his people, and also expose us to the right social stimuli. 
 Secondly, in an organic model, the flourishing design of a thing arises out of an on-going active 
adjustment, rather than a passive conformation, to its nurturing environment. A plant actively seeks the 
right elements such as the warmth of the sun within proper surroundings to nourish its qi-force, which 
affects significantly its behavioral patterns and characteristics. Likewise, human beings must actively seek 
the right elements within proper surroundings conducive to nourishing their qi and heart-mind, such as the 
right food, exercises, teachers, concrete experiences and observation of things that act as stimuli that directs 
and redirects the xins and extends their application etc, all of which affect our behavioral pattern and 
character. What has been discussed here will be elaborated in chapter 5 and 6 of this thesis. I am indebted 
to Franklin Perkins for shaping my views here. See Franklin Perkins, “Mencius, Emotion, and Autonomy,” 
Journal of Chinese Philosophy 29: 2 (2002), 211-12 & 221-23.  
 
46 My reading of Mencius here is influenced by Dewey’s distinction between growth “as having an end” 
and “being an end.” For Dewey, growth is not a movement towards some pre-determined, externally 
imposed ideal goal, but an active response to the stimuli of a positive environment that directs and redirects 
oneself towards contextually set goals. See John Dewey, “Education as Growth,” in Pragmatism: A 
Contemporary Reader, ed. Russell B. Goodman (New York: Routledge, 1995), 99. 
 
47 Nivison argues that this does not mean that Mencius is a moral hedonist. “Enjoying morality” does not 
imply that we perform moral acts for the goal of attaining pleasure and delight; rather, enjoying the 
experience of moral performances is essential for making morality a continued pursuit of life. Nivison also 
highlights Mencius’ distinction between “putting into action benevolence and rightness (ren yi xing 仁義
行) ” and “acting through benevolence and rightness (xing ren yi 行仁 義).” While the former relates to 
doing good things simply because one is told that they are good (like what Gaozi preaches), the latter 
relates to doing good things because one draws on his natural inclination and preference. For Mencius, one 
can progress ethically only through the later sort of action. As Nivison writes, for Mencius “there is a 
significant moral difference between doing something, because it’s commanded by a rule I accept as a rule 
of right conduct and doing it because of my fully involved sensibility to the aspects of the case that make it 
right for me to do it. Only the latter sort of act is morally satisfactory.” See Nivison, The Ways of 
Confucianism, 99, 106, & 111.  
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For Mencius, to have one’s heart-mind truly budong—i.e. to become a committed, 
steadfast ethical agent—therefore depends on an “organic” and “responsive,” rather than 
a “mechanistic” process of qi application and nourishment.  In being mistaken about the 
source of our directedness towards yi, and consequently putting emphasis on the devices 
of yan to drill and still the heart-mind into certain directions, Mencius thinks that Gaozi’s 
notion of budongxin, though perhaps simpler and faster to achieve, will ultimately be 
unsustainable and short-lived.48  
That said, even though qi is the source of our moral orientation, Mencius states 
that one whose qi is not yet flood-like needs to make an effort to devote qi to executing 
ethical aims on a regular, consistent basis, and not in a haphazard, intermittent fashion. 
But, given the expansive range of our endowed likings and dislikings, and the inevitable 
distractions and attractions of the external world, qi is always converging in different 
directions, giving rise to different qing, and configuring and reconfiguring our zhia. As 
Chan puts it succinctly, “so many likes and dislikes compete to dominate the heart-
mind.”49 That is why, as stated earlier, that Mencius agrees with Gaozi that “if one does 
not get it from the heart, one does not seek it in qi.” The idea that qi is the source of our 
moral orientation does not mean we give qi autonomy in shaping zhia. 
Indeed, in Chan’s treatment, Mencius thinks that huo results from allowing qi to 
spontaneously and freely influence zhia. For Mencius, due to the irregular and random 
movement of qi, our qing of likings and dislikings are not prefixed in any specific pattern 
                                                 
48 According to Mencius in 2A: 2, Gaozi achieves budongxin earlier than him. Nevertheless, Mencius does 
not think Gaozi’s budongxin will last as it is “not rooted in a correct conception of yi,” which according to 
Shun, is what Mencius is implying in his claim that qi will collapse unless united with yi and Dao. See 
Shun, Mencius and Early Chinese Thought, 119.  
 
49 Chan, “A Matter of Taste,” 57. 
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or order of hierarchy. In short, the administrative operation of the heart-mind is not 
prefigured in giving primacy to its own taste over the tastes of other organs. 
Consequently, a passive reliant on qi movements will result in the heart-mind being 
perplexed as to how to balance, prioritize, and satisfy our diverse and multiple likings in 
a way that will beget qi nurturance and our moral growth. Faced with equally favorable 
(or unfavorable) options, we will find ourselves in constant dilemmas, and shackled in a 
shilly-shally mode of praxis. Feelings such as fear will arise and affect our ability to 
execute our ethical aims. When this happens, qi will never be nurtured into the flood-like 
qi. Worse still, qi might even channel us into ethically deviating directions on an 
excessive basis, with the eventual effect of the heart-mind losing its moral taste. When 
this happens to any individual, he loses his source of moral directedness, and becomes cut 
off from the process of moral growth.  
To arrest the perturbative influence of qi on our bearings in life, and to ensure that 
it remains as a reliable source of motivational strength for executing ethical aims and 
plans, it is vital for Mencius that the heart-mind actively tends to a concentration on the 
proper zhia. In concentrating the proper zhia, the heart-mind will assume leadership of qi 
to control it from being a distortive influence, and to channel its application towards 
moral actions and cultivation. The implication here is that the heart-mind needs to be 
attentive to the four xins—the phenomenological concomitance of our taste for ethical 
patterns—so as to remain steadfast to ethically oriented thoughts, action, and 
development.50 By holding on and referring to the four xins on a regular introspective 
                                                 
50 Chap. 38, Bai xin 白心 of the Guanzi states that: Should you wish to suppress [your personal qualities], 
you must concentrate on fundamental feelings (duan 端 ) and be steadfast in preserving them.” See W. 
Allyn Rickett, trans. Guanzi: Political, Economic, and Philosophical Essays from Early China, v.2 





                                                                                                                                                
basis, one can synchronically and diachronically attend to the aims that one must focus 
on in order for the cultivating act and process to continue.51  
 
also refers to our “primal breath,” i.e. qi. It is thus possible, though admittedly speculative, that Mencius 
might have been influenced by this stanza in the Guanzi to think that if we concentrate our fundamental 
feelings (i.e. the four xins, which as argued are qi-based), we concentrate qi to preserve it as a cultivating, 
rather than a distortive, force. 
 
51 I follow Lu in submitting that there is a referential relationship between the four xins and ren, yi, li, and 
zhi, in the sense that introspectively, one can refer to the four xins to become aware of the direction towards 
ren, yi, li, and zhi. See Lu, “The Mencian Theory of Human Xing Reconsidered,” 160. 
Chapter 2 
      
 
Mencius: Motivation and Agency  
 
 
2.1  Introduction 
 
We have seen that in Mencius’ view, the heart-mind, by virtue of being constituted by a 
distinctive kind of qi, is prefixed with a moral orientation. This orientation refers to the 
heart-mind’s natural attraction towards ethical things which, when activated in response 
to external stimuli, manifests itself as certain emotional modes exemplified by the four 
xins. We have also stated how the heart-mind needs to be mindful or attentive to the four 
xins so that zhia can control qi from influencing the heart-mind into seeking improper 
aims, and can command qi towards the execution of proper ones. In this chapter, I want 
to use these gleanings to gain a better understanding of Mencian moral agency, 
particularly as regards its operation and concerns.  
2.2  Van Norden on Mencian Moral Agency 
Fish is something I desire (yu 欲); bear's paw is also something I desire. If 
I cannot have both, I will forsake fish and select bear's paw. Life is 
something I desire; righteousness is also something I desire. If I cannot 
have both, I will forsake life and select yi. Life is something I desire, but 
there is something I desire more than life. Hence, I will not do just 
anything to obtain it (生亦我所欲，所欲有甚於生者，故不為茍得也). 
Death is something I loathe (wu惡), but there is something I loathe more 
than death. Hence, there are troubles I do not avoid. If it were the case that 
someone desired nothing more than life, then what [means] that could 
obtain life would that person not use? If it were the case that someone 
hated nothing more than death, then what would that person not do that 
would avoid trouble for himself? From this we can see that there are 
means of obtaining life that one will not employ. From this we can [also] 
see that there are things which would avoid trouble that one will not do. 
Therefore, there are things one desires more than life and there are also 
things one loathes more than death (是故，所欲有甚於生者，所惡有甚於
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死者). It is not the case that only the worthy person has this heart-mind; all 
humans have it (非獨賢者有是心也，人皆有之). The worthy person simply 
never loses it (6A: 10)1 
 
In Van Norden’s treatment,2 we can construct a plausible view of Mencian human 
agency from this portion of 6A: 10. As he argues, one of Mencius’ claims here is that 
human beings must seek that which they desire (yu 欲) the most. An alternative phrasing 
would be that it is our strongest desire that determines the course that one will pursue.3  
What Van Norden is saying is that for Mencius, only desires motivate our action, and that 
our behavioral decision in each situation is predicated and driven by our strongest desire. 
This receives support from the above passage: Though both yi and life are things which a 
person desires, the former will be what he seeks to obtain, and the latter what he forgoes 
in times of their incompatible satisfaction, if it is the case that he desires yi more.4 From 
this, it follows that choosing to seek yi over other things in a certain context depends on 
desiring yi the most.  
 According to Van Norden, two distinctive features of Mencian moral agency 
should be highlighted here: (1) Mencius assumes that “moral” desires naturally occur in 
                                                 
1 Translation (with some modifications) is from Ivanhoe, Van Norden, trans., Readings in Classical 
Chinese Philosophy, 146. 
 
2 Van Norden, “Mengzi and Xunzi: Two Views of Human Agency,” 119-110. 
 
3 According to Nivison, early Chinese discussions on action-theory typically refer to pursuing a course or 
adopting a “way,” or to fill a role that one judges best, rather than performing a specific act that one judges 
best. See Nivison, The Ways of Confucianism, 294. In this thesis, this is how the term “act” should be 
construed.  
 
4 It is interesting to compare Mencius’ position on moral agency to John Dewey, who thinks that moral 
choices are not “as in often thought, choices between doing one action that is quite attractive but obviously 
wrong, and another that is less attractive but obviously good.” Rather, a moral act is the “result of an excess 
of preferences,” its process as “the emergence of a unified preference out of competing preferences.” Faced 
with desirable alternatives, “between values each of which is an undoubted good in its place but which now 
get in each other’s way,” we must evaluate our immediate, concrete circumstances and reject goods that are 
the “nonvalues” within those circumstances. Quoted from Campbell, Understanding John Dewey: Nature 
and Cooperative Intelligence, 131. 
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us, which serve as the proper motivation for pursuing moral courses, and that (2) since 
Mencius holds that every person has the capacity to become good, but does not think that 
every single individual are born possessing the heart-mind of the worthy or the virtuous 
person (xian ze賢者)—the heart-mind that constantly desires ethical things the most, 
Mencius must have thought that there is some method or activity to transform these 
desires into our strongest desires, the purpose of which is for us to pursue moral courses 
with the right motivation on a regular basis. Both (1) and (2) are vital for understanding 
Mencius’ theory of self-cultivation. Let us consider these two features over the next two 
sections. 
2.3  Moral Desires and Proper Motivation 
From 6A: 10, we can see that at least some people in Mencius’ time contend that 
our strongest source of motivation emanates from our desire for life or self-preservation. 
Against this, Mencius claims that human beings can have desire-motivations more 
powerful than the aforementioned one, i.e. our “moral” desires, or our desires for things 
that concern ren, yi, li, and zhi. As argued by Van Norden, Mencius thinks that these 
moral desires are inborn in us; that is to say, they naturally arise or occur in us via certain 
external stimulation.  
 In my reading, moral desires for Mencius have their roots in the “tastes” of the 
heart-mind—the natural attraction of the heart-mind to ethical things. When the likings of 
the heart-mind are activated in response to the stimuli of certain circumstances, impulses 
of wanting or desiring certain things are evoked as certain emotional reactions. The 
emotional reactions of the heart-mind therefore have the function of moving us to seek 
actions pertaining to ren, yi, li, and zhi.  
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Van Norden also notes that for Mencius, it is a requirement to pursue a moral 
course from the appropriate motivation in order for the pursuit to be a cultivating 
process.5 Otherwise, all one does is to engage in “semblances of virtue.”6 In Mencian 
agency, it is imperative then that our aroused “moral” desires must prevail in strength 
over all concurrent desires when we pursue moral courses, if one is to seek shan ways for 
developing the ethical ideal. Specifically, Mencius is dead against acting morally from 
motivations that pertain only to our own interests, i.e. from desires that are self-
regarding.7 
 Consider 2A: 6 where Mencius argues that if a person sees a child about to fall 
into a well, his heart-mind will be moved to a state of compassion (at least momentarily) 
on a direct apprehension of the child’s eventual pain and suffering.8 This compassionate 
                                                 
5 See Van Norden, “Mengzi and Xunzi: Two Views of Human Agency,” 110. Many commentators have 
also compared Mencius’ tight connection between acting morally and acting from the correct motivation to 
Western philosophers’ views such as Aristotle. See for example Nivison, The Ways of Confucianism, 116-
118.  
 
6 In Van Norden’s reading, the point that Mencius wants to make in many passages such as 2A: 3 and 4B: 6 
is that to be genuinely engaged in moral behavior, one has to do so from the appropriate motives. See Van 
Norden, “Mengzi and Xunzi: Two Views of Human Agency,” 110.  As Sim Sock Hoon contends for 
Mencius, “morality is not just about behaving well but behaving well for the right motives.” See Sim Sock 
Hoon, “Education in Morality: A Confucian Response” in Moral Perspectives, ed. Chong Kim Chong 
(Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1992), 90. Applying Lee Yearly’s work to the Confucian 
framework, Jonathon Schofer writes that “semblances, or simulacra, of virtue are actions that appear to be 
virtuous but done out of habit, are based on incorrect motivations, or are results of simply following rules.” 
See Jonathon W. Schofer, “Virtues in Xunzi’s Thought,” in Virtue, Nature, and Moral Agency in the Xunzi, 
74; Lee Yearly, Mencius and Aquinas: Theories of Virtue and Conceptions of Courage (New York: Suny 
Press, 1990), 19-21, 67-72.  
 
7 See for e.g. Mencius 7B: 11 
 
8 As Chong notes, the heart-mind’s reaction to the perception of the danger of the child may simply be a 
more rudimentary feeling of “alarm and distress.” Regardless of whether “compassion” or “alarm and 
distress” captures more aptly the sense of feeling that Mencius is thinking of in his well parable, one can be 
sure that for Mencius, this feeling provides the source of a moral motivation. See Chong, “Mengzi and 
Gaozi on Nei and Wai,” n. 24 & 112. 
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mode of the heart-mind directs us to a concern for its welfare.9 Said another way, the xin 
of compassion evinces a desire for the welfare of the child, which may move us to 
prevent or alleviate its suffering.10 However, Mencius suggests that other motives may 
arise to prompt a person to save the child, such the desire to get in the good books of its 
parents, the desire to win the accolades of those at the scene, and the desire to relieve the 
vicarious distress one feels due to the unpleasantness of the child’s cries. These 
competing desires, which most likely originate from the likings or dislikings of our 
sensory and appetitive organs, may each move a person to save the child. Nevertheless, 
Mencius gives moral credence only to the motivating force that generates from the 
feeling of compassion. In Mencius’ view, acting to save the child from a desire for its 
welfare is different in its operative logic from acting from desires linked to our 
sensory/appetitive satisfaction, even if the behavioral translation or outcome may be the 
same. 
From the perspective of the person acting from a compassionate stance toward the 
child, the motivating force is directed primarily and specifically towards the condition of 
                                                 
9 I follow Chong in reading the xin of compassion as expressing “a direct concern for the child,” although 
Chong is wary about describing it as a desire for the welfare of the child, for fear for linking the aim of a 
moral action to the aim of seeking pleasurable states, much like what we do when we act on 
sensory/appetitive desires. As shall be shown for Mencius, sensual pleasure is not what we aim at when we 
act morally but is rather the spin-off of our moral actions, albeit a spin-off that is crucial for the cultivating 
process to continue. See Chong, “Mencius and the Possibility of Altruism in Early Chinese Philosophy,” 29, 
and “Mengzi and Gaozi on Nei and Wai”, 112-13. 
 
10 I follow Chong in reading the xin of compassion as expressing “a direct concern for the child.” Chong is 
however wary about describing it as a desire for the welfare of the child, for fear for linking the aim of 
moral actions to the seeking of pleasurable states, much like what we do when we act on sensory/appetitive 
desires. As shall be shown for Mencius, sensual pleasure is not what we aim at when we act morally but is 
rather the spin-off of our moral actions, albeit a spin-off that is crucial for the cultivating process to 
continue. Chong, “Mencius and the Possibility of Altruism in Early Chinese Philosophy,” 29. See also 
Chong, “Mengzi and Gaozi on Nei and Wai”, 112-13. 
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that particular child.11 To elaborate, when we act out of compassion to save the child, the 
reference point for doing so is the immediate and concrete connection with the child,12 
which very likely springs out of the experiential commonality of suffering.13 Said another 
way, a desire for the welfare of that child is produced because of the bond felt between 
oneself and the child. Due to our desire for this child’s welfare, we cannot transfer the 
rescue act to another person or delay it to another occasion. The desire for the welfare of 
the child is therefore a function of a living connection felt between oneself and the 
child,14 where this connection evokes a response of self reaching outwards to particular 
others, and communicates an integral mutuality of self with others through an awareness 
of “shared commonalities.” 
Nevertheless, we should not take this to mean that the self “fuses” with the other, 
in the sense that one loses sight of being an individual, unable to distinguish self from 
                                                 
11 I am building on Chong’s analysis in delineating the difference between the motives evinced by the xins 
and other kinds of motives that Mencius mentions in the well example. See Chong, “Mengzi and Gaozi on 
Nei and Wai”, 112. 
 
12  In this reading, the heart-mind is the organ through which we experience our intrinsic connectedness 
with concrete others, i.e., of how intrinsically, rather than instrumentally, one is related to others. 
 
13 As noted earlier, Mencius claims in 2A: 6 that “no man is devoid of a heart sensitive to the suffering of 
others. As I understand Mencius, his view is that our concrete experiences of suffering, which all human 
beings have in some way or to some degree, allow us to respond empathetically to people in states of 
distress, or who show other signs of suffering. Because of our shared experiences of suffering, “bu ren 不
忍 (unable to bear)” also involves an aversion to causing pain and suffering to other. Support for this can be 
seen in Mencius 7B: 31, where Mencius links “bu ren” to a desire not to harm others (wu yu hai ren zhi xin 
無欲害人之心).” For a more thorough discussion on this, see Shun, Mencius and Early Chinese Thought, 
49. 
 
14 As I submit, this is one of the reasons why Mencius criticizes Gaozi’s idea of following the precepts of 
yan to set moral ends. Suppose we follow Gaozi, whereby we simply help a victim because we feel we 
ought to do what a certain ethical doctrine tells us to do, rather than because of an emotional connection to 
that person. In Alfie Kohn’s analysis of a person characterized by a strong concern with rules and feelings 
of obligations, “such an individual may fail to recognize another’s distress correctly to begin with and may 
then help awkwardly or at the wrong times for lack of affective/cognitive attunement with the individual.” 
See Kohn, 259. It seems that for Mencius, the four xins and other emotional responses of the heart-mind 
direct us to the concrete concerns or needs of others, thus providing us with proper aims for self-cultivation. 
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other. Rather, because of the resonance of the interrelatedness between self and the other, 
one cannot reduce the rationale of acting from such a motive (the desire for the welfare of 
the child) to the uni-directional notion of benefiting either oneself or the child. What can 
be identified rather is “a state of interdependence whereby my distress can be relieved 
only if your distress is relieved.”15 The act of helping the child therefore occurs within a 
perspective of the “us,” rather than “I” or “you”16—It is not for my sake or your sake, but 
for my sake as connected with yours. Due to the bi-directionality of its motives, acting 
from a compassionate heart-mind serves to overcome the opposition and detachment 
between self and particular others. It facilitates the formation of an attitudinal conviction 
that self-realization necessitates positive interrelatedness. The xin of compassion, 
together with other emotional responses of the heart-mind, therefore breeds the view of 
seeing others and their good as invariably and inextricably bound up with oneself and 
one’s good. 
 Hence, in being driven to seek certain things or pursue certain courses from 
motives evinced by the emotional responses of the heart-mind, in particular the four xins, 
a person seeks to affirm the relationships that constitute him in a meliorative manner, and 
implicates himself closer in length and breadth with the human community at large. In 
other words, the four xins direct and move one to become receptive to establishing 
                                                 
15 Quoted from Kohn, The Brighter Side of Human Nature, 246. 
 
16 As Kohn submits, there can be four accounts of whom a person is trying to benefit in his act of helping 
someone: (1) me, (2) me because of you, (3) you, and (4) us. Kohn argues that the ability to move into an 
“us” perspective for pro-social behaviors calls into question the notion that human beings are necessarily 
selfish in the context of examining moral motivation. See Kohn, The Brighter Side of Human Nature, 239 
& 247. 
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patterns of reciprocally productive connections with ever-inclusive others17 as a mode of 
being in the world.18  
On the other hand, when a person moves out from a compassionate stance (which 
can happen during the experience of an event which triggers its manifestation), and 
becomes motivated to save the child from the other desires mentioned, he is directed to a 
concern for his own interests. For the desire to win the graces of the child’s parents or to 
win the accolades of those at the scene, the act of helping the child is for one’s benefit, in 
terms of the social rewards of enjoying favors from the parents or a good reputation. For 
the desire to stop the child’s cries, one also acts to benefit oneself, since the real point of 
helping the child is to improve one’s mood by relieving one’s distress.19 Because the 
reference point for acting on these desires is one’s own concerns and interests, and not 
the interconnection between oneself and the child, one can transpose the act of 
                                                 
 
17 As Tu describes, the Chinese classical understanding of self-realization requires the constant 
“harmonizing of self with an ever-enlarging network of relationships.” It is through such a ceaseless 
process that we fully realize our humanity. For a fuller picture of Tu’s views on Confucian self-realization, 
see Tu Wei-ming, “Embodying the Universe: A Note on Confucian Self-realization” in Self as Person in 
Asian Theory and Practice, ed. Roger Ames with Wimal Dissanayake and Thomas P. Kasulis (Albany: 
State University of New York Press 1994), 177-86 et passim. This is akin to Leon Eisenberg’s assertion, 
“one whose concerns extend beyond family and beyond nation to mankind has become fully human.” See 
Kohn, The Brighter Side of Human Nature, 150. Relational perspectives like egoism, nepotism, nationalism 
etc. are therefore impediments to human development in the Confucian framework. Nevertheless, as David 
Wong points out, Confucians think that people who stand in special relationships to us, such as our parents, 
friends etc, naturally have a stronger “ethical pull” than those who do not (possibly because they are bound 
up with our identities as persons) and ethical decisions ought to take into account of this. See David B. 
Wong, “Universalism versus Love with Distinctions: An Ancient Debate Revived,” Journal of Chinese 
Philosophy, 16. 2 (1989): 259. 
 
 
18 This is not unlike Carol Gilligan’s idea that beyond being concerned for the self and being concerned for 
others, there exists a “perspective [that] focuses on the dynamics of relationships and dissipates the tension 
between selfishness and responsibility through a new understanding of the interconnection between other 
and self.” As I contend, the four xins from Mencius’ viewpoint avail to us the kind of perspective that 
Gilligan is describing. See Kohn, The Brighter Side of Human Nature, 246. 
 
19 In Kohn’s analysis, the decision to relieve someone’s distress so as to relieve my own is taken from a 
“me because of you” perspective. Such a performance cannot be described as altruistic because the ultimate 
beneficiary of the act is still oneself—“meeting the others’ needs is, again, just a means to that end.” See 
Kohn, The Brighter Side of Human Nature, 241.  
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benevolence to another person or occasion that will also enhance one’s reputation, or 
interchange helping the child with taking some mood enhancer to relieve one’s personal 
distress. In other words, the act of helping the child can be substituted by other acts to 
satisfy these desires. Helping the child is but one means to one’s own end, rather than an 
end in itself. 
Thus, pursuing the welfare of the child from desires linked to our 
sensory/appetitive satisfaction comports one to view one’s relationship with the child in 
an instrumental and functional way. From a Confucian relational understanding of 
becoming human,20 such forms of relationality do not strengthen or shape our bonds with 
others in a manner that renders personal growth, even if what we do conform to culturally 
codified moral practices and norms.21 Furthermore, if self-regarding desires become the 
                                                 
20 In Confucian thought, the nature of the self qua human is not denoted as an isolated entity, but as a 
dynamical locus of relationships embedded in concrete socio-cultural contexts. In Ames’ words, 
“communal bonds are constitutive of personal identity.” See David Hall and Roger Ames, Thinking from 
the Han: Self, Truth and Transcendence in Chinese and Western Culture (Albany, N.Y.: State of University 
Press, 1998), 218. The self is therefore constituted by interdependent relationships in ever-shifting social 
contexts and by the way it participates in them.  
 From this metaphysical viewpoint of the self, Confucians see human flourishing as grounded in 
active social participation and community realization. We participate in and contribute to communal ideals 
so as to define and fulfill ourselves. Such a personal project has the concrete consequence of producing 
harmony and order in human affairs if done properly. The spirit of this human/moral growth is best 
encapsulated by Confucius’s maxim “In wishing to establish oneself, one seeks to establish others. In 
wishing to be enlarged oneself, one seeks also to enlarge others.” See Analects VI.6, James Legge, trans., 
“Confucian Analects” in The Chinese Classics (Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong Press, 1960), I, 194.  
 However, though the good of the self implicates affirming the good of others, it does not mean 
that we negate our own concerns, or submerge them under the will of the society. Rather, there should be a 
fruitful, integrative and equilibrated unification of self and other concerns. As Tu Wei-ming argues, “The 
prevalent view that Confucianism is a form of social ethics which particularly emphasizes human 
relatedness is basically correct, but it fails to account for the centrality of self-cultivation as an independent, 
autonomous and inner-directed process in the Confucian tradition.” Tu Wei-ming, Confucian thought: 
Selfhood as Creative Transformation, 55. For accounts of the Confucian self, read Tu Wei-ming, 
Confucian thought: Selfhood as Creative Transformation; David L. Hall, Roger T. Ames, Thinking 
Through Confucius (Albany: State University of New York Press (1987). 
 
 
21 In 7B: 37, Mencius singles out the “village honest man (xiang yuan 鄉原)” (cf. Analects XVII) as an 
example of a person who engages in specious forms of virtue. The “village honest man” is someone who 
takes the criterion of moral achievement as conforming to codified moral practices and norms to please 
others so as to attain communal harmony, and who does so for his own interests. For Mencius, not only is 
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chronic motivations for one’s behavior, one will gradually become “dehumanized.” We 
will become so obsessed with our personal profit (li利) 22 that we lose sight of the 
interconnectedness of self and others, to the extent that we become incapacitated for a 
broader, more meaningful narrative of existence. Hence, when such motivations compete 
with the desire-motivations of the four xins, they should be suspended from the thought 
processes that rouse us into action. As a force of agency, they should not form any 
relationship with comporting with moral practices.23  
From what has been discussed, we see that for Mencius, the desires evinced by 
the four xins serve as the proper motivation for seeking moral courses of action as they 
orient us to a schema of relationality that facilitates our moral growth. Expressing a 
natural motivational force directed towards ren, yi, li, and zhi, they are ineluctably the 
emotional modes of the heart-mind that we have to engage in for practicing and attaining 
the ethical ideal.  
2.4  The Function of Si  
As Van Norden argues, Mencius’ thesis that the human motivational structure 
consists of naturally occurrent desires directed towards goodness does not entail the claim 
that people are properly motivated in any immediate or existent context of action. 
                                                                                                                                                 
the “village honest man” not virtuous, but is also considered as “an enemy of virtue.” He would never grow 
morally for his understanding and motivation for morality are way off target. 
 
22 According to Lau, Confucius (as well as Mencius) sees human fixation on personal profit as the strongest, 
the most persistent and the most insidious reason as to why people stray or fail to follow the moral path. 
See Lau, “Introduction” in Confucius: The Analects, 20. See also Mencius 7A: 25, in which Mencius says 
that the distinction between Shun and Zhi is that while the former actively works towards the good of self 
and others, the latter works relentlessly towards his own profit.  
 
23 One should note that Mencius does not deem acting out of self-regarding motives as wrong in itself. It is 
only when self-regarding and moral (i.e. other-regarding) motives clash that the former should be rejected 
as a basis for action. They are therefore not necessarily opposed. 
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Depending on the stimulation of our concrete circumstances, desires that orient us away 
from the good of those circumstances can occur as our strongest motives, and as 
claimants that stir us to action. Our moral desires, if stimulated within those 
circumstances, are therefore not naturally efficacious in moving us towards seeking moral 
courses. Acknowledging the reality of spontaneously shifting forces of agency, one of the 
chief reasons why Mencius thinks people fail to traverse very far down the moral path is 
that they simply follow whatever they desire most in shifting circumstances. 24  
According to Van Norden, the detrimental effect of acting on whatever strongest 
desire we have at each moment is indicated in the rest of 6A: 10.25 What seems to be 
highlighted here is the behavioral pattern that the common human individual (let us 
denote him as X) engages in. In one situation, X may desire yi over life, presumably 
because the xins, in particular the xin of shame and self-loathing, are dominating the 
operation of the heart-mind.26 Consequently, X will not accept food for his sustenance if 
                                                 
24 David Wong criticizes Van Norden for reading Mencian moral agency as the view that we act simply on 
the strongest desire of the moment. As shown, this is not really Van Norden’s interpretation. See David 
Wong, “Xunzi on Moral Motivation,” in Virtue, Nature, and Moral Agency in the Xunzi, 142 & n.18. 
 
 
25 “A basket of food and a bowl of soup— if one gets them then one will live; if one doesn't get them then 
one will die. [But] if they're given with contempt, then [even] a wayfarer will not accept them. If they're 
trampled upon, [1] then [even] a beggar won't take them. [However,] when it comes to 10,000 bushels [of 
grain], then one doesn't notice li and yi and accepts them. What do 10,000 bushels add to me? [Do I accept 
them] for the sake of a beautiful mansion? for the obedience of a wife and concubines? To have poor 
acquaintances be indebted to me? In the previous case, for the sake of one's own life one did not accept 
[what was offered]. In the current case, for the sake of one's own life one did not accept [what was offered]. 
In the current case, for the obedience of a wife and concubine one does it. In the previous case, for the sake 
of one's own life one did not accept [what was offered]. In the current case, in order to have poor 
acquaintances be indebted to oneself one does it. Is this indeed something that one can't stop [doing]? This 
is what is called losing one's fundamental heart (ci zhi we shi ji ben xin此之謂失其本心).” Ivanhoe, Van 




26 It is plausible that for Mencius, the xins have to reinforce one another in order to be strong enough to 
motivate one to do what is good. For instance, compassion for another person may not move one into 
action but compassion combined with shame will. By saying that even beggars take note of li and yi before 
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acceptance violates yi, especially if the way the food is given does not accord with 
culturally accepted—i.e. ritually codified—ways of giving something to X’s social class 
or role. Such a response is inclusive of even those at the lower end of societal 
stratification; a wayfarer may reject food given with abuse, while a beggar may reject 
food that is trampled upon. 
Nevertheless, in another situation, X may accept food (possibly in the context of 
being bribed) to satisfy whatever self-regarding desires arise in him, such as a desire for 
spousal obedience, with scant regard over what acceptance accords with the rites and yi. 
For Mencius, X loses his fundamental heart-mind (benxin 本心) in this particular instance. 
This refers most likely to neglecting the primal morally orientating emotional modes of 
the heart-mind— the four xins— as the basis for one’s action, and thus their far-reaching, 
resonating effects on one’s characteristics. In this case, X neglects the influence of the 
xins on the operations of his heart-mind in allowing his desire for spousal obedience to 
override his moral desires in terms of motivational potency. Consequently, he is not 
mindful and unconcerned about engaging in a self-centered act that contravenes li and yi 
in this episode of his life.  
In my reading, what Mencius is implying in 6A: 10 is that if the desire-
motivations supplied by X’s xins can be stronger than his desire for survival in a certain 
case or context, then surely they can be stronger than any other self-regarding desire 
formed in other contexts, such a desire to attain beautiful houses, spousal obedience etc, 
                                                                                                                                                 
accepting food, Mencius seems to be implying that the xins of “declining-and-yielding” and “shame and-
self-loathing” are working together to overcome the strength of their biological urge to eat, and affect them 
into following good courses. However, I can provide no conclusive proof, textual or otherwise, for this 
reading, although it fits with the rest of Mencius’ thinking. 
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which may move us away from seeking the proper course in those contexts.27 In other 
words, it is always an actualizable possibility for desires supplied by actively operational 
xins to be our strongest motivation, and hence as the driving force behind our actions. By 
not constantly holding on to the four xins, and simply following whatever emotions and 
desires spontaneously inundate the workings of the heart-mind, X seeks ethical aims and 
courses in a piecemeal and haphazard fashion. X’s behavioral pattern, as Nivison argues, 
therefore results from “a failure to intervene and steer the [proper] functioning of his 
desires,” allowing them instead to function of themselves in the mechanics of our agency 
in a passive manner.28 As discussed in chapter one, such a pattern of behavior cripples or 
stagnates ethical development in Mencian thought; the Way of X—i.e. Way of the 
common man—will never result in any significant or genuine moral growth and 
achievement. 
 To prevent oneself from slipping into such a behavioral pattern, Mencius writes 
that we must actively use the heart-mind’s power to “si (思).” In Van Norden’s analysis, 
the technical conception of “si” in Mencian thought pertains to an act of concentration, 
which “involves at least (1) an awareness that they [the four xins] exist within us, and (2) 
a concern for their nurturing.” 29 For Van Norden, “si” is an activity that is of great import 
                                                 
27 In Van Norden’s reading, Mencius’ point in 6A: 10 is that passively following whatever desires form in 
us may lead us to engage in an injudicious behavioral policies, such as sacrificing our desire for integrity 
for our desire for “secondary” goods such as a nice house in one case, but not for the fundamental and far 
more important desire for our own survival in another case. See Van Norden, “Mengzi and Xunzi: Two 
Views of Human Agency,” 111. I suspect however that this may not be what Mencius wants to say in this 
passage. As I argue later in the thesis, sound practical thinking or judgments of such kinds to maintain 




28 See Nivison, Ways of Confucianism, 141. 
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to the workings of Mencian moral agency; its process strengthens the moral desires 
evinced by the four xins.  
In line with Van Norden’s interpretation, I read “si” as an activity of directing our 
attention to something, which has the function of making us mindful of the four xins and 
concerned about the attainment of their desire-ends and thus the nourishment of these 
xins.30 In other words, constant engagements in si for Mencius bring into play the 
predominant influence of the xins on the workings of the heart-mind, which results in our 
moral motivations being constantly stronger than our non-moral ones. To further 
elucidate what “si” is about, let us look at 6A:15. 
Gongduzi asks: “Though equally human, why are some men greater than others? 
“He who is guided by the interests of the parts of his person that are of greater 
importance is a great man; he who is guided by the interests of the parts of his 
person that are of smaller importance is a small man.” 
 
“Though equally human, why are some man guided one way and others guided 
another way?” 
 
“The organs of hearing and sight are unable to si and can be misled by external 
things. When one thing acts on another, all it does is to attract it. The organ of the 
heart can si. But it will get [virtue] only if it does si; otherwise, it will not get it. 
This is what Heaven has given me. But if one makes one’s stand on what is of 
greater importance in the first instance, what is of smaller importance cannot 
displace it. In this way, one cannot but be a great man.”31 
                                                                                                                                                 
29 See Van Norden, “Mengzi and Xunzi: Two Views of Human Agency,” 112-14. The technical sense of 
“si” in the Mencian framework has also been translated as “reflect,” or “think.” I follow Van Norden’s 
reading for reasons that will become apparent in chapter 5.  
 
30 Van Norden, “Mengzi and Xunzi: Two Views of Human Agency,” 112. Van Norden’s treatment of “si” 
is in part based on his interpretation of 6A: 6: “Benevolence, propriety, observance of the rites, and wisdom 
are not welded on to me from without. I definitely have them. It’s just that I haven’t concentrated si upon 
them. Hence, it is said, “Seek and you will get it. Abandon it and you will lose it (仁，義， 禮， 智，非
由外鑠我也， 我固有之也，弗思耳矣。故曰∶ 求則得之，舍則失之).” 
 
31 公都子問曰：鈞是人也，或為大人，或為小人，何也？ 
    孟子曰：從其大體為大人，從其小體為小人。 
    曰：鈞是人也，或從其大體，或從其小體，何也？ 
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As Mencius writes here, our sensory and appetitive organs cannot si, and will 
automatically move us towards getting things which they like, unless the heart-mind si 
and prevents us from responding to whatever our sensory organs are attracted to.32 This 
reiterates the idea that Mencius does not envisage moral agency as a process of following 
of whatever we desire most at each moment.  In Nivison’s words, “[moral] action in this 
sense is not just a cresting of the wave of desire, even including moral desire….”33 It is 
therefore our responsibility to si so as to manage our desire-motives on a collective 
level.34 Said another way, through active engagements in si, the heart-mind focuses on 
things in the modes of the four xins, which energizes our moral desires into our strongest 
motivation so that naturally occurrent non-moral desires do not have the biggest say as 
the force of our agency, and move us into morally improper courses. 
As Van Norden argues, this is for Mencius how we grow morally by 
accumulating ethical acts that stem from the appropriate motivation. Through the process 
of si, the four xins grow in motivational scope and potency, in the sense that we gradually 
extend (tui 推) what we do (or do not do) in some cases to all cases that call for the right 
emotional responses.35 Thus, instead of being responsive to the ox’s suffering but not to 
                                                                                                                                                 
    曰：耳目之官不思，而蔽於物。物交物，則引之而已矣。心之官則思，思則得 之，不思則不得        
也。此天之所與我者。先立乎其大者，則其小者不能奪也。此為大人而已矣。 
 
32 With regards to this reading, I have consulted Nivison, The Ways of Confucianism, 87 & 136.  
 
33 Ibid., 136. 
 
34 Ibid., 91-119 & 133-48.   
 
35 See Van Norden, “Mengzi and Xunzi: Two Views of Human Agency,” 113. 
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the people’s suffering, 36 instead of averting shame by not suffering the ignominy of 
accepting food given inappropriately in one context and not another, a person maintains 
proper emotional engagement with others and fulfills his relational roles at all times. In 
this way, what we want to do and what we ought to do converges, rather than the former 
being subjugated and controlled by the latter. To sum up the gist of this section, when a 
person actively manages his desire-driven agency through si, i.e. when what he 
constantly desires most pertains to what is shan, he embarks on an intrinsically enjoyable 
cultivating process towards greatness (da 大)—practicing and nourishing oneself towards 
attaining the ethical ideal.37  
2.5  Si and the Concentration of Zhia 
I want to propose here that it is through the activity of si that the heart-mind in 
terms of its zhia becomes properly focused. My contention here is not something which 
Mencius explicitly says or implies in the Mencian texts, but gels well and is consistent 
with his thoughts on self-cultivation.  
                                                 
36 See Mencius 1A: 7. We should take note here that from Mencius’ viewpoint, showing compassion to 
human beings is deemed as easier than showing compassion for animals. Also, observing one’s sense of 
ritual propriety for reasons that does not concern personal survival should be easier than observing one’s 
sense of ritual propriety for matters regarding personal survival. Mencius’ claim seems to be that the 
extension of moral behavior is a lot less difficult and disagreeable than what we think.  
 
37 In 7B: 25, Mencius says: “The desirable is called good (ke yu zhi wei shan 可欲之謂善). To have it in 
oneself is called “true (xin 信).” To possess it fully in oneself is called “beautiful (mei 美),” but to shine 
forth with this full possession is called “great.” To be great and be transformed by this greatness is called 
“sage;” to be sage and to transcend the understanding is called “divine (shen 神).” In Sim Sock Hoon’s 
reading, Mencius’ view here is that moral development proceeds through a cumulative sequence of stages, 
the first stage of which is “ke yu zhi wei shan.” See Sim, “Education in Morality: a Confucian Response,” 
in Moral Perspectives, 87-95. In my reading, “ke yu zhi wei shan” (to have the capacity for generating 
desires directed towards ren, yi, li, and zhi) is not much a stage, but more of a necessary quality with which 
we pave our way towards moral achievements. For other readings on this line, see Richards, Mencius on 
the Mind: Experiments in Multiple Definition, 40; Antonio Cua, Ethical Argumentation: A Study in Hsun 
Tzu’s Moral Epistemology (Honolulu; University of Hawaii Press, 1985), 191 & n. 61. 
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 We have analyzed that for Mencius, our endowed organs’ natural attraction to 
many and various things in the world produce a numerosity of emotions and desires 
within us, of both moral (other-regarding) and non-moral (self-regarding) sorts. The 
stronger the attraction, the stronger the desire, and thus, the things that attract us or what 
we desire the most would move us into seeking their obtainment. Since what attracts us 
the most depends on our circumstances and their stimulative impact on our organs, our 
strongest motivation is frequently shifting between moral and non-moral ones. As noted, 
a person who simply acts on whatever he desires most in each circumstance would not 
progress morally, since he would not be moved into seeking moral courses from the 
appropriate motivation on a regular basis.  
As discussed in chapter one, Mencius thinks that, qi, as the source of our qing of 
likes and dislikes and other affective stirrings, is constantly impacting the heart-mind’s 
directedness or zhia when it concentrates in response to virtually all of our happenings. Qi 
therefore has a substantial influence on our habits of thought and action. Through its 
spontaneous, unconstricted motion, qi would at times move the heart-mind towards 
ethical aims and pursuits, but would also move the heart-mind towards other aims and 
pursuits, such as wealth, sex etc at other times. Hence, if qi is allowed to determine zhia 
by its reactive movements, we would vacillate between dedicating our time and efforts to 
moral and to non-moral aims and pursuits. For Mencius, giving free rein to the stirrings 
of the blood-qi excessively might even lead us into deviating from or a total abandonment 
of the moral Way. To counteract this, zhia must become properly concentrated in order to 
guard qi from moving the heart-mind into morally improper directions, and to implement 
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and nurture qi towards a gradually increasing support of moral or morally supportive 
pursuits.  
 I render for Mencius, any person who simply pursues what he desires most and 
consequently remains as an ethically ordinary person is most likely someone who does 
not actively concentrate the proper zhia and therefore lacks a firm command of his qi 
force. In simply seeking what one is attracted to and wants most, i.e. to passively follow 
whatever likes and dislikes and emotions qi configure the heart-mind into to determine 
what one pursues, one relies on the irregular, erratic movements of qi to set zhia on a 
general or specific basis, rather than the other way around. The effect of not actively 
supervising our moral desires into being stronger than our non-moral ones therefore runs 
parallel to the effect of not actively concentrating the proper zhia to control qi’s 
movements, and command it as a reliable source of motivational strength for executing 
moral actions. 
Keeping this reading in mind, we have also seen that the heart-mind performs the 
administration of its desire-motives by engaging in the activity of si, which keeps the 
heart-mind preoccupied with something in the modes of the four xins, and enhances the 
influence of these emotional modes on the mechanics of our agency. It is this way that 
our moral desires become more powerful than our non-moral desires to predominate the 
heart-mind as the stirrings for one’s action in not just some but in all contexts. That said, 
in consideration of the ideas that (1) the heart-mind’s likes and dislikes is the source of 
our proper zhia, (2) these likes and dislikes are manifested as the four xins when evoked, 
and (3) that si’s function is to effect the heart-mind’s attentiveness to and concern about 
something in the modes of the four xins so as to be moved into seeking ethical courses, I 
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submit that (4) the concentration and nurturance of the proper zhia, which controls the 
movement and execution of qi for cultivating ourselves, occurs by one’s efforts at si.  
This interpretation gains support when we consider that, as Shun points out, the 
Shuowen at times links the meaning of “zhia” with “to record something” or “to bear in 
mind” something.38 Furthermore, A.C. Graham has also noted that pre-Han texts did not 
yet distinguish the graphical depiction of “zhia” from “zhib 誌 (to record, remember, or 
bear in mind).” Based on this observation, Graham contends that in early Chinese 
thought, there might not be much difference between aiming at something and bearing 
something in mind.39 For these reasons, Shun argues that it is highly probable that for the 
heart-mind to be aiming at, or directed toward an object or end, the heart-mind has to (to 
some extent) bear in mind and think about this object or end.  
In view of the connection between zhia and zhib, I surmise that when the heart-
mind si, it directs and centralizes its focus on concretely desired moral aims, which arise 
from the activation of its natural likes and dislikes and their associated emotions. And it 
is through focusing on these aims that effectuates the concentration of the proper zhia. If 
we accept this, we can see that active engagements in si for Mencius underlie the activity 
of nurturing our zhia and qi. Through si, the associated desire-motivations of the xins will 
become stronger than other (self-regarding) desire-motivations so that we will act in ways 
that cultivate oneself. Concomitantly, to actively si implies that we are actively 
concentrating zhia for the purpose of controlling the potentially negative influence of qi, 
and executing qi as a driving and supportive force for realizing our aims. As discussed, 
                                                 
38 Shun, Mencius and Early Chinese Thought, 67. 
 
39 Ibid., 67. See also A. C Graham, “Relating Categories to Question Forms in Pre-Han Chinese Thought,” 
in Studies in Chinese Philosophy and Philosophical Literature (Albany: State University of New York 
Press, 1990), 406-7.  
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the result of engagements in si is that we extend our morally significant emotional 
responses to more and more contexts and situations, and become a steadfast—rather than 
a sporadic—follower of the moral Way. Put differently, an active engagement in 
concentrating on certain things within the modes of the four xins permits one to 
accumulatively and slowly nurture zhia and qi towards achieving the flood-like qi and 
budongxin.   
The upshot of this is that the importance of si, as an activity that occurs through 
individual responsibility and effort, cannot be overstated within the Mencian framework 
of self-cultivation. It channels our qing to an active and dynamically nurturing process, 
and moves us into following moral courses not out of the wrong motivations, or out of 
doctrinal dictations, but out of the kind of motivations that allow us to flourish humanly 
through bonding with others in an enjoyable fashion. For Mencius, active efforts at si 
facilitate the proper utilization of the four xins, and differential efforts at this activity 
separate the morally good, the bad, and the mediocre.40 In chapter 5, I will discuss further 
Mencius’ technical terms of “si” and “tui” and their relationship to show the difference 
between Mencian and Xunzian moral agency, as well as to defend Mencius from Xunzi’s 
critique of his idea of the cultivating act. 
2.6  The Congeniality of Qing for Ethical Growth 
 At this point, it is evident that though Mencius thinks that human beings have 
certain qing or natural41emotional dispositions that embody a source of direction and 
                                                 
40 Following his point that the activity of si is vital for us to cultivate ourselves, Mencius writes in 6A: 10: 
“There are cases where one man is twice, five times or countless times better than another man, but this is 
because there are people who fail to make the best of their native endowment  (或相倍蓗而無筭者，不能
盡其才者也).” 
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41 In my understanding of the Mencian framework, the four xins are “natural” in the sense that they are not 
acquired through the kind of educational (doctrinal) process akin to what Gaozi advocates. It does not mean 
however that they are not acquired through experience within a socialization process. Thus, Mencius’ claim 
of the four xins appeals to an existential and experiential, rather than an essentialist and innatist 
understanding of human qualities. For a good discussion on the concepts of “essentialism” and “innatism,” 
Paul E. Griffiths, “What Is Innateness?,” The Monist, 85.1 (2002): 70-85; James Maclaurin, “The 
Resurrection of Innateness,” The Monist, 85.1(2002): 105-30.  
 Like Michael LaFargue, I do not think we should approach Mencian thought from the (Western) 
classical “nature versus nurture” debate, whereby one juxtaposes “human nature” with “socialization” for 
philosophical discussion. This is because such a mode of analysis does not seem to pertain to Mencius’ 
thinking on xing. Rather, as LaFargue suggests, a better way to read Mencius would be to frame his views 
within the practical context of self-cultivation. To be more specific, we compare (in terms of both 
similarities and differences) Mencian moral cultivation, as a process of developing resources that we “feel” 
are internal to us, with the view of moral cultivation as a process of incorporating resources that are 
perceived as “external” to common experience. The “internal resources” that Mencius spells out as the 
basis of moral cultivation, however, are probably shaped by a socialization process. They are elements that 
have roots in both nature and nurture. Thus, in this approach, Mencius is preaching a certain mode of self-
cultivation (informed by a particular moral vision) to pre-socialized people.  See Michael LaFargue, “More 
“Mencius-on-Human-Nature” Discussions: What Are They About?” in China Review International, 10.1 
(2003), 1-28 et. passim.   
 Ames and Shun also argues for the socialized nature of the four xins. As Ames argues, only “an 
adult with experience in the world” would register compassion (or distress) upon seeing a “ruzi 儒子” 
(which connotes a child that is still at weak and young, unable to fend for himself without the support of 
others) about to fall into a well (2A: 6).  In other words, only someone with sufficiently mature socio-
personal experiences will realize and be moved by the impending danger or fatality that the ruzi faces. See 
Ames, “The Mencian Conception of Ren Xing,” 162. Furthermore, Shun also argues that Mencius seems to 
implicitly hold that the four xins have to be nurtured by an appropriate upbringing to develop into the 
cultivating forces that they are. To support this, he points out that King Xuan’s compassionate response for 
the ox is prompted by his association of the sacrificial ox with “an innocent person being led to execution” 
(1A: 7). This affective/cognitive connection presupposes some acquired conception of innocence on the 
king’s part. Shun also argues that in order for a wayfarer to reject food given in a socially abusive manner, 
he has to have some idea of what constitutes abuse to a person of his social status (1A: 7). See Shun, 
Mencius and Early Chinese Thought, 188-91.  
 However, one notable passage seems to oppose this reading. In 7A: 15, Mencius states that we 
have the liang zhi良知 and liang neng 良能 for loving parents and respecting elder brothers as the starting 
point for cultivating ren and yi, and that these feelings of love and respect are not acquired through xue 學 
(learning, studying) and lü 慮 (deliberate). Some commentators take “liang” to mean “original,” and this 
seems to imply that the four xins and their powers are purely a “given” by Nature. Nevertheless, Shun 
contends that “liang” can also mean “good,” and this meaning fits in with a lot of passages in the Mencius 
and other early Chinese texts. The notion of “liang” therefore cannot give any conclusive support for 
interpreting the powers of the four xins as not acquired through socialization. The question then centers on 
what Mencius means by denoting love for parents and respect for elder brothers as not acquired through 
xue and lü.  Does this indicate that the four xins are not learnt or impacted by social-personal experiences? 
Shun provides a good response to this by arguing that the love and respect which Mencius talks about may 
not yet be ethical in form. Shun writes that in this passage, love for parents may simply be a rudimentary 
attachment to individuals from whom one has received nurturance, and that respect for elder brothers may 
simply be some mode of deference to familial figures that we perceive as authoritative. As such, these 
feelings still have to be refined through learning and reflecting (for example, what constitutes the well-
being of parents) before they can be expressed in ethical forms. Ibid., 189.   
 My thoughts on this matter are this. The four xins, as inchoate emotional impulses of attachment 
and deference, may have a biological basis, but it is our socio-personal setting that provide the objects 
(parents, elders etc), concepts (innocence, suffering) etc to which they are attached to. Thus, our social-
personal setting must work with the naturally arising four xins so that they will develop into emotional 
resources that are congenial for self-cultivation. To reiterate, the four xins are products of an interaction 
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motivation towards shan courses and ways, it is through our own efforts at si that channel 
these naturally occurrent emotions and their desire-motivations into effective forces for 
seeking patterns of actions and words that enrich human experience and engender 
development towards the ethical ideal. Nevertheless, the belief that our qing endows us 
with the neng for self-cultivation, in the sense that they evince a positively present 
capacity congenial for inclining us towards ren, yi, li, and zhi, is most likely the reason 
why Mencius rejects other views of xing in his time and propounds the goodness of 
xing.42 
                                                                                                                                                 
between hereditary and environment. Furthermore, insofar as we are nurtured through generalizably similar 
socio-cultural settings (in particular the familial context whereby we first experience love and concern for 
others and a hierarchical mode of existence), the four xins, with respect to the objects that stimulate their 
manifestation and the desires formed within their manifestation, are generalizably similar in pattern for 
each person. The “socially acquired” nature of the therefore does not imply that they are non-
universalizable.  
 Going back to Mencius’ claim of the four xins as not gained through xue and lü, I believe that the 
translations of xue and lü as “learn” and “deliberate” respectively have misguided us into thinking that the 
four xins are not “acquired” through the influence and impact of our socio-cultural environment. As Lau 
points out, the activities of xue and lü are concerned with gaining moral insight from accumulated wisdom 
and narratives of human experience transmitted by sages, which are in large embodied as ritual principles. 
See Lau, “Introduction” in Confucius: The Analects, 45. From this, I submit that the claim of the four xins 
as not “acquired” through xue and lü does not mean that they are “unacquired” in the sense of being 
“unsocialized.” Instead, they are “unacquired” in the sense that their powers (with respect to their 
experiential evincing of moral aims and motives) are not generated through a process of learning and 
reflecting on ritual precepts. Nevertheless, as this thesis shall show, we still have to rely on the rites for the 
proper expression of the four xins (in terms of timeliness, form, and activity), without which we cannot 
engage in proper moral actions that result in harmony and order between self and other. 
 
42 In 6A: 6, Gongduzi (probably a follower of Mencius) lists three alternative positions on xing to Mencius’ 
own. The first is Gaozi who, as mentioned, states that there is neither good nor not-good in xing. As 
examined in chapter 1, Gaozi believes that human qing (informed by the “blood qi”) has no ethical 
direction of its own and has to be guided by yan. For Gaozi, xing is therefore morally neutral and any 
ethical characteristic is an external imposition.  
 The second (unattributed) view claims that that xing has the capacity to become good (ke yi wei 
shan) and the capacity to become bad (ke yi wei bu shan): “If one has Wen or Wu for king, then one would 
be given to goodness; if one has Yu and Li for king, one would be given to cruelty.” I take this view to 
mean that our capacity for development is an open system passively susceptible to the influence of external 
factors. How one turns out, whether good or otherwise, depends essentially or solely on whether one lives 
in a favorable or unfavorable environment, in particular, the socio-cultural-material infrastructure instituted 
by one’s government. As I shall show, Mencius views the environment as important to success in moral 
cultivation, but unlike the unattributed view, it is not the sole determinative or the most important factor. 
Our active efforts and know-how in harnessing and nurturing the emotional responses of the heart-mind in 
adaptive response to our environment add up the ingredients for moral success for Mencius.  
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In contradistinction to Mencius, Xunzi does not think that our qing is configured 
in any congenial way for directing us towards shan for practicing and attaining 
sageliness. From his perspective, our natural emotional dispositions by themselves evince 
neither the source of direction nor motivation for self-cultivation. In the next two 
chapters, I shall discuss why Xunzi asserts that qing must be supplemented with 
                                                                                                                                                 
 There is another line of interpretation on the second view of xing subscribed to by Huang Zongxi, 
Graham and Shun etc. According to them, the view that our xing has the capacity to become good or bad 
means that there are two kinds of emotional dispositions in xing— one points to goodness, while the other 
to badness. As Shun points out, this interpretation is not only compatible with the idea that moral variation 
is due to environmental variation, but it also shows us how the second view is distinctly different from 
Gaozi’s neutral view of xing.  Shun further argues that while Mencius accepts the first half of the second 
view (ke yi wei shan), he rejects the second half because the badness of a person’s character is not due to 
badness in his constitution but is a result of “failing to develop a common constitution directed towards 
goodness.” See Graham, ‘The Background of the Mencian Theory of Human Nature,” 22-23 & 33; Shun, 
Mencius and Early Chinese Thought, 220-22. My interpretation is similar to Shun’s line of interpretation in 
two ways: (1) Mencius does not reject the notion that environmental conditions are important to moral 
cultivation, and (2) Mencius wants to emphasize that badness is in large part a failure to actively develop 
the four xins. While no decisive evidence can support either my interpretation or Shun’s (as Shun admits to 
his own), I believe that Mencius’ main disagreement with the second view is that it pays little or almost no 
attention to the idea that differential moral outcome is also determined by differential human effort at self-
cultivation, particularly as regards the active control of our environmental exposure and efforts at 
psychological act of si (to be discussed in chapter 5).  
 The third (also unattributed) view on xing states that “There are those who are good by nature, and 
there are those who are bad by nature. For this reason, Xiang could have Yao as prince, and Shun could 
have the Blind man for father, and Qi, Viscount of Wei and Prince Bi Gan could have Chou as nephew as 
well as sovereign.” By pointing out empirical facts that bad men may appear under good rulers, and that 
good sons may appear under bad fathers., this view of xing seems to imply some sort of genetic 
determinism in the context of moral cultivation, in the sense that a person cannot control (either through a 
certain activity or shift in environment) whether he becomes good or bad. As Graham suggests, there is a 
passage in the Lu si chun chiu that links up with this position, of which Mencius possibly knows: “Zihuazi 
says: “True kings enjoy the conduct by which they rise to kingship, the ruined likewise enjoy the conduct 
by which they are ruined”…. If this is so, true kings have a taste for order and duty, the ruined likewise 
have a taste for tyranny and idleness. Their tastes are not the same, so their fortunes are not the same.” See 
Graham, “The Background of the Mencian Theory of Human Nature,” 37.  
 Following Graham, I submit that this view of xing connects moral practice and accomplishment 
with having a moral taste, but contends that such a taste is not generic to the human species. Some people 
have it and some do not, depending solely on the determination of Nature. To the extent that one is not 
endowed with a taste for morality, one becomes incapacitated for becoming good. As discussed, Mencius’ 
response to this view is that the generic human palate includes a preference for morality. Thus, everyone 
has the capability for attaining goodness so long as he seeks it. Later, we will see that Xunzi argues that the 
lack of a moral taste (which applies to everyone) does not imply the lack of capacity for moral development 
and achievement. For a different perspective on all the alternative xing positions mentioned in 6A: 6, see 
Bloom, “Mencian Arguments on Human Nature (Jen-Hsing),” 34-38, and  “Human Nature and Biological 
Nature in Mencius,”  27-28. 
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extraneous resources in order for us to engage in moral activities and cultivation towards 











 Chapter 3 
      
 
Xunzi: On Qing, Moral Agency, and the Confucian Rites 
 
 
3.1  Introduction 
In this chapter, I want to acquaint the reader with Xunzi’s view on moral agency in 
relation to his emphasis on learning and implementing the Confucian rites for constituting 
the cultivating process. As an important preliminary to broaching this discussion, we 
need to (1) discuss Shun’s reading of how Xunzi construes xing, qing, and yu, and their 
relationship, 1and (2) examine Xunzi’s views on why xing is “e” as patterns of social 
disequilibrium, and his solution to rectifying such patterns.  
3.2  Qing, Yu, and Xing in the Xunzi 
In Shun’s reading, Xunzi often delineates qing as our likes and dislikes 
(haowuzhiqing 好惡之情), as well as our feelings of joy, anger, sorrow and delight.2 At 
times, these basic feelings are characterized as the response (ying 應) of the 
haowuzhiqing.3 Xunzi also uses qing, often in the phrasal form of “renzhiqing (人之情),” 
to express factual information regarding human beings.4 It is evident then that Xunzi 
understands qing as referring to emotions and what is genuinely so about human beings. 
                                                 
1 See Kwong-Loi Shun, “Mencius, Xunzi, and Dai Zhen: A Study of the Mengzi ziyi shuzheng” in 
Mencius: Contexts and Interpretations, 233-34. Henceforth referred to as “Mencius, Xunzi, and Dai Zhen.” 
See also Yang Liang’s commentary published in the Sibubeiyao series.   
 
 
2 See for example, Xunzi: Zhengming 22.1. 
 
3 See for example, Xunzi: Discourse on Music (Yuelun 樂論) 20.7.  
 
4 See for example, Xunzi: Nothing Indecorous (Bugou 不苟) 3.8; 3.14.  
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 According to Shun, these two senses of qing are likely to be combined in certain 
sections of the text. For instance, in Xunzi’s discussion on the origination of certain rites, 
qing refers to feelings evoked by thinking (si) in the mode of recollection and 
remembrance, and longing for (mu 慕) the dead, which express certain aims and 
intentions (zhia yia 志意) of the heart-mind.5 At the same time, he contrasts qing with the 
refined forms (wen 文) of human characteristics to emphasize what is genuinely within 
human beings.6 Shun also writes that “renzhiqing” in the Xunzi frequently spells out 
desires “pertaining to the senses or to the person as whole….” which are “sometimes 
conceived as the yu of qing, or in terms of what a person likes.”7 
For Xunzi, the concept of xing denotes what is inherent to our constitution,8 as 
well as how our organs and the person as a whole spontaneously respond to the 
stimulation of the external environment.9 At times, Xunzi renders qing as the likes and 
                                                 
 
5 Xunzi: Lilun 19.22.  
 
6 See for example Xunzi: Discourse on Ritual Principles (Lilun 禮論) 19.7; 19.22.  
 
7 Shun, “Mencius, Xunzi, and Dai Zhen,” 233. 
 
8 See Xunzi: Zhengming 22.12. On Xunzi’s criteria for something to be considered xing, see John 
Knoblock, Xunzi: A Translation and Study of the Complete Works v.3 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1988), 141-42. We must take note that Xunzian xing, like Mencius, should also not be contrasted with 
“socialization” (see chapter 2, n. 99). For Xunzi, the content of xing, which is constituted by qing, is 
inclusive of dispositional characteristics and feelings acquired through socio-practical experiences. For 
example, Xunzi includes feelings aroused by remembrance and recollection of the dead, and by thinking of 
and longing for the departed as part of our qing (Lilun 19.22), and includes “shaking out our robes 
immediately after washing one’s body, and dusting one’s cap immediately after washing one’s hair” as 
renzhiqing (Rongru 3.8).  
One can object by pointing out that Xunzi explicitly claims that for anything to be considered as 
xing, it must not be acquired through a learning process. But Xunzi’s sense of “learning” pertains more to 
acquiring structural knowledge and forms to refine and better our faculties and qualities through intentional 
and dedicated efforts. And in the context of self-cultivation, learning for Xunzi refers specifically to a 
pedagogical process of studying rituals and classical texts, rather than the assimilation of some social 
worldview. The upshot of this is that the distinction between Mencius and Xunzi’s views on xing should 
not be construed along the lines of a “nature versus nurture” distinction, for both point out facts and 
emotions that are acquired through social interactions and communal existences.  
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dislikes, joy, anger, sorrow and delight of xing.10 As for the relationship between xing, 
qing, and yu, Xunzi characterizes qing as the content of xing, and yu as the response of 
qing (情者，性之質也；欲者，情之應也).11 In view of this, Shun contends that Xunzi’s 
idea of xing spells out certain facts about how human beings as a whole and their organs 
tend to be attracted to or repulsed by certain things.12 When triggered, these dispositions 
manifest themselves as desires, which are thus the response of qing, or to be more 
specific, the haowuzhiqing. And in getting or not getting what we desire, it is de facto 
that joy, anger, etc., are aroused to affect our behavioral patterns and character. 
According to Xunzi, to seek what is desired is our ineluctable response if what we 
desire is perceived to be obtainable.13 Our endowed likes and dislikes, in the mode of 
desires (the yu of haowuzhiqing), can be said to be forces of impulsion that direct our 
actions and behavior.14 For Xunzi, any action and behavior that stems directly from xing 
is effortless and requires no planning because it arises from a ready co-ordination 
between the external stimulation of our organs and their preset sensitivities, and does not 
require any learning (xue 學) and application (shi 事) of certain principles, techniques etc 
in order to improve or master it.15  
                                                                                                                                                 




11 Xunzi: Zhengming 22.12. 
 
12 Shun, “Mencius, Xunzi, and Dai Zhen,” 234. 
 
13 Xunzi: Zhengming 22.12. 
 
14 For instance, Xunzi writes that “renzhiqing” includes the dislike of being insulted, and it is this dislike 




3.3  The “Evilness” of Xing 
From the previous section, we see that Xunzian xing encompasses a range of 
affective tendencies, where their activation and manifestation as actions and behavior 
result from an unmediated, unplanned stimulus-response operation. So far, nothing 
indicates why Xunzi considers xing as “e.” Before I come to this, we need to take note of 
certain interrelated Xunzian ideas on our spontaneously occurrent desires and emotions, 
as well as facts regarding the human condition. 
(1) For Xunzi, human beings in general are endowed with the same tastes for many 
different things that concern their own interest or profit,16 such as material, sexual and 
appetitive goods.17 It is because of our manifold, egocentric likings and dislikings that we 
have an unremitting flow of self-regarding desires.18 And it is because of our same tastes 
that we have desires for the same things.19 Since the desires and antipathies of human 
beings are similar, there are some things that everyone wants to avoid, and others that 
everyone wants to obtain.  
(2) Xunzi thinks that human beings are naturally inclined to pursue the gratification of 
what is immediately appealing to oneself, and consequently are also inclined to take a 
                                                                                                                                                 
15 Xunzi: Xing e 23.4. In Xunzi’s view, this is part of the criteria for something to be considered as xing. For 
example, he categorizes the faculty of vision under xing, as the capacity of the eye (to see) constitutes 
effective visual power, and the two are inextricably linked in the sense that effective visual power is not an 
acquired feature of the eye. In other words, the ability of the eye to see is not something that can be learnt 
through certain principles, or perfected through any form of practice.  
 
16 As Xunzi claims, man is born with the character of the “xiaoren,” i.e., one who constantly thinks and acts 
in terms of his own profit; our natural behavioral direction is therefore egocentric. See Xunzi: Rongru 4.12; 
Of Kings and Lords-Protector (Wangba 王霸) 11.16.  
 
17 See Xunzi: Rongru 4.11; Contra Physiognomy (Feixiang 非相) 5.9 
 
18 See Xunzi: Zhengming 22.11; Xing e 23.7. 
 
19 See Xunzi: On Enriching the State (Fuguo 富國) 10.1. 
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parochial perspective on desire-satisfaction without giving any forethought on the long 
term impact and consequences that our actions will have on our interests, relationalities, 
states of the world, etc.20 
(3) Xunzi also contends that we are inclined to desire not just things that are fundamental 
to the necessities of life, but also the most and the best of goods. Put differently, we want 
to maximize the satisfaction of whatever desires we have. 21 
 (4) For Xunzi, human beings in general cannot help but to congregate and form a society 
(qun 群),22 which is sustained through harmony and order. Human existence therefore is 
communal and interdependent. Also, since our individual welfare depends on the 
production of many different things, which cannot be borne solely by one’s own labor, 
we need to form communities of specialized occupations so that these things can be in 
supply.23 
From (1), (2), (3), and (4), Xunzi contends that if the populace of any human 
community engages in an unrestrained satisfaction of their spontaneously occurrent, self-
regarding desires, the resultant effect would be “evilness” or “e” in the form of certain 
negative social patterns—deviant partiality (pian 偏), what contravenes reasonableness 
                                                 
20 This is implied in Xunzi: Rongru 4.11; 4.13. 
 
21 For a discussion on this, see Munro, “A Villain in the Xunzi,” 198. 
 
22  See Xunzi: On the Regulations of a King (Wangzhi 王制 9.21); Fuguo 10.5. For Xunzi, human societal 
formation is an instantiation of the principle that things of the same kind tend to associate with one another. 
See An Exhortation to Learning (Quanxue 勸學) 1.6; Lilun 19.18 
 
23 See Xunzi: Fuguo 10.1 
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(xian 險), rebelliousness (bei 悖), and disorder (luan 亂), which are interrelated aspects of 
social disharmony and disequilibrium.24  
To explain for Xunzi, the goods we produce and share in our co-existence are 
limited in supply and cannot be accorded to all on an equal basis.25 Giving free rein to the 
satisfaction of our manifold and self-same26 desires on a collective level will therefore 
put people in a state of fierce and chaotic competition for things. Consequently, emotions 
like envy, hatred etc. would be indulged in due to not obtaining the objects of our likings 
and satisfying our desires. Dominating our interactions and affairs, such feelings would 
result in constant human conflicts; eventually, the building blocks of a flourishing human 
society—cohesion and unity—would be eroded. Poverty would ensue, with people not 
willing to work and serve each other’s needs. Extrapolating from the unsavory effects of 
simply translating our spontaneously occurrent desires into action, Xunzi argues that xing 
is “e” not in an intrinsic sense, but in a collective, consequentialist way.27 If people 
simply respond to satisfy whatever desires and indulge in whatever emotions stimulated 
                                                 
24 See Janghee Lee, The Autonomy of Xin and Ethical Theory in Xunzi, P.H.D Thesis University of Hawaii 
(2001), 37. His main argument is that Xunzi’s claim “Xing e” and his heavy emphasis on ritual 
enculturation arise as a critical response to those (such as Mencius and Zhuangzi) who propound 
“naturalism” as a guide to life. Lee defines “naturalism” as a unique, early Chinese philosophical 
orientation that seeks the normative Dao in the domain of “passive happenings”—our spontaneous 
reactions to sensory, emotional, and spiritual stimuli. Lee has since published his thesis as Xunzi and Early 




26 As Lau points out, the source of conflict that Xunzi discusses does not just come from the dearth of 
things to satisfy our desires; conflicts are also caused by the fact that human beings desire one and the same 
thing.  See 216, n. 39 in D.C Lau, “Theories of Human Nature in Mencius and Xunzi.” 
 
27Munro argues that we should read Xunzi’s claim “Xing e” within the theme of how to counteract the 
imbalance of goods with desires so as to prevent chaos in and the disintegration of society. See Munro, “A 
Villain in the Xunzi,” 199. Knoblock contends that Xunzi’s claim “Xing e” does not imply that our 
characteristic dispositions are inherently depraved or sinister, but that they would lead to evil results if left 
unregulated. In other words, it is not our naturally occurrent emotions and desires that are evil per se but 
the uncontrolled discharge of such emotions and desires into action that can produce evil in states of the 
world. See Knoblock, Xunzi: A Translation and Study of the Complete Works v.1, 99; v.3, 139.  
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in them, a chain of disastrous effects would culminate in an afflicted state of existence for 
all.28  
To shift xing away from evilness, Xunzi thinks that we have to regulate and 
modify the unplanned and uncoordinated activities discharged by the impulsion of our 
spontaneously occurrent desires. Before I come to Xunzi’s solution, which pertains to his 
views on moral agency, we need to first look at a scheme that he rules out. 
3.4  Xunzian Moral Agency  
In Xunzi’s time, there are certain doctrines advocating that we arrest or limit the 
formation of desires in order to instill order in both society and the individual person. 
Xunzi rejects both doctrines. 
As a general rule, those who contend “order requires that we first rid 
ourselves of desires” are those who lack the means to guide their desires 
and so are embarrassed by their having desires. As a general rule, those 
who contend “order requires that first we reduce (gua 寡) the number of 
our desires” are those who lack the means to moderate (jie 節) their desires 
and so are embarrassed that their desires are numerous. “Having desires” 
and “lacking desires” belong to different categories (lei 類), those of life 
and death, not those of order and disorder. The quantity of our desires, few 
or many, belongs to a different category, that of the calculation of our 
qing, not that of order and disorder.29 
According to Lau’s reading of this passage, Xunzi thinks that it is impossible for 
human beings to eliminate their characteristic of having desires because such a project 
necessitates that we either become dead or non-human.30 So long as it is a fact that people 
are beings with life and vitality, we cannot prevent ourselves from having desires.  
                                                 
28 For Xunzi’s writings on the effects of leaving our desires unregulated, see Xunzi: Wangba 9.3; 9.20; 
Fuguo 10.1; Xing e 23.2 
 
29 Xunzi: Zhengming 22.11.  
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As for trying to limit the number of our desires, Xunzi implies that we have to cut 
down the number of qing from many to few. I submit that it is very likely that this qing 
refers to the haowuzhiqing—the natural likes and dislikes of our organs. As stated, the 
intrinsic likes and dislikes of our constitution manifest themselves as desires when 
stimulated. To cut down the number of our desires means therefore that we have reduce 
the endowed likes and dislikes of our organs, so as to make them less responsive to the 
production of desires. In his critique of Song Xing, Xunzi contends that to deny that 
human beings have many desires is to deny the entire gamut of things that human organs 
are naturally configured to like.31 For Xunzi, it is a given, immutable fact that our organs 
are pre-disposed with an extensive range of likes and dislikes. It follows that it is an 
unavoidable reality of being human that we have many and various kinds of desires.  
 Hence, against doctrines that seek to create order by focusing on eradicating or 
limiting the occurrences of desires, Xunzi argues that it is beyond us to negate desire-
formation per se. Desires will occur spontaneously in us and on a voluminous level so 
long as the enumeration of the haowuzhiqing remains beyond our voluntary 
determination and alteration. However, Xunzi contends that even though we have no 
control over whether or not and how many desires arise in us due to the passive, reactive 
nature of their formation, human beings have a good degree of control over what comes 
                                                                                                                                                 
30 See Lau, “Theories of Human Nature in Mencius and Xunzi,” 200. 
 
31 See Xunzi: Zhenglun 18.10. According to Knoblock, Song Xing was a contemporary of Mencius who 
believed that man’s essential desires are few, and who sought the reduction or elimination of conflicts by 
advocating this thesis. Like Mozi, he argued that society can work without the institution of a hierarchical 
order, which prompted Xunzi to attack his doctrines and ideals. See Knoblock, Xunzi: A Translation and 




after the stimulation of desires in us, i.e., whether or not we act to seek whatever we 
desire.  
That the occurrence of desire does not depend on its object of desire first 
being obtainable, but what is sought after follows after what is ke 
(欲不待客得， 而求者從所可). That the occurrence of desire does not 
depend on its object’s first being obtainable is a quality we receive from 
Nature. That we seek to satisfy our desires by following after what is ke is 
what we receive from the heart-mind.32 
When what is desired is judged as ke obtainable, it will be pursued. That is 
a necessary and inescapable part (bi bu mian 必不免) of qing. Judging it ke 
and leading the way to it is where zhic (知) must come into play.33 
 From the two passages, we see Xunzi making a conceptual distinction between 
desiring something and seeking something (to satisfy a desire). Desiring something is a 
phenomenon that occurs prior to and regardless of whether we perceive that something as 
what we ke obtain. Again, this highlights the passively reactive nature of desire 
formation; it is not something we can control by sheer acts of decision. On the other 
hand, seeking something, in terms of both course and object, depends essentially on 
whether the heart-mind judges it to be ke 可 (possible/permissible, approvable). Such 
judgments arise out of the cognitive capacities of the heart-mind (zhic). If the heart-mind 
judges an object and the course of obtaining it as ke, it will carry out that course or way to 
satisfy its desire for that object. Therefore, seeking something (i.e. whether or not we 
proceed to obtain the object of our desire via a certain course or way) is a process that can 
be controlled by judgments of the heart-mind using its cognitive and conative 
                                                 
32 Xunzi: Zhengming 22.11.  
 
33 Xunzi: Zhengming 22.12. 
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capacities.34 Said another way, human beings do not have to act and behave in a direct 
stimulus (desiring something)-response (satisfying that desire for that something) 
manner. As Lee argues, even though Xunzi views the heart-mind as the seat of all 
passively stimulated emotions and desires, it is endowed with an active ability to govern 
and modify courses and behavioral directions that our spontaneously occurrent emotions 
and desires determine originally through the use of its cognitive and conative powers. 35  
 According to Van Norden, Xunzi’s view of the heart-mind’s capacity to judge 
and follow what is ke underlies his idea of moral agency.36 Unlike Mencius who thinks 
that acting morally depends on seeking what we desire most, Xunzi avers that moral 
actions are determined not by desires, but by what we judge as ke. In other words, 
Xunzian moral agency depends not on controlling desire formation, but on controlling 
what the heart-mind ke. And, to ensure what the heart-mind ke pertains to ethical things, 
we have to control the principles that underlie the heart-mind’s judgments. Xunzi writes: 
If what the heart-mind ke coincides with lia, then although the desires be 
numerous, then how could there be harm to order!.... If what the heart-
mind ke conflicts (shi 失) with lia, then although the desires be few, how 
could it stop at disorder! Thus, order and disorder lies in what the heart-
mind ke and not with the desires that belong to qing.37  
                                                 
34 Kline has a similar reading. See Kline, “Moral Agency and Motivation in the Xunzi,” 161.  
 
35 In Lee’s reading, Xunzi conceptualizes the heart-mind as the only organ that “actively judges and 
commands [other organs] and does not just respond passively to external things and stimuli.” Though the 
heart-mind is the seat of all emotions and desires, it can guard against their potentially destructive and 
deceptive tendencies by its ability to choose a course of action deliberately, and the ability to lead the other 
organs, and all of our emotions and desires towards the proper direction. See Lee, The Autonomy of Xin and 
Ethical Theory in Xunzi, 14 & 42-70.  
 
36 See Van Norden, “Mencius and Xunzi: Two Views of Human Agency,” 118. 
 
37 Xunzi: Zhengming 22.11.  
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As many commentators note, Xunzi identifies the lia of morality with the lia of the 
Confucian rites.38 To see why, we have to examine Xunzi’s views on the genesis of the 
Confucian rites, as well as their functions. 
3.5  The Genesis of the Confucian Rites and their Functions 
According to Xunzi, the ancient sages, as the forerunners of Confucian thought, 
recognized the evilness of xing, and saw the necessity of orchestrating and moderating 
our dispositional patterns in a systematic, standardized way for a sustainable social co-
existence.39 Using their zhic40 to seek knowledge about the concrete details and constant 
workings of the celestial/material and human worlds, they tallied up the facts to trace out 
the objective logic in which both worlds can regularly operate as a harmonious whole. 41 
Honing an insight into how modalities of things can be correlated and organized properly 
across all time and space, these sages excogitated a comprehensive lia 42 that constitutes 
                                                 
38 See for example, Chong, “Xunzi’s Systematic Critique of Mencius,” 223-25 & n. 20. 
 
39 See Xunzi: Xing e 23.3; 23.9. 
 
40 Xunzi regarded “zhic” as a characteristic that human beings and animals share. For human beings, it has 
the function of sensing the sameness and differences between things or perceptual states. Through this 
function, “zhic” serves as a means to gaining knowledge, which is produced when it tally with reality. For 
Xunzi’s view on the epistemological process, see Xunzi: Wangba 9.19; Jiebi 21.1; Zhengming  22.5; 22.1. 
See also A.S. Cua, Ethical Argumentation: A Study in Hsun Tzu’s Moral Epistemology; Lee, The Autonomy 
of Xin and Ethical Theory in Xunzi, 56-66. 
 
41 As Knoblock writes, Xunzi believes that Nature operates by knowable processes and principles that are 
not just impersonal, but also certain and constant. See Knoblock, Xunzi: A Translation and Study of the 
Complete Works v.1, 68. For a paradigmatic textual example, see Xunzi: Discourse on Nature (Tianlun 
天論)17.1. For a detailed discussion on the Tianlun, see Edward Machle, Nature and Heaven in the Xunzi: 
A Study of the Tian Lun (Albany: Suny Press, 1993).  
 
42 “Each of the myriad things has a form that is perceptible. Each being perceived can be assigned into its 
proper place…. By penetrating into and inspecting the myriad things, he knows their essential qualities. By 
examining and testing order and disorder, he is fully conversant with their inner laws, By laying out the 
warp and woof of Heaven and Earth, he tailors the functions of the myriad things. By regulating and 
distinguishing according to the Great Ordering principle (dali 大理), he encompasses everything in time 
and space.” See Xunzi: Dispelling Blindness (Jiebi 解蔽) 21.8. As Knoblock writes, the Way for Xunzi is 
“not merely the right way to conduct oneself, nor is it just the way by which the ancient sages organized 
 76
the ideal cosmological co-ordination. At the same time, the sages codified this 
comprehensive lia into a comprehensible and practicable system of rites.43 Through a 
cumulative process of cultivating themselves based on parameters set by ritual principles 
on their xing, the sages gradually sublimated their desire-driven, egocentric faculties and 
behavior and acquired new abilities. Transforming themselves as exemplars of proper 
social relationships and conduct, which gave them an aura of authoritative power (de 德), 
these sages attracted and unified others into following their way of life,44 which produce 
optimally good or “shan” effects on natural and human affairs. These “shan” effects, 
defined by Xunzi as what accords with what is correct (zheng 正), in line with natural 
principles (li 理), peaceful (ping 平), and order (zhid 治),45can be understood with a 
functional understanding of the rites.  
 One of the major functions of the ritual system is to organize us into different 
social divisions (fen 分) for the harmonization of limited goods with our manifold desires 
                                                                                                                                                 
human society; rather, it is a cosmic principle that operates according to certain invariable principles that 
can be grasped by the mind….” See Knoblock, Xunzi: A Translation and Study of the Complete Works v.1., 
75. 
 
43 Xunzi’s view on the origin of the ritual system is stated in Xunzi: Rongru 4.14; On the Regulations of a 
King (Wangzhi 王制) 9.18; Discourse on Ritual Principles (Lilun 禮論)19.1; Xing e 23.9. One must note 
for Xunzi that while the details of the rites may evolve over time and space to adapt to varying 
circumstances, their underlying rationale or lia would not, since it is objective, comprehensive and eternal. 
This point is impressed upon me by Shun in “Mencius, Xunzi, and Dai Zhen,” 217. 
 
44 See Knoblock, Xunzi: A Translation and Study of the Complete Works v.3, 149. For the qualities of the 
sage that make one willing to submit to them, see Xunzi: Contra Twelve Philosophers (Fei shier zi 
非十二子) 6.12. For a good discussion on the charisma of the sage in Xunzi’s thought, see T.C Kline, 
“Moral Agency and Motivation in the Xunzi” in Virtue, Nature, and Moral Agency in the Xunzi, 167-71. 
For a related discussion on Confucian thinking on rule through moral authority, see Herbert Fingarette, 
“How the Analects Portrays the Ideal of Efficacious Authority,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy, 8.1 (1999): 
147-64.  
 
45 See Xunzi: Xing e 23.9.  
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on a collectively satisfactory basis. 46 Based on the principle that all things, including 
human beings, are naturally unequal,47 the rites establish a social fabric where people are 
distinguished and organized in a hierarchy of well-defined classes.48 Each social class 
specifies clearly each person’s proper relational field (in terms of roles, duties, 
occupational tasks and powers) in society.49 Of gradational status, each class also 
determines the portion, grade and precedence of goods that are the due share of every 
person. Ritual habituation therefore trains each claimant into desiring what accords with 
his social status and role.50 
Thus, by participating in the rituals, human beings participate in a standardized 
schema of desire-gratification that operates through an optimal distributional policy of 
privileges and goods. In this way, the ritual system allocates work and goods effectively, 
and achieves on the whole the best possible satisfaction of human desires on both a 
                                                 
46 For a paradigm example of why society needs divisions, see Xunzi: Wangzhi 9.20.  
 
47 As Munro writes, Xunzi’s metaphysical position is that “hierarchy in built into nature and that things 
have their natural places, which are hierarchically related.” See Munro, “A Villain in the Xunzi,”195. This 
metaphysical belief in the natural inequality of all things underlies why Xunzi thinks society must be 
organized in a hierarchical fashion. See Xunzi: Wangzhi 9.3. 
 
48 For Xunzi, the rites, like “markers at fords,” must be clear to prevent people from “drowning” in 
disorder. See Xunzi: Tianlun 17.14. 
 
49 One should note that the class system advocated by Xunzi may be elitist but nevertheless, it is not 
something fixed by birth and is instead allotted by meritocracy. In Xunzi’s words, “Although they be 
descendents of kings and dukes or knights and grand officers; if they are incapable of devotedly observing 
rituals and moral principles, they should be relegated to the position of commoners. Although they be the 
descendants of commoners, if they accumulate culture and study, rectify their character and conduct, and 
are capable of devotedly observing the requirements of ritual principles and justice, they should be brought 
to the ranks of prime minister, knight, or grand officer.” See Xunzi: Wangzhi 9.1.  
 
50 Xunzi does not think that we can deny our desires, as they dictate that we shall act to obtain objects that 
will satisfy them (“…. men are born with desires which if not satisfied cannot but lead men to seek to 
satisfy them.” See Xunzi: Lilun 19.1). Thus, we have to regulate our desires by training and habituating 
each person into accepting what accords with his social status and role. See also Knoblock, Xunzi: A 
Translation and Study of the Complete Works v.3 , 148. 
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collective and personal level.51 Through its regulative effects, the rites bring harmony, 
unity, order and peace in human society, as well as other beneficial outcomes necessary 
to sustain it over time.52 
In internalizing divisions that optimally structure society, the rites also infuse into 
people a prudential outlook on desire-satisfaction that projects into the long term.53 It is 
through the assimilation of such an outlook that makes it possible for us to be directed 
away from our natural comportment, and into relational patterns that place precedence on 
our obligations and responsibilities to concrete others.54 In this way, ritual principles for 
Xunzi are what Chong calls “constitutive rules”—they create or define new forms of 
behavior that would not otherwise exist without their imposition.55 To explain with an 
example, when our sensory/appetitive nature stimulates hunger in us, and thus the desire 
for food, we respond by seeking and eating food so as to satisfy this desire. Such an act 
can take place independently of any instituted rules or principles. In contrast, paying 
                                                 
 
51 See Xunzi: Rongru 4.14; Lilun 19.1. 
 
52 For Xunzi, the institution of the Confucian rites constitutes order while its absence constitutes chaos. See 
Xunzi: Bugou 3.7. 
 
53 Xunzi: Rongru 4.13: “Though the miser has treasures deposited in boxes and trunks, he dares not travel 
by horse and carriage. Why is this? Not that men do not desire to do this, but because, considering the long 
view of things and thinking of the consequences of their actions, they are apprehensive that they may lack 
the means adequate to perpetuate their wealth. In this way, they do moderate what they expend and control 
what their desire….In itself is not this “considering the long view of things and thinking of the 
consequences” quite excellent indeed! Now the sort of person who lives in a haphazard manner and is only 
superficially aware of things do not grasp even this. So he consumes his provisions in an utterly 
extravagant manner, not considering the consequences, and suddenly he finds himself forced into difficult 
straits and impoverished….How much more important, then, are the way of the Ancient Kings….and the 
pattern of life given in the Ode, Documents, Rituals, and Music….they will cause anyone born to the world 
to consider the long view of things and think of the consequences, thereby protecting a myriad of 








deference to our elders during meals, such as letting them go first before we do, is an 
activity that will not occur without knowing and observing certain principles.56 Such 
deferential acts therefore depend on and are generated through certain rules that spell out 
and valorize certain values and ways of conduct. 
To clarify further, changing the way in which we view the world and importing 
certain values and norms, the rites have a formative influence on our natural dispositions. 
They provide prescriptive categories with which to view our relations with others, and 
through these categories, direct our behavior in ways that mesh the concrete present with 
the futurity of desire-satisfaction. Put differently, through ritual enculturation, we 
assimilate a common framework that emphasizes a set of norms, values and obligations 
for negotiating the gratification of the immediate and a consideration for the prospective 
(what works out in the long run for the interests of all that are concerned) as the principal 
guides for action, words and behavior. In this way, learning and practicing the rites on a 
habitual basis channel us away from mere stimulus-response behavioral patterns. For 
Xunzi, the rites channel us into modalities of conduct that would not otherwise happen if 
we simply follow what our spontaneously occurrent desires direct and move us to do. 
Through their constitutive effects, learning and practicing the rites also channel 
our natural dispositions into refined and felicitous forms (wen) by structuring them into 
aesthetic-cum-timely modes of expressions or activities. As Chong points out, Xunzi’s 
characterization of xing as “e” has the additional sense of being “ugly.”57 Through the 
                                                 
56 Xunzi: Xing e 23.6: “Now it is the inborn nature of man that when hungry, he desires something to eat….. 
But when in fact a man is hungry, if he sees one of his elders, he will not eat before his elder does; rather he 
will defer to him….[this] mode of conduct [is] contrary to inborn nature and contradict his true feelings.”   
 
57 Chong, “Xunzi’s Systematic Critique of Mencius,” 224.  The Shuowen also denotes “shan” in terms of 
what is “beautiful.” See n. 61 in Chan, “A Matter of Taste,” 69. 
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refining operation of ritualization, “the raw material” that is our emotions and desires 
undergoes transformation into beautiful (mei 美) products. Consider what Xunzi says: 
Rites trim (duan 斷) what is too long, stretch out (xu 續) what is too short, 
eliminate excess (sun er yu 損而於), remedy deficiency (yi bu zu 益不足), 
and extend cultivated forms that express love and respect so that they 
increase and complete the beauty of conduct according to one’s duty. 
Thus, elegant adornment ((wen shi 文飾) and gross ugliness (cu e 粗惡), 
the sounds of music and the sobs of crying, contented happiness and grief-
stricken distress are all opposites (fan 反), yet rites use them all, 
substituting them and changing them as the occasion requires (shi ju er dai 
yu 時擧而代禦). Elegant adornment, music, and happiness are what sustain 
tranquility and serve auspicious occasions (chi ping feng ji ye 持平奉吉也). 
Gross ugliness, weeping, and sorrow are what sustain anxiety and serve 
inauspicious occasions (chi xian feng xiong ye 持險奉凶也). Hence, their 
utilization of elegant adornment does not go so far as to be sensuous or 
seductive, nor gross ugliness so far as to produce emaciation or self-
neglect (ji qi 瘠棄). Their use of music and happiness does not go so far as 
to be wayward and abandoned or indolent or rude, nor do weeping and 
sorrow go so far as to produce despondency or injury to life (ai she shang 
sheng 隘懾傷生). Such is the middle course of ritual (li zhi zhong liu ye 
禮之中流也)58 
From the passage, we see that the rites for Xunzi do not just serve as the structural 
embellishment of our emotions and desires, but are also the avenues for them to be 
fulfilled in the most balanced fashion.59 By merging our emotions and desires with form 
and pattern (wen-lia 文理) embodied in the rites,60 we convey our emotions and desires in 
the right forms of expressions or activities at the right time. For example, whether and 
                                                 
58 Xunzi: Lilun 19.13. 
 
59 As Xunzi says, “Or will we follow those cultivated and ornamented gentlemen? For them, the twenty-
five months of the three-year mourning period pass as quickly as running horse glimpsed through the crack 
in the wall, and if we follow their example, mourning will have no limit at all. Therefore, the Ancient Kings 
and Sages acted to establish some mean, and to regulate it with a definite interval. As soon as enough time 
has been allowed to perfect cultivated form and to fulfill the dictates of reason, then mourning was to be 
put aside.” Xunzi: Lilun 19.18. 
 
60 See Xunzi: Lilun 19.9.  
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when they should be elaborated or simplified. This prevents anti-self-realization effects 
like repression of or over-indulgence in our naturally occurrent emotions and desires.61   
Moreover, the refinement of our emotions and desires would also result in the 
“ornamentation” of our social relations.62 Take the Confucian sacrificial ceremonies for 
instance, which give the people a framework for translating their emotional attachment 
and affiliation with the dead into dignified and elegant expressions. By separating the 
participants into differential roles and performances, the sacrificial rites unite the various 
emotions and desires of those present into a powerful and shared exhibition of loyalty, 
faithfulness, love and reverence,63 thus reinforcing a sense of spiritual/communal 
togetherness. It is for this reason that music is used as a complement to many rites as part 
of the refining program of our emotional dispositions. By conducting their “beat and 
flow,”64 music modulates our emotions and desires and “joins together what is common 
                                                 
 
61 Xunzi believes that focusing on the repression of our natural emotions, rather than their regulation, would 
not institute order in society. As he writes:  “Some men repress their emotions and innate nature. Theirs is 
an excessively narrow path and a harsh and intricate way….But they are adequate neither to the task of 
bringing concord to the great mass of people nor to that of clarifying the fundamental distinction in 
society.” For Xunzi, regulating, rather than denying, our desires, prevents our emotions from being 
excessive and deficient, and allows us to satisfy our desires and fulfill our emotions in a way that build 
social order and harmony.  See Xunzi: Fei shier zi 6.3.   
 
62 See Xunzi: Lilun 19.17. 
 
63 See Xunzi: Lilun 19.22. 
 
64 For Xunzi, music complements the regulatory function of the rites by helping to move us into the 
appropriate emotional modes. He says: “Music is joy. Being an essential part of man’s emotional nature, 
the expression of joy is, by necessity, inescapable.…Since it is impossible for men not to be joyful, where 
there is joy, it is impossible that it should not be given perceptible form. But if its form is not properly 
conducted, then it is impossible that disorder should not arise. The Ancient Kings hated such disorder. Thus 
they instituted as regulations the sounds of the Odes and the Hymns to offer guidance. This would cause the 
sounds to be sufficient to give expression to the joy, but not to lead to dissipation. It would cause….The 
rhythm and meter of music to be sufficient to stir and move the good in men’s hearts and to keep evil and 
base qi sentiments from finding a foothold there. Such was the plan of the Ancient Kings in establishing 
their music.” Xunzi: Discourse on Music (Yuelun 樂論) 20.1.  
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to all (yue he tong 樂合同).”65  Such music can be described as “ritualized” by the sages. 
Based on an understanding of certain uniform facts about the human psyche, their 
arrangement, pitch etc. are configured to channel and translate emotions like joy into 
beautiful, socially cohesive forms and patterns.66 That said, the Confucian rites 
structuralize the original responses of our emotions and desires from raw and “ugly” to 
cultured, savoir-faire forms. 
With this functional perspective of the rites,67 we can see the significance and 
impact of the Confucian ritual order on social life and human development in Xunzian 
thought. Through the institution of social divisions, ritual principles organize society into 
the best possible design that regulates and harmonizes our desires, creates social 
harmony, order, rootedness and cohesiveness, provides the foundation and a model for 
self-cultivation, impresses in us the proper patterns for human relationships and 
expressions of emotions and desires and so forth. In short, the overall significance of the 
ritual system is that they organize the human populace into a moral society and elevate 
human beings into living a moral existence.  
As can be inferred, Xunzi’s claim of the shan effects the Confucian ritual order 
have on both society and its individual members is intimately related to his claim of its 
                                                 
 
65 Xunzi: Yuelun 20.10: “Music joins together what is common to all; ritual separates what is different 
(乐合同，礼别异). The guiding principles of ritual and music act as the pitch pipe that disciplines the 
human heart (礼乐之统，管乎人心矣).”  
 
66 “Music…. can make the hearts of the people good; it deeply stirs men; and it alters their manners and 
changes their customs. Thus, the Ancient Kings guided the people with ritual and music, and the people 
become harmonious and friendly.” Xunzi: Yuelun 20.6. 
 
67 Cua provides a good account of the functions of the rites within the Confucian framework, which can 
help enhance one’s understanding of Xunzi’s view on the importance of the rites. See Antonio S. Cua, “The 
Concept of Li in Confucian Moral Theory,” in Understanding the Chinese Mind, ed. Robert E. Allinson 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 209-35. 
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“perfect lia.”68 And because of the invariability of the cosmological patterns, this lia acts 
as a socially equilibrating and harmonizing rationale in all conditions, times and places. It 
is from such a standpoint that Xunzi equates the lia of the Confucian ritual order, which 
as Nivison submits, represents the Way of the sages and their accumulated insights for 
elevating and meeting every need of the basic human condition, with the rationale of 
morality.69  
3.6  Learning and Practicing the Confucian Rites 
Based on his identification of the moral rationale with the lia of the Confucian 
rites, whereby it is this and only this lia that can equilibrate society into order and 
harmony, it seems that for Xunzi, whether the heart-mind’s judgments and consequent 
following70 of ke and bu ke accord with shan depends on ensuring that the rationale 
underlying such judgments is the rationale of the Confucian rites.71 In order for a person 
                                                 
 
68 According to Knoblock, lia in the Xunzian framework is “the rational basis of all order.” See Knoblock, 
Xunzi: A Translation and Study of the Complete Works v.1, 80. Thus, lia is intimately connected with zhid 
(orderliness, governance) and is opposed to luan (disorderliness, chaos). In Xunzi’s view, since the ritual 
system is what the sages imposed on society to govern and organize it into order, and to harmonize with the 
natural patterns, lia for him is intricately bound up with the rites. That is why Xunzi says that if we trace the 
foundation of fen (which comes about through the imposition of the rites on people), we would find lia. 
Xunzi: Feixiang 5.17 
 
69 As Nivison argues, we need not posit to Xunzi a belief that the Dao of the sage is created from a single 
lifetime of an individual genius. Rather, extrapolating from Xunzi’s discussion on self-cultivation, Nivison 
suggests that we can plausibly understand Xunzi as thinking that the institution of the Confucian moral Dao 
and order is a gradual and cumulative process that spans over many generations of sages, who each built 
on, refined and adapted lia  to innumerable, piecemeal human problems until it culminated in final 
perfection. See David Nivison, “Replies and Comments,” in Chinese Language, Thought and Culture, 328-
31; see also Kline, “Moral Agency and Motivation in the Xunzi,” 162-64.  
 
 
70 Nivison points out that to follow (cong 從 ) the Way does not mean that we make a choice to follow it in 
every instance of one’s life, but to choose the Way as a form of life and the kind of person one is to be. See 
Nivison, The Ways of Confucianism, 116. 
 
71 In discussing the significance of ke for Xunzi’s view of human agency, Van Norden contends that the 
proper sense of ke and bu ke for Xunzi arises out of knowing and understanding only Confucian ritual 
principles. See Van Norden, “Mengzi and Xunzi: Two Views of Human Agency,”117-21.  
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to act morally at any time or space, his sense of ke and bu ke must conform to fen, i.e., the 
contextual requirements and responsibilities of his ritualized class. 
Given this, Xunzi thinks that it is of utmost efficacy and necessity that we use our 
cognitive and conative capacities to learn and practice ritual principles. This will 
inculcate in us a proper understanding, and a habituated following of what is ke (or bu ke) 
with respect to our various roles and interactions with others in society.72 Such a training 
process (as well as its effects on our dispositions) is labeled by Xunzi as “wei 僞” (to be 
explained in the next chapter),73 which allows us to be directed towards goodness.74 The 
more a person learns and practices rituals, the more what is ke or bu ke becomes intuitive 
                                                 
 
72 As Kline writes, because of his identification of the Confucian ritual order with the moral order, Xunzi 
thinks that learning and practicing ritual principles (which are the highest and only correct form of moral 
knowledge) constitute the most efficacious and necessary way for us to approximate the Way of the sage. 
Such a process economizes effort and prevents useless wandering, and leads us most quickly, directly and 
certainly to the result of attaining goodness. Thus, Xunzi views Confucian rites as the only proper devices 
of self-cultivation, for only they can direct us expeditiously towards the ethical ideal. See Kline, “Moral 
Agency and Motivation in the Xunzi,”165-66.  
Consequently, Xunzi thinks that anyone who deviates from the rites will not engage in efficient 
moral growth. This underlies why Xunzi thinks that modes of self-reflection to understand the rationale of 
morality independent of what one has learnt from the rites are a waste of time (Xunzi: Quanxue 1.3), while 
those have never undergone ritual enculturation will probably never acquire goodness. Nivison’s 
interpretation of the Way of the Confucian sage as not the work of a single individual in a single lifetime, 
but as a “creative process that may have taken innumerable piecemeal decisions over centuries by many 
sages” substantiates further the necessity and efficacy of Confucian rituals for acquiring moral knowledge 
in Xunzi’s view. What Nivison’s reading implies is that that no person or group can possibly figure out, or 
invent a new rationale of morality, i.e. a new Dao for others to follow. See Nivison, “Replies and 
Comments,” 328-29. For Xunzi, the Confucian ritual and its rationale will always be the authoritative and 
comprehensive source of moral knowledge across time and space. As Xunzi writes in Yuelun 20.10, rituals 
embody a rationale of natural order that can be changed (礼也者，理之不可易者也). 
With this perspective, Xunzi disparages other schools of thought, such as the Mohism, who reject 
the Confucian rites and its rationale and seek to formulate their own Dao. Xunzi states that their  non-
reliance on Confucian rites and precepts would result in their heart-minds’ thought processes to be fixated 
on or blinded by one aspect of the proper Dao, and to take this aspect as definitive or sufficient in itself for 
optimizing social harmony and order. As such, even though these schools may sincerely and industriously 
create their own moral principles, Xunzi argues that their approach would only produce erroneous and at 
best partial moral knowledge. See Xunzi: Jiebi 21.5 in particular. 
 
73 Knoblock translates “wei” as both “conscious exertion” and “acquired nature.” While the former 
emphasizes a process, the latter emphasizes the accumulative effects during that process.  See Knoblock, 
Xunzi: A Translation and Study of the Complete Works v.3, 143.  
 
74 Xunzi opens the Xing e chapter with this: “Any good in humans is acquired by wei.”  
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in his deliberation and action. In short, ritual principles structure a person’s thought 
processes into a design that enables him to respond morally to the demands of his 
situation. Hence, proper judgments and execution of ke and by bu ke does not transpire 
naturally but develops out of understanding and knowing how to apply ritual principles. 
This does not mean that we have to reflect on ritual principles all the time before we act, 
but that our courses are inextricably influenced by their systematic guidance.  
 Going back to the functions of the Confucian social infrastructure, we see how 
the rites expand our horizon by inculcating a long-term perspective in planning our 
courses of action. In Xunzi’s view, this long-term perspective is very important for it 
keeps in check actions urged by our spontaneously occurrent desires, which are to seek 
their immediate gratification as well as top-of-the-range objects. As discussed, such 
actions will undermine social order and harmony. For Xunzi, this long-term perspective 
is inculcated from understanding and appreciating the value of ritual principles for 
managing human desire-satisfaction on a collective and personal level.75  
To explain further, in learning and practicing ritual principles, not only will we be 
able to know and distinguish the things that are permissible for us to pursue, but over 
time, we will also arrive at an approval of the ways of life that they mark out. In other 
words, we develop a sense of recognizing and accepting them as proper paths for us to 
plan (mou 謀) our actions as a certain ranked member of a necessarily hierarchical society 
over the long haul. In slotting into its modus operandi, not only will each person perceive 
that his allotment of goods and benefits is fair, but he will know that he is avoiding 
                                                 
75 My view here is shaped by Nivison’s account of Xunzi’s moral psychological transformation. See 
Nivison, “Xunzi on ‘Human Nature’,” in Ways of Confucianism, 203-13.  Many writers in Virtue, Nature, 
and Moral Agency in the Xunzi contribute to my view here. See for example Van Norden, “Mengzi and 
Xunzi: Two Views of Human Agency, 121; Philip Ivanhoe, “Human Nature and Moral Understanding in the 
Xunzi,” in Virtue, Nature and Moral Agency in the Xunzi, 135-45 et passim. 
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natural hates like disorder and danger, as well as psychological states—such as fear and 
anxiety (you kong 憂恐)—which will lower desire-satisfaction significantly.76 Hence, a 
person who is ritualized to a certain degree will be able to calculate (ji 計) that he is 
“exchanging one for two (yi liang yi yi 以兩易一),”77 and getting the “most numerous” 
(qu suo duo 取所多) over the long run.78 Put differently, he would appreciate that the 
Confucian Dao illuminates patterns of life that uniquely optimize the fulfillment of his 
emotions and desires by meeting the demands of prudential and far-sighted thinking.79  
Thus, even though no one, be it the common man or the ruler, will satisfy every 
desire to the utmost if he abides by the Confucian ritual order, Xunzi contends that every 
person will choose to plan his actions in accordance with the paths it marks out. As Xunzi 
claims, the attraction of Confucian states lies in the fact that they are unequalled in terms 
of helping humans fulfill their natural emotions and desires, to nurture their life and to 
                                                 
 
76 See Xunzi: Zhengming 22.16. This analysis is consulted from Nivison, “The Ways of Confucianism,” 209. 
 
77 Xunzi: Zhengming 22.15: “Of a trader who exchanges one for one, people say there was no gain and no 
loss. Of exchanging one for two, people say there was no loss but rather gain. Of exchanging two for one, 
people say there was no gain but loss. One who calculates chooses what is most numerous; one who plans 
follows what is ke. No man acts so as to exchange two for one, because he understands how to count. To 
proceed by following the Way is like exchanging one for two. How could there be loss! But to abandon the 
Way and select on the basis of personal considerations is like exchanging two for one. How could there be 
gain! Anyone who would exchange the desires accumulated over hundred years for the gratification of the 
moment, and there are indeed such actions, does not understand how to count.” 
 
78 Xunzi says: “Even though one were the Son of Heaven (ruler of the world), one could not satisfy them 
all. Although one’s desires cannot be completely fulfilled, one can approach complete satisfaction, and 
although one cannot get rid of the desires, the pursuit of their satisfaction can be moderated. What is 
desired, though not completely satisfied, can if pursued be made nearly complete. See Xunzi: Zhengming 
22.12. Xunzi also writes that people “would not abandon the way of obtaining what they desire and choose 
instead what they hate just because they could not satisfy all they desire. See Xunzi: Zhengming 22.13. 
79 Xunzi writes: “As a general rule, all men follow what they regard as ke and reject what they 
regard as bu ke. There is no instance of someone understanding that there is nothing to compare 
with the Way and yet not following the Way.” Xunzi: Zhengming 22.13: 
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find peace of mind.80 That is why Xunzi claims that people will favor and flock to states 
which operate by ritual and moral principles (li-yi 禮義) , such as states governed by Tang 
and Wu, and abandon those that do not, such as Jie and Zhou Xin.81  
In view of what has been said, both an understanding of what is permissible for us 
to pursue, and an approval of this circumscription on our desire-satisfaction in view of its 
optimizing benefits capture Xunzi’s technical sense of ke.82 For Xunzi, it is an inculcated 
sense of approval that will motivate a person abide by the rites and do what is morally 
appropriate. Consider what Xunzi says here: 
                                                 
80 Xunzi: On Strengthening the State (Qiangguo 強國) 16.4: ‘Thus men prize nothing so highly as life and 
enjoy nothing more than peace. Among the things used nurture life and bring about the enjoyment of peace, 
they consider nothing as important as ritual and moral principles.” 
 
81 Xunzi: Qiangguo 16.4: “Jie and Zhou Xin were the descendents of sage kings…. Yet suddenly the whole 
world abandoned Jie and Zhou and rushed to Tang and Wu, changing their attitudes to hatred for Jie and 
Zhou and admiration for Tang and Wu. How did this happen? Why did Jie and Zhou Xin lose? Why did 
Tang and Wu succeed? I say it was due to no other cause than that Jie and Zhou Xin were adept at doing 
what men hate whereas Tang and Wu were adept at doing what men like. What do I meant by what men 
hate? Baseness and recklessness, contention and plundering, and a rapacious appetite for profit are such. 
What do I mean by what men like? Li-yi, polite refusals and deference to others, and loyalty and 
trustworthiness are such.”  
In tune with his analysis of The Great Compendium (Dalue 大略) 27.67 (see this chapter, n. 101), 
Eric Hutton interprets for Xunzi that human beings like li-yi, polite refusals and deference to others etc. in 
the sense that they like Tang and Wu to display such “virtues” to them (I hesitate to see li-yi as a “virtue” 
though), with no implication that they enjoy or desire being virtuous themselves. Thus, liking such 
attributes means liking others to behave in a certain manner to oneself, and not that one likes to behave in 
accordance with them. See Eric Hutton, “Does Xunzi have a Consistent Theory of Human Nature?” in 
Virtue, Nature, and Moral Agency in the Xunzi, 227.  
While not disagreeing with Hutton’s interpretation, I think, at the bottom line, the reason why the 
common people find such qualities attractive in the governmental administration and officials is that such 
qualities assure the masses a conducive environment with which to optimize their overall satisfaction of 
desires, which includes the nurturance of their life, enjoyment of peace of mind. as well as other goods like 
material possessions etc. As Xunzi says, the common man still considers the greatest treasure to be wealth 
and material possessions, and taking the highest Way to be nurturing one’s life. See Xunzi: The Teachings 
of the Ru (Ruxiao 儒效) 8.11. With rulers like Jie and Zhou at the helm, which influence officials into 
acting basely and recklessly and being rapaciously concerned with profit (A point Xunzi talks about in 
Dalue 27.67), the political/social infrastructure will lead to a poor or unacceptable level of desire-
satisfaction, with people being denied their fair allotments of goods and benefits and suffering 
psychological harm like anxiety etc. That is why people will go to states like Tang and Wu, and leave states 
like Jie and Zhou. This seems to reflect contemporary human migratory patterns.  
 
82 Nivison points out that Xunzi is not quite clear on whether ke means “possible” or “acceptable” (i.e. to 
approve of something). See Nivison, The Ways of Confucianism, 208.   
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What men desire most is life, and what they hate most is death. Be that as 
it may, men sometimes follow the pursuit of life and end up with death. It 
is not that they do not really desire life and rather desire death; it is that it 
is not approvable to continue living and that it was approvable to die. 
Thus, when desires run to excess, actions do not reach that point because 
the heart-mind stops them (故欲過之而動不及，心止之也)….although the 
desires are not strong enough to move a person, his actions may exceed his 
desires because the heart-mind has ordered them to do so 
(欲不及而動過也，心使之也).83 
Xunzi’s claim here is that the heart-mind has the power to command us into 
certain courses of action to accord with what it approves, even though our desires may 
stand at variance (i.e. qi moves in opposite direction) with what it commands. To 
elaborate, if the heart-mind does not approve the pursuit of an object, then even though 
we may have a very strong desire for it, the heart-mind can override the force of such a 
desire. Put another way, we will stop seeking a thing once the heart-mind commands it, 
even though we may still desire it strongly. Hence, however powerful desires are, they 
must await the heart-mind’s approval to be acted upon.  
Conversely, when the heart-mind approves the pursuit of an object, then even 
though we may lack a desire for, or be strongly averse to this object, the heart-mind can 
move us into seeking it. Regardless of how weak, unsupportive, or antipathetic our 
desires are as motivational forces, the heart-mind can impel us into action. As the 
arbitrator of our behavioral decisions, the power of the heart-mind in governing action 
over the force of desires is underscored by Xunzi when he states, as seen in the above 
passage, that a person may defy our most powerful desire to live, and choose death 
instead, if such a course accords with what the heart-mind approves. Thus, if what a 
person approves of corresponds to what the Confucian rites mark out, it will be possible 
                                                 
 
83 Xunzi: Zhengming 22.11 
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for him to choose to follow morality and accept death, if choosing to live contravenes the 
rationale of the rites and morality.  
However, Nivison argues that there seems to be a tension in Xunzi’s thought: Is it 
consistent to claim, on one hand, that our approval of the rites and moral ways stems 
from our understanding that they optimize our desire-satisfaction, and to claim on the 
other that it is because of this approval that we will embrace adherence to rites and 
morality to the point of accepting death and overcoming our aversion to “the termination 
of all [future] desire-satisfaction?”84 In other words, if following ritual/moral courses of 
action is valued only insofar as they are the best means to fulfilling my interests, and not 
as ends in themselves, then Xunzi may find it hard to maintain why one will not give up 
ritual/moral courses of action at times when they lead to death, and switch to improper 
courses so as to prolong life and desire-satisfaction? The problematic for Xunzian 
thinking is how we can move from such an “extrinsic” form of approval (in the sense of 
engaging in something as a means to some other end) to an “intrinsic” one (in the sense 
of engaging in something for its own sake because we love and enjoy it), and become a 
genuine committed moral follower? In order to answer this, we have to probe further into 
Xunzi’s view of “wei” and moral agency, which shall be done in the next chapter. 
 
 
84 See Nivison, The Ways of Confucianism, 208.   
 
Chapter 4 
      
 
Xunzi: Restructuring our Emotional Predispositions 
 
 
4.1  Introduction 
Following the discussion from the previous chapter, I want to show here why Xunzi 
thinks that our naturally occurrent emotions and desires do not already avail to us the 
appropriate resources for responding to the world in shan ways. To facilitate this, a 
further examination of Xunzi’s conception of “wei” and moral agency will be given. 
What will also be presented to the reader is how for Xunzi, in contradistinction to 
Mencius, the heart-mind in terms of its zhia becomes set and fixed on leading qi and the 
person as a whole towards engendering and expressing the characteristics of the ethical 
ideal.   
4.2  The Concept of “Wei” in the Xunzi 
According to Xunzi, the process of “wei” (conscious exertion) entails two 
interrelated operations: the heart-mind’s thinking about something, and the application of 
what one has thought about into action.1 This two-fold training scheme works by the 
heart-mind “fixing its attention on some goal, devising ways and means to realize it, and 
effectuating it through the habituation of custom” (zhu cuo xi shu 注錯習俗) so that zhia 
will be shifted (yi 移) and xing would be transformed (hua 化). 2  
As Xunzi claims, the extent of transformation that occurs through wei depends 
essentially on how hard the heart-mind works to unify all these elements towards training 
                                                 
1 See Xunzi: Zhengming 22.1. 
 
2 See Xunzi: Ruxiao  8.21  
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our emotional dispositions so as to alter zhia and xing concomitantly over a long time. 
This is because the transformative effects of wei on man are akin to the transformative 
effects of the butterfly in its chrysalis—they occur not instantaneous but gradually over 
an extensive period of time. This is Xunzi’s doctrinal principle of accumulation (ji 積).3 
Like Mencius, self-cultivation for Xunzi does not and cannot proceed by leaps and 
bounds, or in an intermittent manner. 
As a technical concept in Xunzian thought, ji refers to making constant and 
cumulative efforts to amass modest but essential acts and deeds towards achieving a 
definite and final goal. What this means is that the conditioning of our aims and 
emotional dispositions is an additive process; the more the heart-mind engages in 
accumulation of conscious exertion, the more profound one’s zhia and xing is altered (the 
converse holds true as well). For Xunzi, differences in transformation of xing are due to 
differences in “steadfastness and constancy of purpose and the accumulation resulting 
from continuous effort.”4 And in his conceptualization, the metamorphosis that is 
accumulatively generated—the product of our repeated and repetitive conscious 
exertion—is also termed as wei (acquired nature). As Xunzi defines, “what must be 
learned before a man can do it and what he must apply himself to before he can master it 
yet is found in man is properly called acquired nature (可學而能，可事而成之在人也， 
謂之僞).” 5 Acquired nature therefore results from using certain powers of the heart-mind 
to study and implement the rites, so that we can reflect on its principles and translate 
                                                 
 
3 For Xunzi’s concept of “ji,” see Xunzi: Quanxue 1.6; Ruxiao 8.22. 
 
4 Quoted from Knoblock, Xunzi: A Translation and Study of the Complete Works v.1, 131. 
 
5 See Xunzi: Xing e 23.4. 
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them into actions to effectuate the shifting of zhia and the transformation of our 
characteristic dispositions. 
From this, we can see that for Xunzi, the heart-mind’s proper directedness and the 
nurturance of our emotional predispositions is generated by acquiring ritual knowledge. 
Like Gaozi, Xunzi holds that the setting of zhia towards goodness must come from 
knowing and implementing resources that come from what is external to oneself. To lend 
further support, I shall examine Xunzi’s views on qi and the content of the haowuzhiqing. 
4.3  Qi and “Acquiring” a Moral Taste 
For Xunzi, the human constitution and its processes seem to be rooted in the 
xueqi, a term which occurs several times in the Xunzi. When the term “qi” appears in the 
text, it is usually discussed in relation to the nurturance of life, health or temperament, all 
of which are based on the xueqi.6 As such, it is most likely that Xunzi identifies human qi 
with the “xueqi.” Since Gaozi’s standpoint on movement of such qi in the context of 
moral cultivation is that it is simply a source of motivational energy with no inherent 
ethical direction, and thus cannot move the heart-mind into emotional states that direct us 
to yi (or other aspects of goodness), it is also likely that Xunzi views qi as such.  
Furthermore, in the chapter on “Self-Cultivation” (Xiushen 修身), Xunzi states 
that to care for the heart-mind, one must zhid (regulate or control)7 qi by making it follow 
                                                 
 
6 See for example Xunzi: Xiushen 2.2.  
 
7 As Knoblock points out, the primary sense of zhid is to govern something well or to put it in good order. In 
its verbal usage, it mean “to regulate, govern, control, manipulate, and arrange” so as to put in good order.” 
Knoblock, Xunzi: A Translation and Study of the Complete Works v.1, 145. Xunzi also argues that the qi of 
a person who is not yet ritually acculturated tends to be contentious (zhengqi 爭氣) during debates or 
discussions. See Xunzi: Quanxue 1.13. 
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the requirements of ritual principles.8 As he claims, “of all the methods of controlling qi 
and nourishing xin, none is more direct than proceeding according to the ritual principles 
(凡治氣，養心之術，莫徑由禮).”9 In Yuelun, Xunzi talks about the need to use music to 
stir and move (gan dong 感动) the goodness in man’s heart-mind (shan xin), and keep 
evil and base qi (xie wu zhi qi 邪污之氣) from occupying it,10 and how sinister (jian 奸) 
and correct music can make qi respond rebelliously (ni 逆) or obedient (shun 顺) 
respectively.11 In Xunzi’s view, the rites provide the necessary structural controls to 
produce order in qi, as well as to unify and set properly the directedness of the heart-
mind. Managing our qi via ritual structuralization is therefore important for the regulation 
of our aims and actions. 
Going back to the first two chapters, we have discussed how Mencius views the 
qing of liking liayi as facilitating the determination of the proper zhia. Contra Mencius, 
Xunzi does not think that human beings are naturally inclined to have a preference or 
taste for liayi. 12 Allow me to quote Xunzi at length: 
Now if a man were caused to live without ever having tasted the meat of 
pastured and grain-fed animals or rice and millet, but knew only beans, 
coarse greens, dregs and husks, then he would be satisfied with such food. 
Were there suddenly to arrive a platter filled with the finest and most 
delicate of meats, he would look at them with astonishment and exclaim: 
“What strange things!” But since when savored, they are not unpleasing to 
                                                 
 
8 See Xunzi: Xiushen 2.2. 
 
9 See Xunzi: Xiushen 2.4. 
 
10 See Xunzi: Yuelun 20.1. 
 
11 See Xunzi: Yuelun 20.8. 
 
12 In the Xunzi, lia and yi are seldom used in conjunction, while li (rites) and yi have a high frequency of 
being used together. Nevertheless, for Xunzi, lia refers specifically to the rationale underlying the 
Confucian rites, and thus the heart-mind’s lack of delight in liayi is equivalent to the lack of delight in liyi. 
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the nose; when tasted, they are sweet to the mouth; and when eaten, they 
are satisfying to the body, everyone who tries them will reject their old 
foods and choose these new ones instead. Consider the way of the Ancient 
Kings and the guiding principles of ren and yi; Are they not the means by 
which we live together in societies, by which we protect and nurture each 
other, by which we hedge in our faults and refine each other, and by which 
we together we become tranquil and serene (今以夫先王之道，仁义之统，  
以相群居，以相持养，以相藩饰，以相安固邪)? Consider the way of Jie 
and Robber Zhi. Does it not contrast with that of the Ancient kings just as 
the meat of pastured and grain-fed animals contrasts with dregs and husks! 
Though this is so, many men still become like them and few like the 
Ancient kings. Why is this? I say: They are uncultivated rustics (lou ye zhe 
陋也者).13 
Herein lies an argument that reveals Xunzi’s disagreement with Mencius on the 
nature and function of the haowuzhiqing in the context of self-cultivation. Earlier, we 
have seen that for Xunzi, it is our natural tendency to maximize desire-satisfaction—we 
would be moved by our spontaneously occurrent desires to seek obtainable objects that 
can provide the better or best satisfaction. As Xunzi claims in the above passage, if a 
person has always tasted unrefined food and has never tasted otherwise, he would be 
satisfied with eating such food. But if he becomes aware of the taste of the 
gastronomically finest food, he would instantly reject his old food and choose the new 
one instead. Therefore, if the Way of the sage and their guiding principles and the “e” 
Way of Jie and Robber Zhi are analogous to the finest food and coarse food respectively, 
it follows that that a person will prefer the former to the latter when presented with both. 
But Xunzi argues that this is not the case. Human beings in general would prefer and 
choose the latter.  
In Knoblock’s reading, this paragraph implies that for Xunzi, the heart-mind’s 
delight in liayi is not the same as our appetitive organ’s delight in the best food.14 In other 
                                                 
13 Xunzi: Rongru 4.12.  
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words, Xunzi thinks that man does not naturally enjoy following the Confucian ritual 
order. As he writes, “the tasks and duties of one’s station in life are what all hate, and 
accomplishment and benefit are what all love (事業所惡也功利所好也).”15 Thus, having a 
taste for ethical things, unlike our appetitive tastes, is not natural but “acquired.” As I 
contend, Xunzi’s reason is that human beings in pre-ritualized states do not naturally 
enjoy and doing what accords with liayi because their courses and patterns actively limit 
what the impulsion of our spontaneous desires inclines us to pursue—their immediate and 
maximal satisfaction. Only the ritually cultivated likes to seek them (for differing reasons 
and to differing measures). From Xunzi’s perspective, the lack of a natural moral taste 
means that there are no spontaneously occurrent emotions and desires that can provide 
the heart-mind with ethical aims and motivation.  
However, passage 27.67 of the Dalue seems to contradict the reading that for 
Xunzi, human beings “acquire” a taste for ethical patterns and things.  
Yi and a sense of profit are two things human possess (you 有). Although 
they were unable to get rid of the desire for profit in people, Yao and Shun 
were able to cause them not to allow their desire for profit to triumph over 
their liking for yi (haoyi 好義). Although even Jie and Zhou Xin were 
unable to get rid of people’s liking for yi, they could nonetheless cause 
their desire for profit to conquer their liking for yi.16  
Here, Xunzi claims that human beings have (you) yi in the sense that they have a 
liking for yi, and that people do not lose their liking for yi and desire for profit, be it 
                                                                                                                                                 
14 See Knoblock, Xunzi: A Translation and Study of the Complete Works v.3, 146-47. My argument here is 
inspired by Knoblock’s reading. 
 
15 Xunzi: Fuguo 10.1.  
 
16 Xunzi: Dalue 27.67. I am greatly indebted to Eric Hutton’s work for my analysis of this passage. See 
Hutton, “Does Xunzi have a Consistent Theory of Human Nature?” 224-25. Hutton has an interesting 
interpretation that “liking yi” in this passage pertains to liking others to act in yi ways towards oneself, with 
no implication that one likes to act in accordance with yi. This defends Xunzi from imputing a natural taste 
for yi to human beings. With a further examination of this passage, I offer another interpretation. 
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during the reign of Confucian sages, or the reign of tyrannical rulers. Now we have seen 
that Xunzi includes the desire for profit as part of the content of xing, and since our liking 
for yi is made parallel to our desire for profit in this passage, in that both are something 
that humans have, it appears at first sight that the qing of liking yi is also part of Xunzi’s 
delineation of xing. Furthermore, Xunzi has stated elsewhere that whether people are 
given to goodness or otherwise is determined essentially by what kind of rulers they 
have.17 This passage shows, however, that despite the fact that people are under the ruling 
system of Jie and Zhou Xin, and are following their Way, their liking for yi is retained to 
some extent. What seems to be suggested here is that for Xunzi, our liking for yi is not 
acquired through ritual habituation to some extent. 
 To resolve this issue, we should first note that Xunzi has always discussed our 
inborn dispositions in terms of desiring something, and have equated the xing of every 
person with the character of the petty man (xiaoren 小人).18 Yet, nowhere in the Xunzi is 
there mention of human beings desiring yi, or any indication that the xiaoren desires yi.19 
Moreover, in Xing e 23.7, Xunzi does not include the heart-mind’s liking for yi as a liking 
that arises from qing and xing. Thus, to say that people like yi need not be a claim that 
human beings naturally like and enjoy yi. As I submit, human beings for Xunzi acquire 
such a liking only after learning and practicing the Confucian rituals on an accumulative 
basis. At this juncture, I suggest we look at another passage in which Xunzi claims that 
human beings have yi. 
                                                 




19 For example, Xunzi lists the likings and dislikings of the xiaoren as honor and benefit, and disgrace and 
harm respectively. See Xunzi: Rongru 4.9.  
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Fire and water have qi but no life. Plants and trees possess life but lack 
awareness. Birds and beasts have awareness, but lack yi. Human beings 
possess qi, life, and awareness (zhic), and add to that, yi. It is for this 
reason that they are the noblest beings in the world. In physical power they 
are not as good as an ox, in swiftness they do not equal the horse; yet the 
ox and horse can be put to their use. Why is that? I say it is because 
humans alone can form societies (qun) and animals cannot. Why can man 
form a society? I say it is because humans alone can form societies and 
animals cannot. Why can man form a society? I say it is due to fen. How 
can fen be translated into behavior? I say it is because of yi. Thus, if yi is 
used to divide society into fen, concord will result (gu yi yi fen ze he 
故義以分則和). If there is concord between the classes, unity will result 
(he ze yi 和則一); if there is unity, great physical power will result (yi ze 
duo li 一則多力); if there is great physical power, real strength will result 
(duo li ze qiang 多力則強); if there is real strength, all objects can be 
overcome (qiang ze sheng 強則勝). For this reason, humans can acquire 
places and houses where they can dwell in safety. Thus, that they put the 
four seasons in their proper sequence, control the myriad of things, 
universally benefit the whole world (古序四時，裁万物，兼利天下), is due 
to no other cause than getting fen-yi (分義).20  
In this famous Wangzhi “ladder,”21 Xunzi claims that qi, life and awareness are 
things that human beings have (which are properties clearly characterized as inborn to 
man in other chapters), and goes on to claim that what separates man from, and makes 
them more noble than other beings is their possession of yi. In this context, having yi 
seems to indicate that people are naturally responsive to things pertaining to yi because of 
their endowed taste for it, much like what Mencius claims.  
Not only does this interpretation create problems for Xunzi’s dictum, “Xing e,”22 
making him out to be more Mencian than he thinks, but, as Eric Hutton points out,23 is 
                                                 
20 Xunzi: Wangzhi 9.19. Knoblock’s original translation of yi is “a sense of morality and justice.” For 
reasons that will become evident, this translation is highly inappropriate, in particular the characterization 
of “yi” as some kind of sensibility.  
 
21 This label is given by Nivison in “Replies and Comments,” 321.  
 
22 The Wangzhi “ladder” is raised by both Munro and Nivison as a problematic for Xunzi’s view on xing 
being “e.” Munro denotes “having yi” as “having an innate moral sense,” and sees no problem with this 
interpretation because he thinks Xunzi’s primary concern is never about xing, but about how to form a 
orderly and harmonious society given the imbalance of goods with human desires. See Munro, “A Villain 
 98
also directly at odds with Xunzi’s assertion in Xing e 23.8: “Now, man’s xing is 
originally without ritual principles and yi as part of his xing; therefore he must study very 
hard when seeking them (gu qiang xue er qiu you zhi ye 故強學而求有之也). Xing does 
not endow him with awareness of them (xing by zhic li yi 性不知禮義); therefore in his 
thoughts and ideas he has to seek to understand ritual principles and yi (gu si lü qiu zhic 
zhi ye 故思慮求知之也).”24 If we read the Wangzhi “ladder” as saying that humans have a 
natural responsiveness to yi, then clearly Xunzi shoots himself in the foot by claiming in 
Xing e 23.8 that responsiveness to yi requires cognitive and conative efforts to be 
actualized. 
Upon a closer examination of the passage, we see that Xunzi links yi with the 
concepts of qun and fen. Specifically, he says that (1) our ability to qun arises from fen, 
(2) yi allows us to translate fen into action, (3) a chain of communally beneficial effects 
(concord-unity-great physical power etc.) will occur if yi is used to fen society, which 
permits humans to acquire houses and places and dwell in safety, and finally (4) “that 
they “put the four seasons in their proper sequence, control the myriad of things, 
universally benefit the whole world)” is through their getting25 of fen-yi. By tracing out 
the connection of these concepts, and drawing attention to the precedent and subsequent 
                                                                                                                                                 
in the Xunzi,”198. Nivison proposes a solution by arguing that “having yi” refers to having a bare non-
moral capacity for regarding something as a duty, whereby its proper content (the transformation of a mere 
“ought” into an “moral” ought) is something invented by the Confucian sages.  See Nivison, The Ways of 
Confucianism, 206-13; “Replies and Comments,” 321-22. Nivison, however, has changed his views on the 
Wangzhi “ladder,” which I shall discuss later. 
 
23 See Hutton, “Does Xunzi have a Consistent Theory of Human Nature?,” 222. 
 
24 Xunzi: Xing e 23.8.  
 
25 As Hutton elucidates, Xunzi’s choice of words, “de yi,” already implies that Xunzi never means “yi” as 
an endowed disposition and thus as part of human xing. Hutton, “Does Xunzi have a Consistent Theory of 
Human Nature?,” 224. 
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passages of the Wangzhi “ladder,” 9.18 and 9.20, in examining (4) to (1) in this order, I 
want to bring out the presumptions underlying Xunzi’s claim that “humans have yi.” 
From this, I shall show that “having yi” does not refer to some incipient moral taste and 
sensibility that people have. 
We have seen that the proper fen26 for Xunzi pertains specifically to the ritually 
codified hierarchical divisions of societal life and identity established by the sage kings. 
As Knoblock writes, “fen [in the Xunzi] is a technical term referring here to the patterns 
                                                 
26 In my analysis, Xunzi views fen as a product of our ability to distinguish (bian 辨). Nivison has also 
interpreted Xunzi’s technical usage of fen as such: “Thus fen is something we have done with our abilities 
[to bian], not the abilities themselves.” See David S. Nivison, “Response to James Behuniak,” PEW 50.1 
(2000): 115. In the Xunzi, bian is a natural ability that every human has. As Xunzi writes, “The eyes bian 
white from black, the beautiful from the ugly. The ear bian sounds and tones as to their shrillness or 
sonority….These, too, are part of the nature that man is born possessing, that he does not have to develop, 
and that is true of both Yu and Jie.” Xunzi: Rongru 4.11. It is also an ethically neutral ability, since it is 
used to differentiate between white and black, beautiful from ugly etc., and morally polar opposites like Yu 
and Jie both have this ability.  
Furthermore, Xunzi talks about how petty man, the gentleman and the sage engages in bian, and 
that the petty man engages in bian to discuss (yan) about danger, while the gentleman bian to discuss about 
the principle of humanity. See Xunzi: Feixiang 5.17. This lends further support that bian is an ethically 
neutral ability, since we can use it to yan (which as discussed, can refer to common speech as well as 
doctrines, teachings etc) about moral and non-moral subjects. See Xunzi: Feixiang: 5.18. Xunzi also claims 
that bian allows us to find principle of things. Xunzi: Ruxiao 8.20. Thus, we can see that for Xunzi, bian is 
related to knowledge, since it can be used to produce principles, doctrines etc. As such, bian for Xunzi 
probably serves as the power to gain knowledge regarding principles for how to guide and organize human 
society, and as discussed, only the ancient Confucian sages manage to generate it in a comprehensive 
manner. As Xunzi writes, “Only the most discriminating (bian) will be able to fen properly….only the most 
enlightened will be able to make it harmonious. Thus, only a sage is capable of fully meeting these three 
conditions (Xunzi: Zhenglun 18.2)”, and that such bian, none is more important than that between fen. Of 
the instruments for fen, none is more important than ritual principles. Of the sources of ritual principles, 
none is more important than the sage kings.” 
Hence, as a natural, neutral ability for deriving knowledge (in necessary conjunction with other 
functions of the heart-mind), bian for Xunzi underlies the generation of the proper Dao of man, as it 
facilitates the formulation of proper social distinctions and relationships, for instance, as between that of 
father and son. As Xunzi writes in Feixiang 5.9, “Hence, what makes a man lies…in his ability to bian. 
Even though wild animals have parents and offspring, there is no natural affection between them as 
between father and son, and though there are male and female of the species, there is no proper separation 
of sexes. Hence, the proper way of man lies in nothing other than his ability to bian.”  
The necessity of using other functions of the heart-mind to achieve knowledge in Xunzian thought 
is an extensive topic in itself and will bring me out of focus. I will therefore not discuss it further except to 
bring one’s attention that Xunzi thinks that bian is required for “zhengzhic (徵知)—authenticating what the 
sensory organs bring to its awareness. For how such functions of the heart-mind must be used to produce 
knowledge in Xunzi’s view, see Cua, Ethical Argumentation, et .passim ; Lee, The Autonomy of Xin and 
Ethical Theory in Xunzi, 56-66.  
 
 100
of life that characterize each of the classes into which the sages divided society.”27 And it 
is the assimilation of such fen, i.e., internalizing and adhering to ritualized way of life, 
that human beings de zhi fen-yi. I render the term “fen-yi”28 refers to observing the duties, 
responsibilities, and behavioral norms of one’s class, or doing what is appropriate in view 
of the requirements of one’s social roles.29 This can be seen in Fei shi er zi 6.12, where 
Xunzi makes terminological compounds of yi such as observing protocol appropriate to a 
minister and subject (chen xia zhi yi 臣下之義), observing demeanor of a son or younger 
brother (zhi di zhi yi 子弟之義) etc, all of which are linked to the patterns of life 
customized by one’s fen. Continuing this train of thought, we can reason that it is through 
“getting” the lia of the rites that we “get” yi. Therefore, getting ritual principles and 
getting yi are inseparably connected. Like Nivison, I contend that in the Wangzhi 
“ladder,” the intension and extension of the term “yi” should be taken as what pertains to 
li-yi,30 a term which occurs throughout the Xunzi. With this reading of yi, let us look at 
statements (4) to (1).  
In (4), Xunzi says that it is the getting of fen-yi that we can put the four seasons in 
their proper sequence, control the myriad of things, and universally benefit the whole 
                                                 
27 See n. 87 in Knoblock, Xunzi: A Translation and Study of the Complete Works v.1, 292.  In his glossary, 
Knoblock writes that in the Xunzi, “fen regularly has the technical sense of the divisions or distinctions that 
characterize the hierarchical society the Ru thinkers advocated… the pattern of life customary to the 
“division” of society to which one belonged.” Ibid., 251.  
 
28 Some occurrences of fen-yi in the text are Xunzi: Qiangguo 16.2; Junzi 24.2.  
 
29Since fen denotes one’s share of goods in society, fen-yi also refers to keeping to the goods allotted to 
one’s station. As Xunzi writes: “The laws of state forbid picking objects that have left behind, since they 
condemn the people’s practice of obtaining things that do not belong to one’s fen. If there is fen-yi, then the 
whole world will become orderly, if there is no fen-yi, then a single wife and a single concubine will cause 
chaos.” Quoted from Xunzi: Dalue 27.113.  
 
30 According to Nivison, li-yi is an “A+B compound” and is treated separately by Xunzi at times.  They are 
therefore not synonyms. Nevertheless, in a lot of contexts, Xunzi uses yi and li-yi interchangeably. See 
Nivison, “Response to James Behuniak,”113-14. 
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world. As I contend, this claim makes sense in Xunzian thought only if we understand yi 
in fen-yi as li-yi. Indeed, it is no coincidence that in the section preceding the “ladder” 
passage, Xunzi depicts the gentleman as providing the organizing principle (lia) for 
Heaven and Earth, and the beginning of li-yi and the summation of the myriad of things, 
and claims how the gentleman uses lia to devise social roles and functions as a foundation 
for order (which is another way of saying that we need a schema of fen to install order). 
As such, the creation and institution of li-yi by the sages is what makes it possible for 
human beings to get fen-yi, or rather fen-li-yi, and allows them to organize themselves 
into effectuating activities like “controlling the myriad of things.”31 
In (3), Xunzi’s claim is that using yi to fen society will result in concord, unity, 
strength etc. In the passage that comes after the Wangzhi “ladder,” Xunzi says that if a 
society is formed without fen, the antithesis of concord, unity and strength (i.e., strife, 
fragmentation and weakness) would result and human beings would not obtain places and 
houses in which to live in security. In view of this, we should never neglect li-yi. This 
implies that we need to use li-yi to fen society so that concord, unity, and strength etc 
would arise in man. From (4) and (3), we can reason that it is the use of li-yi that (2) 
allows us to translate fen into behavior so that (1) human beings can qun. 
Based on what has been discussed, it is evident, even if not explicitly stated, that 
when Xunzi says that human beings have yi besides qi, life and awareness, he does not 
see “having yi” and “having li” as apart. 32 For Xunzi, having yi here means knowing the 
                                                 
31 In the Tianlun chapters, Xunzi gives an account of the sages bringing order to the four sequences. See in 
particular Xunzi: Tianlun 17.5; 17.6. 
 
32 One puzzling question is why Xunzi chooses to say human beings have yi instead of li-yi in the Wangzhi 
“ladder.” Nivison gives a plausible answer by suggesting that Xunzi probably uses yi to maintain the 
monosyllabic ring in rounding up the things (i.e. qi, sheng ,and zhi) humans have, without meaning to 
imply anything about how we come to have them, or to say anything about our inborn dispositions. See 
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rationale excogitated by the sages, following it by having undergone ritual assimilation, 
and observing the norms and protocols of one’s social class and roles. Following Nivison, 
I read Xunzian notion of yi as “an institutional feature exhibited by humans as a 
species.”33 It is not some taste and sensibility that we have prior to ritual socialization. 34 
Thus, “having yi” for Xunzi is far from the Mencian sense of having an inborn 
responsiveness towards yi. For Xunzi, humans have yi in the same sense that they “have 
tools;”35 they have yi insofar as they are “equipped” with ritual principles. Yi is therefore 
a characteristic of human-in-ritualized society, and “acquired” in the process of learning 
and practicing rites, and is something that one does by following directives set by the 
rites. 
With this view of the conceptual linkages between lia, li, yi, and fen in the Xunzi, 
let us look at the rest of Dalue 27.67 to understand what Xunzi means by saying that 
human beings have a liking for yi. 
Thus, one who causes yi to conquer profit makes his age well ordered, 
whereas one who causes profit to overcome yi creates a chaotic age. When 
superiors stress the importance of yi, yi overcomes profit…A lord who 
possesses a whole state does not raise cattle and sheep, a minister charged 
with arranging ceremonial gifts does not raise chickens and pigs. A great 
minister does not repair a broken fence. A grand officer does not take care 
of open spaces and gardens. When everyone, from knights to the highest 
                                                                                                                                                 
Nivison, “Response to James Behuniak,”113. Nivison is probably right but I would add that the import of 
the “ladder” text can only be fully understood if we read it together with Wangzhi 9.18 and 9.20 (and 
perhaps also 9.21). 
 
33 Ibid.,114. To understand why and how Nivison rejects his original interpretation of yi in The Ways of 
Confucianism, see James Behuniak’s criticism of Nivison in James Behuniak, “Nivison and the “Problem” 
in Xunzi’s Ethics”, PEW 50.1 (2000), passim; For other interpretation of Xunzian idea of “yi,” see Munro, 
“A Villain in the Xunzi,” 198. Shun, Mencius and Early Chinese Thought, 226; Robert Eno, The Confucian 
Creation of Heaven (Albany: State University of New York press, 1990), 273-74; Edward J. Machle, 
Nature and Heaven in the Xunzi (Albany: State University of New York press, 1993), 203 & n. 52.  
  
34 See Nivison, “Response to James Behuniak,”114. 
 
35 Quoted from Hutton, “Does Xunzi have a Consistent Theory of Human Nature,” 225. 
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officials, feels ashamed of being eager for profits, they will not compete 
with the people for goods. Rather, they will find enjoyment in their 
portions and grants, considering it disgraceful to engage in accumulating 
stores (le fen shi er chi ji zang 樂分施而耻積臧). This being the case will 
result in the people not being beset with difficulties over goods and in the 
poor and wretched having something to lay their hands on.  
Here, Xunzi says that in an orderly state (i.e. a state that operates on ritual 
principles), the higher echelons of society are conditioned to see the fit between the work 
they do and the goods and benefits that they get. This conditioning, as I contend, is 
equally applicable to every other class. In being conditioned so, human beings acquire a 
sense of enjoyment and contentment with their share of goods and benefits, and do not 
hanker after what is outside or beyond their due lot. They like what is fen to them (the 
share belonging to one’s class) and dislike the hoarding of goods that will deprive other 
classes of their allotments. In consideration of this, one can claim with confidence that 
“having a liking for yi” in this passage actually refers to “having a liking for what is fen 
to us,” in the sense that we take delight in the goods and the pattern of life and desire-
satisfaction proper to our individual social class.36 In Xunzi’s words: “Deliberate (lü 慮) 
on them [the patterns of life given the rites] and you can attain inner peace (an 安). 
Repeat (fan 反), imitate (yan 鈆), and investigate (cha 察) them, and you will love all the 
more. If you use them to bring order to your qing, you will benefit…. what could bring 
greater joy to your view (yia 意) than this!”37 By undergoing ritualization, which forms 
and shapes affirmative attitudes towards the Confucian rites as the ideal organization of 
                                                 
36 According to Knoblock, when fen corresponds to lia, there is harmony. As he writes, “people recognize 
the justness of their position, of their duties, and of their rewards. Things are as ought to be is the general 
perception.” See Knoblock, Xunzi: A Translation and Study of the Complete Works v.1, 82-83.  
 
 
37 Xunzi: Rongru 4.13.   
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social life, people will on the whole come to follow and enjoy what is yi; i.e. what is ke or 
approved in line with one’s socially ranked lot. 
Thus, Xunzi does not think that prior to ritualization, human beings are able to 
cognize the value of the Confucian Dao, and appreciate the benefits of acting in 
accordance with the rites. It follows that we lack any natural inclination to like and enjoy 
acting in accordance with yi.38 Liking yi for Xunzi is, to reiterate, a product of learning 
and practicing the ritual principles.  
4.4  Deficiencies of our Other-regarding Emotions and Desires 
 However, in thinking that our liking and responsiveness to yi is a product of 
learning and practicing the ritual principles, we must note that Xunzi does not claim that 
we are creatures that are simply self-interested. In the Lilun chapter, 39 Xunzi outlines 
feelings which are other-regarding, such as love and concern for others, as part of our 
inborn affective dispositions and as mentioned previously, also states that man have 
emotions such stirred by thinking and longing for the dearly departed, which serve as the 
basis of the sacrificial rites.40 In justifying the three-year mourning period for parents, 
                                                 
38 I owe this point to Ivanhoe. See Ivanhoe, “Human Nature and Moral Understanding in the Xunzi,” 240. 
 
39 As Shun notes, the Lilun chapter seem to be written with a defense against Mohist’s critique of 
Confucian ritual practices in mind, while the Xing e chapter is written specifically to criticize Mencius’ 
theory. In defending and attacking positions that seem to undermine his idea of the Confucian view in 
different contexts and time, Xunzi might not perceive any conflict in asserting that the rationale of 
Confucian ritual practices shows the way to the appropriate fulfillment of our natural, other-regarding 
emotions, and in asserting that our xing is e due to our collective insatiable gratification of natural, self-
interested emotions and desires. From this, Shun thinks that we should not take Xunzi to task for his 
inconsistencies because the two chapters might represent different stages and concerns in the development 
of his thought; we cannot rule out the possibility that the Xunzi was never constructed as a coherent whole. 
See Shun, Mencius and Early Chinese Thought, 224. For argumentative support for the last point, read 
Munro’s analysis, which is based on Kanaya Osamu’s textual study of the Xunzi. Donald Munro, The 
Concept of Man in Early China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969), 77-78.  
 
40 Since Xunzi views the establishment of rituals and their principles as precipitated on the nature of other-
regarding emotions, it is highly likely that he thinks we have this sort of emotions prior to learning and 
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Xunzi says that as beings with awareness, we love our own kind. And since human 
awareness is considerably more extensive than other animals, our love for our own kind 
exceeds those of animal.41 The prolongation of funereal observation for parents is 
therefore made-to-measure the grief and pain felt from deep filial attachment and love, as 
with many other kinds of rites for other-regarding affective movements of the heart-
mind.42 Xunzi therefore does not discount the fact that human beings have inherent 
emotions and concerns that stem from and show the affinity and bonding between self 
and the other, especially those with whom one has a close history of interaction with.43 
Despite this, Xunzi does not, unlike Mencius, construe the “other-directedness” of these 
natural emotions and concerns as indicating a “moral directedness” in itself.44 
 In my reading, Xunzi does not romanticize these other-regarding emotions as 
allowing them to be spontaneously conveyed may actually lead to “e” forms of activities 
and expressions. As Eric Hutton points out, a person A may express his filial love for his 
father by harming others, such as the father of person B, and this may in turn provoke B 
                                                                                                                                                 
practicing the rites. This point is highlighted by Shun. I have benefited much from consulting Shun’s 




41 See Xunzi: Lilun 19.18.  
 
42 Xunzi: Lilun 19.22: “The Ancient Kings acted to establish proper forms wherein men could express the 
full measure of their obligation to pay honor to those deserving honor and to show affection to those whom 
they cherished (故先王案爲之至矣，尊尊親親之義至矣). 
 
43 Shun, Mencius and Early Chinese Thought, 223-24. 
 
44 Many commentators have taken this line of interpretation. See Antonio Cua, “The Quasi-Empirical 
Aspect of Hsun-Tzu’s Philosophy of Human Nature,” PEW 28.1 (1978), 9; Shun, Mencius and Early 
Chinese Thought, 223-24; Chong, “Xunzi’s Systematic Critique of Mencius,” 221-23; as well as various 
authors in Virtue, Nature, and Moral Agency in the Xunzi, in particular David Wong, “Xunzi on Moral 
Motivation,” 148-50, et passim; T.C Kline, “Moral Agency and Motivation in the Xunzi,” 161; Hutton, 
“Does Xunzi have a Consistent Theory of Human  Nature?,” 230-31, et passim.  
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into harming A’s father.45 Such love and concern for familial others, if not properly 
regulated by the rites, may bring people into conflicts and clashes, and end up not just 
harming others, but also the object of our love.  
 Hence, the “other-regarding” nature of such emotions does not mean that the 
behavioral responses that they impel us to are necessarily expressions and actions that 
Xunzi (or any other Confucian ethicists) would consider as ethical or virtuous. Indeed, as 
Xunzi argues, even a natural emotion like joy, which facilitates and accompanies 
psychological unification between human beings, will lead to disorderly states in the 
world if not given proper forms of expression.46 The same thing goes for having a 
compassionate (en 恩)47concern for others—extending (tui) such a concern without lia 
would not achieve benevolence.48 I believe we can extend this standpoint of Xunzi to his 
views on all our other-regarding emotions and desires, and contend that the pursuance of 
their objects and ends do not translate into orderly and harmonious forms and patterns if 
not brought within the control of the ritual circuit. More likely, their spontaneous 
expressions are as problematic as our self-regarding emotions and desires. On a collective 
interactive level, they will also result in social conflicts, as can be inferred from the logic 
of Hutton’s example. 
                                                 
45 In Hutton’s view, love for parents does not constitute a tendency towards virtue for Xunzi, “because it 
becomes a virtue only when given the proper form, and there is no natural tendency to do that.” See Hutton, 
“Does Xunzi have a Consistent Theory of Human Nature,” 231. Hutton’s example seems particularly apt 
when one considers what Mencius says in 7B: 7: “Only now do I realize how serious it is to kill a member 
of the family of another man. If you killed his father, he would kill your father….This being the case, 
though you may not kill your father….with your own hands, it is but one step removed.”  See Lau, 
Mencius, 289. As I shall show later, Mencius also regards the expression of our emotions into patterns and 
forms as an important factor in considering whether one has acted virtuously or not.  
 
46 See Xunzi: Yuelun 20.1.  
 
47 “En,” as many commentators remark, is translatable as or at least intimately linked with “compassion.” 
 
48 “To extend compassion to others but not accord with lia is not to perfect ren conduct.” See  Xunzi: Dalue 
27.22.  
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 Support for this can be seen in the way Xunzi links dissolute and wanton behavior 
as a form of disorder (yin luan 淫亂) with the collapse of li-yi wen-lia (禮義文理).49 As 
understood by Chong and other commentators, while lia constitutes a rationale that gives 
rise to order in the world and is “contrasted with various forms of disorderliness,50 wen 
denotes forms of expression and activity which are cultured and refined, as well as 
reasonable and judicious. In combining li-yi with wen-lia, and saying that yin luan results 
from their breakdown, I take Xunzi to be saying that rituals and their instituted patterns of 
yi allow man to channel and translate their emotions into proper (in the sense of being 
refined and reasonable) forms of activity and expressions, which prevent disorderly states 
like yin-luan from arising in society. Given that Xunzi also says that the Dao of the filial 
son comes from following li-yi wen-lia,51 one can reason that for Xunzi, our other-
regarding emotions and concerns must also conveyed in ritualized forms before they can 
actually be characterized as “shan.” For Xunzi, we must learn and practice li-yi wen-lia so 
as to direct our “pristine”52 other-regarding emotions and concerns to morally appropriate 
forms of expression and activity. 
                                                 
 
49 See Xunzi: Xing e 23.2. 
 
50 Quoted from n. 20 in Chong, “Xunzi’s Systematic Critique of Mencius,” 231-32. My analysis follows 
Chong’s views closely. According to Chong in his note, Tang Junyi  points out that “wen-lia (文理) is the 
sense of lia most emphasized” in the Xing e chapter and “is closely connected with its homophone wen-li 
(文禮).”   
 
51 Xunzi: Xing e 23.6.  
 
52 The word “pristine” is used because for Xunzi, the original “untainted” expressions of our emotions do 
not lead to “shan” patterns of behavior, and have to be artificially transformed via wei. Wei has traditionally 
been treated as a “pejorative” term in some Chinese philosophical schools of thought and is translated by 
commentators as false, inauthentic or hypocritical. Xunzi, however, uses it positively because xing cannot 
be left au naturel and has to be transformed by the artifice of rituals to become good. For a discussion on 
this, see Chad Hansen, “Xunzi: Pragmatic Confucianism,” in A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought: A 
Philosophical Interpretation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 320. 
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 In this treatment so far, we see that forms of expression and activity is an 
important criterion in Xunzi’s assessment of our emotional dispositions, and only the 
cultural forms embodied by the Confucian rituals would suffice to translate any emotions 
and desires, be they self-regarding or other-regarding, into socially harmonious and 
orderly expressions of behavior. Still, this does not quite capture Xunzi’s thought, as one 
can argue that ritual forms and expressions are but extensions of the original forms and 
expressions of other-regarding emotions and desires. Since these emotions and desires 
provide the initial patterns for the creation of these ritual forms and their functions, they 
must have been able to generate certain effects, or direct us to something that bears a 
rudimentary resemblance to what the rites produce and direct us to. Rites like Confucian 
funeral ceremonies are therefore “ideal” expressions of other-regarding feelings like love 
for parents, having fine-tuned the original behavioral responses of such emotions and 
concerns into cultivated forms and expressions that can consistently and uniformly 
produce good effects. Against any suggestion of such a relationship between ritual forms 
and expressions and the natural forms and expressions of other-regarding emotions, 
Xunzi says: 
An inquirer says: Li-yi, accumulated effort, and acquired abilities are part 
of human xing, which is why the sages were able to produce them. The 
reply is that this is not so. The potter molds clay to make an earthenware 
dish, but how could the dish be regarded as part of the potter’s xing? The 
artisan carves wood to make a vessel, but how could the wooden vessel be 
regarded as part of the artisan’s xing. The sage’s relation to li-yi is just like 
that of the potter molding his clay. This being so, how could li-yi, 
accumulated effort, and acquired abilities be part of man’s original xing?53 
It is evident here that for Xunzi, the relationship between our xing and the rites 
should be construed as the relationship of raw material to a product, whereby we cannot 
                                                 
53 Xunzi: Xing e 23.12. 
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simply trace the form of the product back to the characteristics of the raw material.54 
Chong makes a good point where he proposes that Xunzi is pointing out a variant of the 
“genetic fallacy”—it is fallacious to assume that any product that we make has the same 
form and structure as the raw material that go into their construction.55 Conversely, it is 
fallacious to assume that the raw material already possess the same form and structure of 
the final product. Given that the product has a different form and structure from its 
material, many of its properties and capabilities would not inhere in the material. 
We can elucidate Xunzi’s point by examining the relationship between clay and 
earthenware dish. Clay provides the potter with the ingredient to create the form of 
earthenware dish. By making clay undergo certain processes and procedures devised by 
human ingenuity, the potter substantively directs and transforms the clay into an artifice 
that has the capability or power to hold food. Clay is able to hold food (or other things) 
when it is made into the form of a dish. Nevertheless, it is false to say that clay already 
possess the form and structural qualities of the dish, or to say that the form and structural 
qualities of the dish are extensions of the form and structural qualities of the clay. And 
without the form and structural qualities of the dish, we cannot say that the clay has the 
capability of holding food. 
Analogously, the form and structural qualities of the rites neither inhere in our 
other-regarding emotional dispositions, nor are they extensions of the form and structure 
                                                 
 
54 In one passage of the Lilun chapter (which some writers believe belongs to the Xing e chapter), Xunzi 
states that “Xing is the root and beginning, the raw material and original constitution. Wei is the form and 
principle of order, the development and completion. If there were no xing, then there would be nothing for 
wei to improve; if there were no wei, then xing could not refine itself.” Xunzi further claims that it is the 
union of both xing and wei that man and society perfects themselves in the form of the sage and the unified 
order of the world respectively. See Xunzi: Lilun 19.15. 
 
55 See Chong, “Xunzi’s Systematic Critique of Mencius,” 222.  
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of such dispositions. There is simply no continuity between the rites and other-regarding 
emotions in terms of their formal and structural constitution.56 For Xunzi, just the 
rationale of the dish shape is something thought out by human creativity, the regulative 
cum aesthetic rationale underlying ritual forms and structures originates from the 
sophisticated reflections and experimentations by the sages. Such deliberative activities 
do not depend on the engagement of our emotional dispositions, but on our cognitive and 
conative powers. Hence, even if we are endowed with other-directed emotional 
dispositions, the former sages did not rely on their guidance in any straightforward and 
positive manner to solve human problems and to generate the proper Dao. What can be 
said about the relationship of ritual principles and other-regarding emotions is this: just 
the originators of the craft of pottery must understand the nature of the material he is 
working at, and devise principles that “as far as possible work with the grain as opposed 
to against it,”57 the sages must also understand the nature of such emotions, and devise 
principles that engender a modification of their original form and structure that would 
enable us to produce goodness in terms of effectuating harmonious and orderly forms of 
behavior. 
                                                 
 
56 Based on the lack of continuity between rituals and other-regarding emotions and desires in terms of 
form and structure, Chong argues that, from Xunzi’s perspective, we cannot presume that the original 
expressions and responses of other-regarding emotions and desires must tend towards the good to some 
extent. In his words, these “emotions do not come to us in a morally packaged way, but require nurturance 
and guidance through the rites.” As such, the admittance of other-regarding emotions and concerns does not 
undermine Xunzi’s thesis, “Xing e,” as the capability to direct us towards, or produce the good is not in any 
way intrinsic to the nature of such emotion, but is always extrinsically based on the impact of ritual 
principles which constitutively transform their forms and structures into moral ones. See Chong, “Xunzi’s 
Systematic Critique of Mencius,” et  passim.  
 
57 Quoted from Kline, “Moral Agency and Motivation in the Xunzi,” 157. 
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At this juncture, I want to comment on Xunzi’s claim that “men desire to do good 
is the product of the fact that their xing is e (人之欲爲善責，爲性惡也).”58 In response to 
Xunzi’s claim, Nivison argues that a Mencian can object that this desire to rectify an 
inherent moral lack is indicative that we have feelings that want to better ourselves 
through the development of certain qualities, and this reflects the goodness inherent in 
our xing.59 Whether or not it is implicit in this argument of Nivison, we have to stress for 
Xunzi that the assessment of the goodness or badness of our affective tendencies lies 
largely on their performative effects, i.e., whether their resultant expressions and 
activities can impact on the world in ways that produce shan outcomes. 
With this in mind, I would like to propose here that perhaps the desire to do good 
for Xunzi pertain to our naturally arising other-regarding emotions and concerns that he 
adumbrates in the Lilun chapter. Said differently, having psychological episodes of the 
desire to do good is none other than having episodes of having other-regarding emotions 
arise in us.60 If we accept this, we can surmise that for Xunzi, the desire to do good as a 
                                                 
 
58 Xunzi: Xing e 23.8. 
 
59 See Nivison, The Ways of Confucianism, 211-12. Cua submits that Xunzi’s conceptual point about the 
nature of a desire (what one desires is necessarily something perceived as what one lacks) throws no light 
on whether human xing is e or good, as one can desire something that one lacks, but can also desire more of 
something that one already has, if one is not yet completely satisfied with it. See Cua, “The Quasi-
Empirical Aspect of Hsun-Tzu’s Philosophy of Human Nature,” 3-19. Wong argues that Xunzi’s aim in 
this passage is not so much to show that our xing is not good, but to argue that “contra those who think that 
goodness must come from goodness, that goodness can come from evil.” See Wong, “Xunzi on Moral 
Motivation,” 144.  
 
 
60 Fung Yu-lan interprets the desire to do good as arising from a consideration of one’s long-term interest.  
Fung Yu-lan, A History of Chinese Philosophy v.1 trans. by Derk Bodde (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1962), 209-01. Wong argues against Fung’s reading because it cannot explain how the ancient sages 
for Xunzi can transform themselves into people who love morality for its own sake. As Wong points out, 
Xunzi never really says anything substantial regarding the status of the desire to do good. The reason 
perhaps can very well be that he is never sure how it can fit with his thesis “xing e.”  
Nevertheless, Wong gives Xunzi’s claim that we have desires to do good an interpretation that fits 
with his thesis “Xing e”, as well as explain how one can move from being self-interested to a delight in 
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natural drive must also undergo ritual processes and structuralization before it can lead to 
good expressions in the world. Thus, in my reading of Xunzi, even though we have 
feelings that want or desire to do good, they would still be characterized as “e” because 
they lack certain qualities that translate into good expressions or responses. As I contend, 
the “lack” in our spontaneously occurrent emotions and desires for Xunzi (which 
underlies his depiction of xing as e) is the lack of forms and structures for directing us 
towards the effectuation of the good (i.e. zheng li ping zhi), which we have to actively 
seek “outside” from the Confucian rites through a learning and application process.  
According to Shun, Xunzi seems to posit a further “lack” in our naturally arising 
other-regarding emotions, concerns and desires, which has to do with their motivational 
nature.61 In the Xing e chapter, Xunzi observes that when hungry, one desires food and 
when tired, one desires rest, and claims that deference to fathers and elder brothers, such 
as not eating before they do and relieving them of their workload, are modes of behavior 
that go against his actual qing and xing.62 Also, Xunzi states that human beings have a 
love of profit and a desire to obtain it, so much so that brothers would fight against each 
other for bigger shares of good if they follow their qing and xing.63 
 Based on this, Shun argues that even though Xunzi attributes to human beings 
some natural concern for familial members, and in my reading, some intrinsic desires to 
                                                                                                                                                 
morality in itself.  See Wong, “Xunzi on Moral Motivation,” 146-47. Wong’s interpretation is similar to 
mine. He contends that the desire to do good is somehow related to the natural other-regarding feelings and 
concerns that Xunzi mentions in the Lilun chapter, and suggests that the desire to do good may be specified 
as a desire for harmony, to return good for good etc. Ibid., 147-51. Against Wong, Chong suggests that 
imputing a natural desire for harmony to Xunzi’s framework may make such a desire appear to be morally 
loaded, and thus gives Mencian defenders ammunition with which to criticize Xunzi.  See Chong, “Xunzi’s 
Systematic Critique of Mencius,” 225-26.  
 
61 See Shun, “Mencius and Early Chinese Thought,” 224. 
 
62 See Xunzi: Xing e 23.6. 
 
63 See Xunzi: Xing e 23.7. 
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do good, such concerns and desires may be far and fewer, and frequently less powerful 
than our self-regarding ones. In other words, the unritualized heart-mind does not 
prioritize the satisfaction of other-regarding desires, especially when self-regarding and 
other-regarding concerns and desires conflict. This is very likely why Xunzi contends 
that humans generally follow a course of life that is directed and focused on our own 
profit, and acting for the sake of the satisfying our self-regarding desires rather than our 
naturally occurrent other-regarding desires, because of their weak motivational efficacy. 
From Xunzi’s perspective, our other-regarding desires also seem to be an erratic 
and unreliable source of motivation for seeking the good. Support for this can be seen in 
Xunzi’s linking of the phrase “unexpected change (ge gui 愅詭)” to describe the way in 
which our feelings for the dead evoked by thinking and longing for the dead may move 
the heart-mind into a certain zhia.64 As I surmise for Xunzi, this unpredictable, impulsive 
nature of our other-regarding emotions and desires is very likely connected with his 
views on their passive and reactive evocation. When we spontaneously si (si for Xunzi is 
therefore highly likely an uncontrolled activity) about our experience with those whom 
we love and are close to, emotions such as grief and pain may stir us to aim at and 
execute their expression, albeit not in the right forms without acquiring knowledge and 
approval of the rites.65 
                                                 
64 Xunzi writes in Lilun 19.22: “There inevitably may be occasions in everyone’s life when he is seized by 
an unexpected change of mood, when feelings of disquietude and melancholy cause him to sigh involuntary 
or to feel that his breath is short from strong emotion (愅詭唈僾而不能無時至焉) 
 
65 Here we see that “si” for Xunzi seems to be an activity that can stir up and concentrate the affective 
motions of the heart-mind. In the next chapter, I shall argue that for Mencius, control of our environmental 
influence and exposure facilitates controlled, active, and voluntary engagements in si so as to regularly 
move and concentrate the heart-mind into emotive modes that aim at and effectively move us into seeking 
the good. 
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 Accordingly, Xunzi thinks that our other-regarding desires are deficient with 
respect to a sufficient degree of motivational consistency and potency for generating any 
discernible sort of non-random pattern. It follows that people who have not undergone 
proper ritualization would not be consistently and sufficiently moved to put the interests 
of their kin above their own. Hence, disorder and conflicts can occur even within the 
family. Consequently, our other-regarding emotions, concerns, and desires need to be 
regulated and shaped by li-yi wen-lia before they can be structured to an appropriate level 
of motivational consistency and degree. Due to their “lacks,” Xunzi, contra Mencius, 
does not think that we simply rely on our naturally occurrent other-regarding qing to 
engage in self-cultivation.  
Despite these deficiencies in our other-regarding emotions and desires, it is highly 
probable, and consistent with his outlook, that Xunzi thinks these emotions and desires 
serve as the “raw material” for developing oneself towards a liking for morality in itself 
and a genuine commitment to following its patterns. Before I go into this, we need to 
know, from Xunzi’s view, how the processes of wei rectify their deficiencies.  
 
4.5  The Cultivating Process towards Xunzian Ethical Ideal 
Pleasure (ai 喜) and anger (nu 怒), sorrow (ai 哀) and joy, like and dislike, 
and desire are differentiated by the heart-mind.66 
The qing being so paired, the heart-mind’s choosing between them is 
called lü. The heart-mind’s lü something and the ability to act on it (neng 
wei zhi dong 能爲之動) is called wei.67  
If a man uses his xueqi, zhiayi (志意),  zhiclü (知慮) to follow the 
requirements of ritual principles, good order penetrates every aspect of his 
activity.68  
                                                 
66 Xunzi: Zhengming 22.5.  
 
67 Xunzi: Zhengming 22.1.  
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 In juxtaposing these selected Xunzian writings, we can infer that for Xunzi, by 
having its deliberative processes structuralized by ritual principles, the heart-mind (which 
is naturally able to differentiate between antipodal pairs of emotions and desires) acquires 
the ability to assess an occasion, select what emotions and desires fit a certain occasion, 
so as to decide whether or not to fulfill certain emotions and desires when they are 
stimulated in it. This is part of the process of wei called zhiclü. Thereafter, the heart-mind 
will set itself towards executing a certain ritualized form of conveying his emotions and 
satisfying his desires (the operation of zhiayi). It becomes focused on ritually set aims to 
command the xueqi to execute those aims via ritualized forms of expression or activity.69 
For Xunzi, the heart-mind whose deliberative and motivational processes is structured by 
ritual principles is thus the agent that can lead us into morally proper courses by its 
activities of discerning and executing the emotions and expressions that fit a certain 
occasion. In my understanding of Xunzi, this is how the approval power of the heart-
mind can engender the cultivating process. 
To clarify with an example, let us conceive, with some imagination, what moves 
an average person (let us call him H) not to eat before his elder, even though he is hungry 
and desires food. As mentioned earlier, such a deferential mode of conduct is contrasted 
with the behavior that our xing and qing predispose us to do. From Xunzi’s standpoint, H 
therefore can only be someone who is ritually habituated and able to judge deferential 
behavior as ke or approvable; he understands that ritually prescribed ways of behavior, 
like not eating before his elders do, are prudential patterns that allow us to optimize 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
68 Xunzi: Xiushen 2.2. 
 
69 I have greatly benefited from Chan’s comments on section 2.2 of the Xiushen chapter. 
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desire-satisfaction in the long haul. Thus, even though X will be dissatisfied to some 
extent in forgoing the satisfaction of his hunger immediately, he will reason that such 
dissatisfaction will be outbalanced by the consequent avoidance of natural dislikes such 
unhappiness and stress brought on by possible conflicts with elders, which will 
significantly bring down his level of enjoyment in satisfying his hunger, as well as the 
fulfillment of his other-regarding emotions and concerns, such as love of his elders. As 
such, X approves of deferential forms of conduct based on his understanding that, all 
things considered, engagement in them results in a most favorable trade-off. 
With this approval, the heart-mind will then need to make the effort of 
deliberating about ritual principles and its emotional status to pick out and express the 
ones that fit the deferential performance of not eating before one’s elders. As I read 
Xunzi, such emotions and desires can only pertain to those that are other-regarding in 
nature. To sum up what moves a person not to eat before his elders, the heart-mind 
through its understanding and approval of ritual principles curbs the desire to satisfy 
one’s hunger, and directs itself towards conveying an affective concern for the interests 
of one’s elders by not eating before them. Hence, it is through wei, which encompasses 
the processes of zhilü, zhiayi and xueqi, that the “lacks” (in terms of motivational and 
expressional efficacy) in our other-regarding emotions and desires are rectified to 
effectuate morally good responses. 
As Lee argues, “the process of thinking that discerns and chooses between the 
various sets of emotions and desires is the pivotal juncture in Xunzi’s moral 
psychology,”70 and as I contend, in his views on the operations of moral agency. It shows 
that unlike Gaozi, Xunzi thinks that acting morally for the program of cultivating 
                                                 
70 Quoted from Lee, The Autonomy of Xin and Ethical Theory in Xunzi, 59. 
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ourselves towards the ethical ideal springs not just from making the effort to follow 
objectively set precepts, but also on making the effort to convey the right emotions (and 
satisfy the right desires) at the right time to support the pursuance of the good. One 
cannot merely consider and execute what one ought to do, but must also deliberate about 
what one should feel in order to have the right (cultivating) motivation for carrying out 
that act.71 It is through such a process that our other-regarding emotions and desires can 
influence our emotional and behavioral dispositions, so that we will gradually progress 
from a self-centered orientation to an increasing social sensitivity where the welfare and 
interests of others matter in our decisions to act.  
Thus, Xunzian moral agency, with an inextricable combination of elements like 
cognitive considerations and other-regarding emotions and desires configuring its 
motivational setting, derives from ritual principles that govern a person’s thought 
patterns. It is a product of a matrix of interaction between cognitive-cum-conative 
training, and their influences on the processes of zhiclü,  zhiayi, and xueqi, rather than 
spontaneous psychophysical activation. As Xunzi says: “The simple desires we receive 
from nature are controlled by the complex devises exercised by the heart-mind until it 
                                                 
 
71 Van Norden has an interesting interpretation that despite having certain commonalities in their views on 
xing, such as claiming that the effect of morality on xing is akin to the effect of using certain invented 
devices to direct and shape raw material, Xunzi and Gaozi’s dictum on xing differs because Xunzi does not 
subscribe to Gaozi’s “moral voluntarism,” defined as the thesis that we become good by mere acts of 
choice to do the good, and implies the claim that a moral character is not created gradually but can be 
created in an outright manner. As Van Norden argues, Xunzi, like Mencius, thinks that self-cultivation is a 
gradual, accumulative process, and his claim of “xing e” (rather than Gaozi’s “xing wu shan wu bu shan”) 
is meant to assert that we need to learn and practice rites over a long time to reform our inborn dispositions 
and develop a genuine morally character, which is one that delights in and responds to ritual and morality 
for their own sake. See Van Norden, “Mengzi and Xunzi: Two Views of Human Agency,”122-23, 126-27. 
For a good discussion on Gaozi’s moral voluntarism, see Nivison, “Philosophical Voluntarism in Fourth-
Century China,” in Ways of Confucianism, 121-32. Van Norden however does not explain for Xunzi how 
we can move from following rituals from a prudential consideration of self-interest to a delight and love of 
its rationale. I believe my interpretation, which is based on Wong’s treatment, supplements Van Norden’s 
reading in this aspect. 
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becomes inherently difficult to properly categorize what one has received from nature 
(所受乎天之一欲，制于所受乎心之多，固難類所受乎天也).”72 Kline describes best what 
Xunzi means when he submits that “approval can be understood as a motivational 
mechanism distinct from [a spontaneous] desire as such, yet not completely separate from 
desire…. [It is connected] to understanding, to our cognitive capacities to describe and 
evaluate our internal motives as well as the external situation.”73 With significant input 
from exercises of our cognitive/conative capacities that introduce new elements to and 
organize our aims and agency, what moves us to act morally cannot be described as a 
naturally occurrent response, but an “artifactual,” principled response arising out of wei. 
 Turning the spotlight back on how we can acquire intrinsic motivations for 
following rites and morality in Xunzi’s view, we can gather for Xunzi that when we are 
organized into adhering to ritualized ways of life, we develop an approval of their 
operative rationale for optimizing desire-satisfaction, the totality of which includes not 
just desires of a self-regarding nature, but also our other-regarding ones. From Xunzi’s 
perspective, it is highly likely that the process of responding to others from our other-
regarding emotions and desires in appropriate forms via ritual study and practice 
generates an awareness that their attainment and satisfaction provide us with our most 
significant and meaningful experiences. As David Wong argues, in having our other-
                                                 
 
72 Xunzi: Zhengming 22.11.  
 
 
73 Kline, “Moral Agency and Motivation in the Xunzi,” 160. Kline’s examination of what constitutes a 
moral motivation in Xunzian thought is to address Wong’s concern that the distinction between approval 
and desire might not be as strong as what Van Norden makes it out to be. For Wong’s argument, see Wong, 
“Xunzi on moral motivation,” 139-42. Van Norden makes the distinction between approval and desire so as 
to draw the contrast between Mencius and Xunzi’s view of agency. See Van Norden, “Mengzi and Xunzi: 
Two Views of Human Agency,” 118. The views and dialectics displayed by these commentators 
significantly influence my view of Xunzian moral motivation and agency.  
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regarding emotions and desires regulated, strengthened and refined by ritual processes, 
“we can come to love morality because it allows full expression of natural and deep 
human emotion.”74 In this way, we can become conditioned to respond to others via the 
Confucian rites and morality in an “intrinsic” way, i.e. to enjoy such forms of expressions 
and activities for their own sake, rather than for other ends.  
 From what has been said, we can now give a plausible explanation why Xunzi 
thinks that our approval of rites and morality can sometimes induce the choice of death as 
the course one has to take to stay within their parameters. For Xunzi, individuals who 
learn and practice the rites to a certain stage would achieve such a boost in the 
motivational and expressional efficacy of their other-regarding desires that in wanting to 
best satisfy such desires in and of themselves, they would in certain cases override their 
repulsion to death and ke seeking it to meet their other-regarding aims. In being ritually 
transformed to the point where the well-being of others gain substantial weight in our 
behavioral decisions, we may commit ourselves firmly to certain moral causes even if the 
way to achieve them is to intentionally seek death, for instance, in situations that call for 
the sacrifice of one’s life to save one’s loved ones. At this stage, we can surmise for 
Xunzi that the heart-mind in terms of its zhia has become focused and fixed on seeking 
and according with the ethical ideal. 
4.6  Summary 
 In this diagnosis, Xunzi thinks that our other-regarding emotions and desires lack 
motivational and expressional potencies for directing us to goodness. To rectify these 
                                                 
 




“lacks,” human beings need to familiarize themselves with ritual principles theoretically 
and practically, which will slowly inculcate an understanding and approval of these 
principles for the guidance and governance of their actions, words, and behavior. For 
Xunzi, one therefore becomes a moral agent if and only if one learns and implements the 
rationale of the rites on a habitual basis. Regular accumulation of ritually guided acts will 
restructure our characteristic responses in accordance shan, and gradually shift and 
nourished zhia in line with the ethical ideal. In the next section, I shall link up Xunzi’s 





      
 
     Xunzi’s Disagreement with Mencius:  
On the Distinction between Keyi and Neng 
 
5.1  Introduction 
 
In chapter 3 and 4, I have brought together and expanded on recent scholarly 
commentaries on Xunzian ideas to give a comprehensive account of why Xunzi thinks 
that responses triggered by the stimulation of our qing of likes and dislikes (and evoked 
by our spontaneous emotions and desires) do not effect shan expressions and deed. It is 
with this view of our pre-figured emotional dispositions that Xunzi thinks that they are 
not congenial for guiding our practice and attainment of the ethical ideal. Here, I want to 
link up Xunzi’s view of moral agency and the cultivating process with his distinction 
between keyi and neng to become or act as a sage. From this discussion, what will 
become apparent is that Xunzi’s distinction between keyi and neng is an extension of his 
criticism of Mencius that we can simply respond to our passively stimulated emotions 
and desires for effectuating moral forms of activity and expression. 
5.2  Xunzian Moral Agency and the Capacity for Sageliness 
From what has been discussed, Xunzi thinks that our behavior and actions (i.e. 
our seeking of objects) may be initiated from desiring to fulfill our passively stimulated 
emotions and desires, but moral agency centers on being concerned with checking and 
guiding such behavior and action by way of what one ke or bu ke for realizing these 
emotions and desires with. In Xunzi’s view, we should therefore make a distinction 
between a spontaneous response and a deliberative response to attaining our emotions 
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and satisfying our desires. They pertain to two different types of motivation, i.e. two 
different operations with regards to how the heart-mind executes its stimulated 
movements by the external environment, the latter a structuralized, controlled version of 
the former. To spontaneously respond to our stimulated emotions and desires is to be 
motivated by the mere ephemeral—the immediate satisfaction of one’s own emotions and 
desires to the fullest possible extent. In contrast, to have a deliberative response to our 
emotions and desires is to allow the heart-mind’s trained sense of what is ke and bu ke 
govern whether one realizes stimulated emotions and desires, as well as with what and 
how. This operation depends on projecting and planning the harmonization of one’s own 
emotions and desires with others’ emotions and desires in the most reasonable and 
felicitous fashion over the long run.1 For Xunzi, only this deliberative form of motivation 
can give rise to the formation and execution of shan expressions and activities that will 
accumulatively lead to the development of the ethical ideal. 
As diagnosed, Xunzi thinks ke as the driving force of morally good actions 
derives from understanding ritual principles, which furnish us with the necessary and 
most important repository of human erudition that broadens our outlook and gives us 
ethical guidance in life. For Xunzi, it is through understanding the rationale of Confucian 
rites that one will ke the proper Dao (for equilibrating the fulfillment of our emotions and 
desires with the fulfillment of others), and it is through ke that one will choose to follow 
                                                 
1As Xunzi says: “When a man sees something desirable, he must reflect on the fact that with time it could 
come to involve what is detestable. When he sees something beneficial, he should deliberate (lü) that 
sooner or later, it too, could come to involve harm. Only after weighing (quan 權) the total of the one 
against that of the other and maturely calculating should he determine the relative merits of choosing or 
refusing his desires and aversions. In this fashion, he will regularly avoid failure and being ensnared by 
what he has chosen. In general, the calamities (huan 患) that beset mankind are the result of the prejudices 
(pian 偏) and damages they cause. If, when a man sees something desirable, he does not deliberate that it 
may come to be detestable and, something beneficial, that it could come to be harmful, then it is inevitable 
that his movements will ensnare him and his actions will bring disgrace (ru 辱). Just this constitutes the 
calamity of prejudice and the damages that result from it.” Xunzi: Bugou 3.13.  
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moral forms of activities and expressions for attaining our qing. Such an understanding is 
generated by using the heart-mind’s cognitive and conative functions, which provide us 
respectively with the capacity to know (ke yi zhi 可以知) and the capacity to utilize and 
apply (ke yi neng 可以能) ritual principles. Moral agency for Xunzi is therefore a matter 
of receiving and establishing guiding principles in the heart-mind for attaining our 
emotions and satisfying our desires via the effort of exercising its cognitive and conative 
capacities. 
To elaborate, as Joyce Ho suggests, Xunzi does not think that self-cultivation is a 
process that is volunteered or chosen by anyone in its early stages.2 The initial stage of 
Xunzian moral development can be described as “artificial metamorphism”—enforcing 
modes of change in our inborn dispositions that would not otherwise happen without such 
enforcement.3 By their sheer pervasiveness and prevalence in society, the rites enforce a 
                                                 
2 See Joyce Ho, Transformation from Externalism to Internalism: The Possibility of External Reasons in 
Moral Cultivation, 5-6. Cited 18 March 2004. Available from 
http://www.stanford.edu/group/dualist/vol5/pdfs/ho.pdf 
 
3 From Xunzi’s perspective, cultivation towards sagehood is, as I submit, akin to the cultivation of a bonsai 
tree. The ideal form of a bonsai tree is never an “organic given,” but is something that must be actively 
manipulated by the craft and ideas of man. Besides giving the plant sufficient sunlight, water, and fertilizers 
etc, we have to actively control and structure its growth pattern over an extensive period of time to achieve 
our chosen conception of how it should look like.  
Thus, not only do we have to regulate the environmental conditions, we have to regulate the form 
of the plant to direct its growth as well. In other words, planting a tree in a pot, watering it once-a-week, 
and allowing nature to take its course would either create a short-lived “bonsai” effect, or a tree that cannot 
be called a bonsai. Discipline and effective management of prescribed techniques have to be applied to 
ensure that its structure grows towards the direction of a horticultural masterpiece. A bonsai project 
requires one to learn the fundamentals of the techniques, as well as to be committed in terms of time, effort 
and endurance. These obstacles can seem daunting to those wanting to enjoy the beauty of bonsai trees but 
are afraid that the hobby is too difficult or not worth the investment. The aesthetics and style of the bonsai 
tree are therefore very much dependent on the meticulous care of an enthusiast and not the tree per se, 
though the enthusiast should understand the plant and not contort it into an unrealistic or unsuitable design 
that does not meet its natural characteristics.  
When the chosen style is achieved, the bonsai tree should look natural, though its developmental 
process is definitely not. Like the cultivation of a bonsai, Xunzi thinks that ideal form (or character) of a 
person is due to the intentional design and arrangement of man. In Xunzi’s view, our natural dispositions 
do not and cannot blossom into their peak form by the simple program of establishing a positive 
surrounding. Beyond the provision of an environment conducive to moral development, we must actively 
refine and mold our dispositions into the proper form and channel them towards the proper direction, 
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model of behavior on the person, and mold him into following it without his own 
conscious knowledge or awareness of their presence. As a form of rote education to 
assimilate correct ideas of ke objects and ways, this initial cultivating process is not 
something that human beings delight in—it is not a comfortable or appealing way of life 
as it frequently requires us to override and moderate what we desire most. At times, we 
may experience some congruity between what is ke and what we desire. For instance, our 
natural love for parents makes following certain rites easier and to some extent 
pleasurable. But, more often than not, we are made to obey rules of conduct that stand at 
variance with our immediate, personal desires and inclinations.  
By the time we become conscious of the formative influence of the rites, we 
would have internalized some knowledge and partial understanding of their underlying 
rationale. Upon reflection on this understanding, together with a limited awareness of the 
objective facts of human and natural affairs, we can figure out and appreciate the goods 
and benefits that rites and moral ways offer to both society and the individual person. For 
example, we might realize how they help to coordinate and balance the totality of all our 
                                                                                                                                                 
whereby the notion of what is proper is determined and framed by the tradition invented and sustained by 
man’s ingenuity, rather than what is inherent within the structure of our natural dispositions. Rites, in the 
Xunzian view, are parallel to the wiring, pruning and trimming methods (as well as other devices and 
stratagems) used in the art of making a bonsai—they share the function of shaping and training a thing 
towards a certain direction of development, which is not intrinsic in the thing itself. Also, just the quality 
and progress of one’s bonsai tree depends on one’s willingness to put consistent efforts using the proper 
techniques of cultivation over a long period of time, the level and success of one’s moral development 
depends on this dedication and summative exertion.  
In a nutshell, the horticultural practice of cultivating bonsai trees can be seen as an analogy to 
Xunzi’s cultivation model because the ideal form of what we are cultivating is (a) due to the intentional 
design of man rather than to the structure of his internal dispositions, and (b) achieved over a long and 
tedious process of shaping his inborn dispositions to that intentional design. Also, the ideal form of the 
bonsai expresses the harmony between nature and man’s artifice (symbolized by the union of tree and pot), 






desires so that everyone can co-exist orderly and harmoniously, and how a person can 
rely on the rites as a means to optimally satisfy his own interests from present to future. 
All these prudential reasons instill into us an approval of ritual structures as the guiding 
framework for our behavior, actions, and words. Despite the fact that many of our 
spontaneously occurrent desires are very much self-interested and contrary to what the 
rites prescribe, the approval of the ritual system gives us the motivation to conform to its 
standards and to perform what is incumbent of our socially distinguished, socially 
constructive roles.  
From the above, I render for Xunzi, the heart-mind’s natural capacity to know and 
apply ritual principles so as to ke following them makes it possible for every person to ke 
yi wei (have the capacity for) sageliness. Thus, in this reading, to have the capacity to 
become or act as a sage presupposes the condition of being acculturated in a Confucian 
social-political milieu, where one is made to learn and practice Confucian rites until the 
operative basis and motives of one’s behavioral choices are significantly influenced by 
the rationale of the rites. As Xunzi writes, “Fanruo and Jushu were the best bows of 
antiquity, yet had they not be pressed into shape into the bow-frame (bu de pai qing不得
排檠), they would have been incapable of shaping themselves (ze bu neng zi zheng則不能
自正).”4 In Xunzi’s view, it is imperative that we can be trained and habituated into an 
understanding and approval of ritual/moral behavior, such as with regards to fulfilling 
one’s family and social obligations,5 if we are to possess the capacity to become or act as 
a sage. 
                                                 
4 See Xunzi: Xing e 23.19. 
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Nevertheless, even under a common milieu of receiving ritual education and 
developing the capacity for sageliness, Xunzi thinks that most people would not actually 
possess the neng to practice and attain sageliness. Before I explain why, let us consider 
what it takes to acquire the neng to be or act sagely in Xunzian thought.  
5.3  Xunzi: The Neng for Sageliness 
For Xunzi, the ideal stage of moral development presupposes that one achieves a 
comprehensive grasp of ritual rationale. As profound and panoptic as ritual rationale is, 
Xunzi thinks that it is fully understandable to anyone who will concentrate and dedicate 
himself ceaselessly to the “scholar (shi 士)” route—the continuous accumulation of ritual 
study and practice, and the incorporation of what one has understood into morally good 
actions, over a long duration. As he claims, “Now, if the man in the street were induced 
to cleave to these methods and engage in study (fu shu wei xue伏術爲學), focus his mind 
on a single aim and unify his intentions (zhuan xin yi zhia專心一志), ponder these 
principles, accomplish them each day over a long period of time, and to accumulate what 
is good without slacking off (ji shan er bu xi 積善而不息), then he could penetrate as far 
as spiritual clarity (shen ming 神明)6 and could form a Triad with Heaven and Earth (can 
                                                                                                                                                 
5 Xunzi writes: “ ….the man in the street (tu zhi ren 凃之人) understands both the moral obligations 
between father and son (fu zi zhi yi 父子之義), and the standards of rectitude between lord and minister 
(jun chen zhi zheng君臣之正). This being so, he has the substance (zhie 質) that makes it possible to know 
them (ke yi zhic zhi zhie可以知之質) and the resources to become capable of them (ke yi neng zhi ju可以
能之具). Thus, it is clear that both are present in the man in the street. So if he could be induced to make 
use of the substance that makes it possible for him to know and the resources that enable him to become 
capable to build a foundation for the principles of natural order in humanity, morality, the model of law, 
and rectitude, it is obvious that he could become a Yu.” Xunzi: Xing e 23.14.  
 
6 According to Shun, Xunzi’s notion of “shen” has “to do with the subtle way in which certain effects are 
accomplished.” “Ming” is used in opposition to becloudedness (bi 蔽), whereby the removal of the latter is 
necessary for one to follow the moral Dao. See Shun, “Mencius, Xunzi, and Dai Zhen,” 236. 
 128
yu tian di xi參於天地 矣) ”7 Hence, anyone who wants to keep within sight the ultimate, 
long-term goal of becoming a sage must, out of his own accord,8 focus on and direct 
every activity to accord with ritual rationale.9 He must become the “resolute scholar (jin 
shi 勁士)”—one whose “conduct is based on the model and whose zhia is hardened so 
that merely private desires do not confuse what he has been taught (xing fa zhi jian行法
志堅)”10 In other words, his zhia must be set by and concentrated on ritual principles, 
rather than arising from and concentrated on what he desires the most.  
Furthermore, Xunzi thinks that it is also vital for anyone pursuing the scholar way 
to seek positive surroundings. This includes especially the tutelage of a teacher well 
versed in the Confucian cultural heritage to oversee and guide one’s moral education, as 
well as friends or other companions that are like-minded on the pursuit of goodness. 
Serving to explain and interpret classical texts and rites that are terse in content, 
rectifying what one has learnt and so forth, teachers ensure that we do not acquire 
haphazard and erroneous forms of moral knowledge and practice.11 Association with 
                                                 
7 Xunzi: Xing e 23.14. 
 
8 I am influenced by Chong’s reading here. In the context of discussing the necessity of exerting oneself in 
learning the rites to achieve sagehood in Xunzian thought, Chong contends, “that there is a strong element 
of voluntariness that determines whether or not anyone makes the effort.” See Chong, “Xunzi’s Systematic 
Critique of Mencius,” 219. 
 
9See Xunzi: Quanxue 1.8. Knoblock writes that for Xunzi, the immediate end of learning is to “create a 
scholar, its final end is to produce a sage…. The scholar puts into practice his learning, he admires the 
model transmitted by tradition, and he seeks to emulate the example of the past.” See Knoblock, Xunzi: A 
Translation and Study of the Complete Works v.1, 131.  
 
10 See Xunzi: Ruxiao 8.11. 
 
11 For Xunzi’s claims on the importance of having a good teacher, see in particular Xunzi: Quanxue 1.11, 
1.12.  
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good men, on the other hand, will create a personal environment that reinforces one’s 
focus and fortitude, and provide suitable models for one to emulate.12 
From Xunzi’s perspective, anyone who internalizes a firm and comprehensive 
grasp of ritual knowledge, and thus becomes aware of how everything is connected, will 
acquire the deliberative powers to respond perfectly to every situation he faces in terms 
of expressing and attaining his emotions and desires in harmonious and orderly forms 
without the need to follow prevailing ritual details and mores. In other words, the sage-
like person is a fully autonomous moral agent equipped with the qualified and reliable 
sensibility to effortlessly work out and improvise for himself and others what is ke and bu 
ke in the varied circumstances of life. He possesses the adaptability and judiciousness to 
refine rituals, or create new ones to cope with novel human situations. With his 
sensibility and powers, the sage is also someone who is able to take on the establishment, 
administration, stabilization, and innovation of the ritual system of order. 13 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, to deliberate on and ke ritual principles for 
behavioral and emotional control involves the prompting, regulating, and shaping of our 
other-regarding emotions and desires. Xunzi writes that “the resolute scholar,” if he is to 
practice the way of the gentleman, must become “fond of cultivating and rectifying 
himself in terms of what he has been taught so that his qing and xing are reformed and 
improved (hao xiu zheng qi suo wen yi jiao shi qi qing xing 好修正其所聞以矯飾其情
性).”14  
                                                 
12 See Xunzi: Xing e 23.19. 
 




As I understand Xunzi, such a process slowly imbibes us with viewing others’ 
interests and concerns with import, and that it is through such an attitudinal change that 
we start to appreciate to different extent and in different contexts the value of 
ritualized/moral activities and interactions as inherently enjoyable and fulfilling in 
themselves. Finding enjoyment and fulfillment in rites and morality therefore grows hand 
in hand with personal efforts at internalizing ritual knowledge and forms. The more we 
understand and apply ritual rationale, and ke the proper attainment of our other-regarding 
emotions and desires, i.e. the more the accumulated wisdom of the human condition 
embodied in classical human culture impacts on our thought processes and agency, the 
more strongly we attitudinize, as beings necessarily interrelated and interdependent with 
others, that rites and morality are the one and only way and direction in life that sustains 
the most flourishing pattern of emotional fulfillment and desire-satisfaction.  
With his all-encompassing perceptiveness of moral rationale and the human 
condition, the sage realizes a character that not just always does what is good and right in 
full knowledge of what he is doing, but also always and only takes utmost delight in 
choosing to seek such courses for their own sake. In short, it is second nature to the sage 
to love and to find his greatest enjoyment and ease in fulfilling his social roles in ways he 
knows to be good.15 With this attitudinal transformation, the sage can dispense with 
external reinforcement and self-control in terms of expressing and attaining his passively 
stimulated emotions and desires, the reason being that his emotional and sensory nature 
has been wholly restructured to consistently produce emotions and desires that concur 
with the good of any situation.  
                                                 
15 See Xunzi: Quanxue 1.15. 
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Consequently, at any time and place, the sage sees no conflict between what is 
judged as ke and what he feels and wants, and so can follow his spontaneous emotions 
and desires without transgressing any ritual and moral principle. As Kline explains 
succinctly, “At the final stages of [Xunzian] moral cultivation, we will approve [ke] of 
only those actions that are in accordance with ritual, and our desires will accord with 
what we approve of…. However, the congruence of desire, approval, and ritual is an ideal 
goal for most people. It will be fully manifest only in the actions and psychology of the 
sage.”16 In short, the sage is someone who perfects his deliberation and his emotional 
dispositions to the point that they are always directed towards goodness—harmonious 
and orderly patterns of behavior. 
For Xunzi, such an attitudinal and emotional transformation also indicates 
achieving a firm commitment to the moral life.17 As he claims, the person whose heart-
mind in terms of its zhia always heeds lia [of the Confucian rites] would be free from 
being “a servant of things.”18 What this implies is that the sage would no longer be 
controlled by external things and circumstances. No matter how adverse things and 
circumstances are, they would not stimulate emotions like fear, anxiety, etc in the sage, 
and hence, will not induce him to veer off the moral Way. In other words, he achieves, to 
use Mencian parlance, the “budongxin” because of a categorical conviction that only rites 
and morality are both means and ends of peace, happiness, and the nurturance of every 
aspect of the self.  
                                                 
16 See Kline, “Moral Agency and Motivation in the Xunzi,”158-59. 
 
17 See Xunzi: Quanxue 1.15 
 
18 See Xunzi: Zhengming 22.16, 22.17. 
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Thus said, in Xunzi’s view, to neng become or act as a sage necessitates extensive 
personal exertions at proper fulfillment of our stimulated emotions and desires via ritual 
study and practice on an accumulative basis. It indicates that one has attained an ideal 
unity of moral knowledge and self refinement, and the power of operating independently 
from the ritual order for achieving the ideal embodiment of human conduct, relationships, 
emotional attainment, and desire-satisfaction at all times.19  
Nevertheless, Xunzi thinks that most people would fail to arrive at such a level of 
moral accomplishment. Xunzi gives two main factors for this. Firstly, people tend to lose 
their focus, and weave in and out of, or totally forgo the accumulative pattern of 
cultivation. A probable reason for this, as I understand Xunzi, is that the profound subject 
matter of ritual rationale is often presented in perspectives and attitudes remote from the 
Way seeker, and thus out of relation to his concrete experience and aims. It is therefore 
an arduous and unattractive affair to continuously devote oneself to the additive process 
of garnering moral knowledge and self-refinement to the point of completion.  
Due to this, together with the long duration of the cultivating process and the 
distractions and temptations of the world, most people lose interest in scholarly pursuits, 
and concentrate the capacities of the heart-mind on other endeavors instead. Indeed, 
Xunzi seems to think that once a person is set on other pursuits and directions in life, it 
would be hard for him to choose to follow the scholarly route. That is why he states that 
though the xiaoren keyi become a gentleman, he will not (bu ken) and cannot be forced 
(bu ke shi 不可使) to do so. 20 Most likely, this is due to the self-regarding aims that the 
                                                 
 
19 For a good summary of Xunzi’s thought on the virtuous dispositions of the sage, see Schofer, “Virtues in 
Xunzi’s Thought, 81-82.  
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xiaoren sets himself on, such as to generate a good reputation in order to expand the 
margins of his profit. As such, the xiaoren will never become a gentleman.  
Secondly, Xunzi points out that most people would not consciously seek or have 
access to worthy teachers and association with good friends on a constant basis. As a 
result, their personal environment and influences will hamper their efforts and progress at 
acquiring comprehensive ritual/moral knowledge and a thorough transformation of their 
inborn dispositions.21 
5.4  Xunzi’s Distinction between Keyi and Neng  
From the above two sections, we see that for Xunzi, having the keyi for sageliness 
pertains to having the capacity for habituation in the Confucian ritual system, i.e. being 
shepherded by sages to know, approve, and act on ritual principles as the way for social 
actions and desire-satisfaction. Having the neng for sageliness, on the other hand, 
pertains to making the effort to transcend beyond mere ritual training and enculturation to 
attain a comprehensive knowledge of ritual and moral rationale and a thorough 
refinement of our emotional dispositions. The path to this interwoven goal depends on 
accumulating ritual study and practice, and implementing its principles in terms of what 
and how we realize and fulfill our emotions and desires (especially our other-regarding 
ones) with. Accordingly, the extent to which each human being develops towards 
sagehood depends on the amount of effort he summates in such an accumulative process. 
                                                                                                                                                 
20 See Xunzi: Xing e 23.15. For another reading on this, see Chong, “Xunzi’s Systematic Critique of 
Mencius,” 219-20. 
 
21 For a good discussion on Xunzi’s views on why human beings in general will fail to develop the virtuous 
dispositions of sages, see Schofer, “Virtues in Xunzi’s Thought,” 82-83. Also, see Chong, “Xunzi’s 
Systematic Critique of Mencius,” et passim. 
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Hence, in Xunzi’s framework, having the capacity (keyi) and having the ability 
(neng) to practice and attain the ethical ideal are substantively different in content, and 
should not be conflated and used interchangeably. Also, having the capacity for 
sageliness neither implies nor necessitates its realization into having the ability for 
sageliness. As Xunzi argues, keyi in the context of self-cultivation is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for neng; keyi will translate into neng if and only if one voluntarily 
and persistently exerts effort in learning and practicing the rites, and the proper 
expression and attainment of our qing. However, for various reasons such as the lack of 
focus and or due to non-conducive environments, Xunzi contends that most individuals 
will fail to make and sustain such efforts. As such, only very few people actually persist 
to a successful translation of keyi to neng. In other words, Xunzi thinks that the bulk of a 
ritually organized society will not achieve the neng to practice sageliness, though they 
keyi do so. Hence, being “bu neng” to become or act as a sage does not mean being “bu 
ke yi” to do so. 
With this line of reasoning, Xunzi thinks that with regards to the possession of 
sage-like powers and characters, we have to separate a Confucian society into the haves 
and have-nots. For Xunzi, when society operates under a sage king and the institution of 
the Confucian ritual order, human beings in general will acquire moral agency in the 
sense of having the capacity to make moral deliberations and to be motivated to act on 
them. Through enforcing the right conception of ke and bu ke into their heart-minds so as 
to cultivate control over the expression and satisfaction of passively stimulated emotions 
and desires, the masses would be processionally transformed into moral followers. 
 Nevertheless, the acquisition of moral agency and behavior on the part of the 
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masses does not give them parity to the sages. In Xunzi’s view, due to their limited moral 
understanding, the choices of the common man, in terms of the ways and forms in which 
he expresses and attains his emotions and desires, are and must be determined solely by 
prevailing ritual rules and not by his own determination.22 Moreover, the common man, 
in lacking sage-like thought patterns and dimensions of moral experience, tends to see 
rituals and morality as only the most expedient means to meet and safeguard his own 
interests as a member of a society. Due to the elementary level of ritually reforming his 
affective/cognitive attitudes, the passively stimulated emotions and desires of the 
common man frequently deviate from what he ke. As such, he does not experience 
intrinsic joy in following rites and morality in every instance.  
Based on the lack of a consistent congruity between what he actively ke and what 
he desires in reaction to the stimuli of his environment, Xunzi thinks that the character of 
the common man cannot be referred to as virtuous. Knoblock writes that in Xunzi’s 
theory of moral society, it is not necessary that “men be good, or that they display 
goodwill, or that they do anything other than be subject to the influences of their times.”23 
If society operates under ritual and moral rationale, then the common man’s acquired 
sense of ke will overcome his self-regarding desires. If ritual order deteriorates and hard 
times are experienced, what he ke will be too weak to trump the motivational force of 
what he spontaneously feels and desires, especially those that pertains to his own profit 
and interests. As a result, he would lapse into responding to whatever emotions and 
desires he has at any moment, and consequently, would engage in “e” behavior. From 
                                                 
22 Xunzi seems to think that a person’s discourse on moral matters will reveal his grasp of moral 
understanding or the lack of it. See for example, Xunzi: Xing e 23.17. 
 
23 See Knoblock, Xunzi: A Translation and Study of the Complete Works v.3, 150.  
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Xunzi’s perspective, the “virtue” of the masses is therefore contingent and not reliable. 
Their self-transformation arrives only at the stage of “considering goodness to be 
following customary usages, considering the greatest treasure to be wealth and material 
possessions, and taking the highest Way to be nurturing one’s life (以從俗爲善, 以貨財爲
寳, 以養生爲己至道).”24 Insofar as the common man does not persist in making efforts to 
learn ritual principles, and apply what he understands to expressing and satisfying his 
emotions and his desires on every occasion in an accumulatively regular manner, he 
would never bridge that moral chasm between the sage and him. 
By emphasizing the substantive gap between the powers and characters of sages 
and the common man, it seems that Xunzi wants us to appreciate, which he thinks 
Mencius fails to do, the rigorous exertions sages put in for learning and practicing ritual 
principles to ameliorate and depart from our shared natural dispositions. Moreover, such 
a distinction allows us to see the deficiencies in our characters and powers, and how 
inadequate and inferior our sources and dimensions of satisfaction and fulfillment are. In 
this way, we will also recognize and valorize their unique social roles as perfect 
embodiments of man-in-relation and authoritative overseers of human and natural 
affairs.25 In other words, we would acknowledge the Way of the sages and the Confucian 
rites as marking out the proper Dao, and be provided with the psychological impetus to 
expend effort to improve our grasp of ritual and moral rationale for the expression and 
attainment of our emotions and desires. 
 
                                                 
24 See Xunzi: Ruxiao 8.11. 
 
25 See Xunzi: Xing e 23.9, 23.12. 
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5.5  Xunzi’s Criticism of Mencius 
In Xunzi’s theorization, knowing how and being moved to execute the proper 
forms of attaining our emotions and satisfying our desires in a non-capricious, reliable 
manner—the fundament of societal and personal growth—is so foreign to the natural 
operations of the heart-mind that it is of the utmost importance in the primordial stage of 
human education.26 It is from this perspective that Xunzi contends that our source of 
moral direction life stems from following a standardizable and objectively worked out 
rationale for planning and structuring our inborn emotional dispositions towards their 
appropriate activities and expressions. Against Mencius, Xunzi argues that our inborn 
emotions and desires by themselves do not direct us towards goodness. The cultivating 
act and process therefore cannot be an unpremeditated operation of responding directly to 
whatever emotions and desires form in us. 
At this stage of discussion, it is clear that Xunzi’s distinction between keyi and 
neng to practice and attain sageliness furthers and reinforces his criticism of Mencius’ 
view of the cultivating act and process by hammering in the contention that sages possess 
the power, skill, and determination to spontaneously respond to their passively stimulated 
desires for the effectuation of shan patterns of behavior in all situations only because of 
their attainment of comprehensive ritual knowledge and transformation of their emotional 
dispositions to arrive at a steadfast congruity of ke, desire, and ritual principles.27 As 
Chong submits, Xunzi objects to Mencius’ claim that moral agency prior to one’s 
                                                 
26 This reading of Xunzi is inspired by Dewey’s views on moral education. See in particular, “Education in 
Relation to Form” in John Dewey, The Essential Dewey v.1. ed. Larry A. Hickman and Thomas M. 
Alexander (Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1998). 
 
27 Xunzi uses the metaphor of straightening a warped piece of wood to hammer in the necessity of radically 
transforming our inborn dispositions. See Xunzi: Xing e 23.3. 
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emotional dispositions having become structured in a way congenial for practicing and 
attaining the ethical ideal “is simply a matter of calling upon resources that are entirely 
within one’s control.”28  
For Xunzi, our emotions and desires are ultimately reactive in nature, in the sense 
that their occurrences are contingent on the stimulation of our inborn constitution. Hence, 
they cannot be within our direct control. This fits with Xunzi’s observation that self-
cultivation and the institution of order cannot depend on the inconceivable task of ridding 
ourselves of, or reducing our desires—emotions and desires will be stimulated in us 
irrespective of our determination. For this reason, and given the fact that we are endowed 
with self-interested dispositions (which Xunzi seems to play up to increase the impact of 
his criticism of Mencius), to allow free play in the fulfillment of whatever emotions and 
desires form in us before attaining an appropriate level of their ritually fostered 
restructuralization and melioration is assuredly a recipe for disorder and disaster for both 
society and the human individual.  
Thus, throughout the “Xing e” chapter, Xunzi criticizes Mencius for naively 
construing the cultivating act and process as a procedure of expressing xing by simply 
responding to our spontaneously occurrent qing, rather a program of restructuring the 
responses of qing and modifying xing for their meliorative manifestation. In a nutshell, 
Xunzi’s distinction between keyi and neng extends his critique of Mencius by claiming 
that the Mencian model of moral agency and cultivation is confused, as it applies only to 
someone who has achieved a superlative alteration of his thought processes and natural 
emotional dispositions in accordance with ritual principles. 
 
28 Quoted from Chong, “Xunzi’s Systematic Critique of Mencius,” 218. 
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Managing Qing and Directing Awareness: 
More on Mencian Si and Tui 
 
6.1  Introduction 
We have noted that Xunzi criticizes Mencius for claiming that our spontaneous emotions 
and desires, which occur via the stimulation of our naturally endowed likes and dislikes, 
can by themselves direct us towards goodness. We do not need to engage in any kind of 
active control or management of our emotions and desires, but to simply follow them in a 
passive manner to practice and attain the ethical ideal. Against Mencius, Xunzi argues 
that ethical direction and motivation are generated from using certain capacities of the 
heart-mind for understanding and implementing Confucian ritual principles. By learning 
and practicing ritual principles cumulatively, one understands not just how to fulfill all 
our emotions and desires with respect to proper objects and forms of activity and 
expression, but also understands the value and importance of the rites for optimizing 
human satisfaction, particularly when viewed from the long term. This gives us sufficient 
motivation to follow the Confucian rites and the Way of the sage to determine our 
responses to emotions and situations. In Xunzian thought, ritualized human beings are 
habituated into taking proper management of their emotional dispositions, and form pro-
attitudes or approval of such management for the guidance of their actions.  
Due to the additive nature of such a training process, Xunzi thinks that only 
individuals who relentlessly dedicate efforts to study and deliberate about ritual rationale 
for the modulation and refinement of emotions and desires, especially those of an other-
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regarding kind, will supercede the rest in terms of their attitude and skill in negotiating 
the Confucian Way. They will come to comprehend completely the ritual rationale, and 
achieve the deliberative ability to evince timely, properly formalized emotional responses 
to all situations. In addition, they will appreciate clearly the intrinsic enjoyability of the 
Confucian Way, and develop a total, steadfast commitment to according with it. In such a 
cultivation model, striving to comport with the pattern of the Confucian sage through 
ritual understanding and implementation is therefore uniquely and absolutely pivotal to 
arriving at moral achievements. For Xunzi, Mencius’ idea of agency and his disregard of 
the resonating wisdom of the sage (embodied as ritual principles) for managing our 
emotional dispositions would only lead us towards disorder and disharmony for both 
society and the individual. Xunzi’s distinction between having the keyi and having the 
neng to practice and attain the ethical ideal is the culmination of this critique of Mencius. 
We have now a good grasp of the nature and point of Xunzi’s critique of Mencius. 
In this chapter, I have a minimal and a maximal goal, both of which have to do with 
defending Mencius from Xunzi’s critique. My minimal goal is to give an account of how 
the processes of “si” and “tui” work in Mencian thought so as to aver that unlike Xunzi, 
Mencius does not view the setting of zhia and the management of our emotions and 
desires as dependent on understanding and deliberating on certain principles or a certain 
rationale. Rather, such a management is based on an active choice to focus our awareness 
or attention on proper things in order to allow ourselves to fully experience meaningful 
social experiences in the mode of our other-regarding xins. I will provide a substantial 




By illuminating the substantive differences between Mencius and Xunzi on the 
issue of moral development and achievement, my maximal goal is to convince the reader 
that Xunzi mistakenly attributes to Mencius the view that we need not engage in an active 
management of our emotions and desires for directing and driving ourselves towards 
shan so as to practice and attain the ethical ideal. At the end of this chapter, I will also 
contend that the difference between Mencius and Xunzi’s views on what constitutes an 
ethical directedness or orientation toward liayi underlie their different conceptions of 
agency. Before I proceed, it is important to first discuss Mencius’ standpoint on the 
influence of one’s surroundings on the operations of the qi-formed heart-mind.  
6.2  The Importance of the Environment in Mencian Thought 
  Many commentators have remarked that Mencius’ thesis “Xing shan” entails the 
proviso of having access to adequate goods for our basic well-being.1 Put differently, it is 
a prerequisite for human beings in general to be provided with at least a decent level of 
sustenance and living conditions in order to  “ke yi wei shan.”2 This is evident in 
Mencius’ use of horticultural metaphors to describe the moral developmental process.3 
Just like we can expect barley seeds to grow in a flourishing direction under the right 
environmental conditions, much of which is dependent on the tending of the farmer, we 
can expect people to develop in the direction of goodness if they are under a king who 
                                                 
1 For recent discussions, see Cua, “Xin and Moral Failure: Notes on an Aspect of Mencius’ Moral 
Psychology,” 140-42; Perkins, “Mencius, Emotion, and Autonomy;” 211-12; Manyul Im, “Emotional 
Control and Virtue in the Mencius,” PEW 49.1 (1999), 19-20.  
 
2 One must note that for Mencius, there are exceptions to this requirement. As he writes in 7A: 10, there 
would be outstanding people who would dedicate effort to seeking morality even in times without King 
Wen. One such person would be Yen Hui, who does not let the lack of economic and material support 
affect his joy in following moral courses (Mencius 4B: 29). 
 
3 See Mencius 2A: 2; 6A: 2; & 6A: 8. 
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can provide each of them with the means for satisfying their basic sensory and appetitive 
needs and wants. In 1A: 7, Mencius writes that if the common people lack sufficient 
material and economic support for themselves and their families, they would not dedicate 
time and effort to tend to the rites and yi, most likely because their energy (i.e. qi) is 
expended on matters of survival.  
With support from Mencius 6A: 8, Chan and Shun connect the above 
interpretation of Mencian self-cultivation with his views on the nourishment of qi. In this 
passage, Mencius writes that the reason why the Ox mountain loses and fails to have its 
foliage restored to lushness is because certain adverse external conditions prevent the 
élan vital of its embedded shoots from being preserved and nurtured. Similarly, people 
lose the goodness of their heart-mind (liangxin 良心)—i.e. fail to manifest and develop 
their ethical dispositions—because negative external conditions, such as harsh times 
compelling a lack of respite from pursuing human necessities, malnourish and dissipate 
their qi to keep it from supporting the likes and dislikes of the heart-mind. From this, 
Chan states that for Mencius, the nourishment of qi through the obtainment of sufficient 
food, rest, etc. is essential for maintaining the heart-mind’s natural liking for ethical 
goods and its associated affective movements in an active, influential state.4 Shun also 
argues for Mencius that, “just as the heart-mind has certain ethical predispositions that 
are most conspicuous when one is free from the influence of ordinary human endeavors 
and that should be preserved and nourished, the ch’i [qi] of human beings also has a 
shared element that is free from such influences and that should be preserved and 
nourished.”5  
                                                 




Taking this into account, let us look at 1A: 7 and 6B: 2 where Mencius switches 
from talking in terms of keyi to neng to convince his interlocutors the lack of difficulty in 
comporting with sage-like patterns of behavior. In 1A: 7, Mencius claims that King 
Xuan’s act of sparing the ox, which is the response of his heart-mind “bu ren” (the basis 
of the xin of compassion) the suffering of the ox in associating its frightened appearance 
to an innocent man going to his execution, reveals the sufficiency of the king’s heart-
mind to implement benevolent governance and alleviate the suffering of his people. 
Mencius then likens this sufficiency with physical strength. He reasons that someone who 
is strong enough to lift a hundred jun would surely be physically strong enough to lift a 
feather. Why this person fails to lift the feather is therefore not because of his lack of 
neng. Rather, it is because he bu wei as he chooses not to use his strength (bu yong li 不用
力). Similarly, someone who responds compassionately to the suffering of animals, and 
who responds upon associating their suffering to the suffering of human beings, would 
surely be emotionally affected, and motivationally strong enough to respond to the 
suffering of human beings. The reason then that the king fails to govern with benevolence 
is not because he bu neng, but because he bu wei use his capacity for compassion to 
engage with his subjects (bu yong en 不用恩).6 Later in their conversation, we see 
Mencius ruling out the inadequate satisfaction of the king’s sensory/appetitive desires as 
interfering with his heart-mind’s neng to practice benevolent government.  
                                                                                                                                                 
5 Shun, Mencius and Early Chinese Thought, 160. 
 
6 Nivison notes the similarity in reason behind King Xuan’s moral inaction to Ran Qiu, who tells Confucius 
that he does not have the dispositional strength to follow the Confucian Dao despite his favorable opinion 
of it (The Analects 6A: 12). According to Nivison, King Xuan and Ran Qiu could either mistakenly believe 
that they really do not possess the strength, or could have deceived themselves into thinking so. See 
Nivison, Ways of Confucianism, 89. 
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Mencius gives a similar diagnosis of ethical failure in 6B: 2. Here, he explains to 
Cao Jiao, who thinks that all he can do to attain the ethical ideal is to eat rice to cultivate 
his physical form, that it is easy to practice and comport with sageliness.  
Here is a man who cannot lift a chicken. He is, indeed, a weak man. Now, 
if we were to lift a ton, then he would, indeed, be a strong man. In other 
words, whoever can lift the same weight as Wu Huo is himself a Wu Huo. 
The trouble with a man is surely not his lack of sufficient strength, but his 
refusal to make the effort (fu wei er 弗爲耳). One who walks slowly, 
keeping behind his elders, is considered a well-mannered younger 
brother…. Walking slowly is surely not beyond the neng of any man. It is 
simply a matter of his not making the effort. The way of Yao and Shun is 
simply to be a good son and a good younger brother.  
  As Manyul Im argues, Mencius’ claim here is not that sageliness is a mere matter 
of executing certain lauded behavioral routines.7 Rather, his claim is that just as a person 
who possesses the same physical power as the strong man would be able to do what the 
strong man does, one who possesses the same affective power as the sage would be able 
to do what the sage does—the utilization of our other-regarding emotional capacities to 
engage with others, such as responding with feelings of respect and reverence to one’s 
elders by walking slowly behind them. 
Both King Xuan and Cao Jiao, as we can see, are people who have access to the 
satisfaction of their biologic needs and wants. The point that I am making is that for 
Mencius, the capacity of the common man’s heart-mind to be occupied by other-
regarding emotions (exemplified by the four xins) would engender a neng to practice 
sageliness if and only if his basic sensory/appetitive desires are adequately satisfied. Only 
then would the heart-mind find it easy to exert qi towards moral endeavors. To iterate, it 
is only under the condition of having a certain level of material and economic wants 
                                                 
7 See Im, “Emotional Control and Virtue in the Mencius,” 19-20.  
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fulfilled that qi can expand (kuo 擴) and fill (chong 充) the heart-mind for the vivification 
of its other-regarding preferences and sensitivities.8 Thus, when the qing of the blood qi 
does not dominate the operations of the heart-mind, making it preoccupied with matters 
of survival and biologic welfare, the four xins and their associated desire-motivations 
would become active and potent capacities of agency. As Mencius says, people in 
general, who cannot live without water and fire, would act benevolently by 
accommodating others’ solicitations for water and fire when they themselves have such 
items in abundance.9  
From his dialogue with King Xuan and Cao Jiao, we get the idea that Mencius 
thinks that the main source of ethical failure10 in terms of fulfilling our constitutive social 
roles is one’s lack of voluntary utilization of our other-regarding emotional capacities to 
engage with others, even though these capacities are nourished enough to move one in 
the right relational direction. As mentioned for Mencius, it is through being emotionally 
connected with others via our other-regarding xins that one apprehends our shared 
humanity, and finds the direction and drive to bond in certain ways with concrete others 
so as to approximate the ethical ideal. Eating rice, as in the case of Cao Jiao, to upkeep 
the nourishment of one’s qi and psychosomatic status is a prerequisite for one to engage 
in self-cultivation. However, one would only follow the pattern of the ethical ideal and 
                                                 
8 See Mencius: 2A: 6. 
 
9 Mencius 7A: 23. 
 
10 In Shun’s reading, Mencius stresses erroneous teachings (such as those of Gaozi) and “distortive desires” 
as main sources of ethical failure. Shun points out that Mencius’ remedy for erroneous teachings is to 
expose them for what they are through argumentation against their advocates. See Shun, Mencius and Early 
Chinese Thought, 173. I shall discuss how for Mencius “distortive desires” interfere with one’s effort to 
pursue the ethical ideal, as well as his cure for it.  
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attain its physical form if and only if qi is nurtured by accumulations of acts or patterns of 
relationality based on the right xins and motivation.11   
As for King Xuan, Mencius advises him to weigh (quan 權) his heart-mind so as 
to realize for himself whether he is able to tui his compassion to his people: “It is by 
weighing a thing that its weight can be known and by measuring it that its length can be 
ascertained. It is so with all things, but particularly with the heart-mind (權，然後知輕。
度， 然後知長短。物皆然，心為甚).” Here, I render the idea of weighing one’s heart-
mind as the determination of one’s likings and emotional strength. In the context of 1A: 
7, Mencius is therefore advising King Xuan to find out whether and to what extent he 
would favor, i.e. to find enjoyment and satisfaction in being compassionate to his 
subjects. How King Xuan can quan would be suggested later. In any case, this 
interpretation gains force when we consider Mencius asking King Xuan prior to this 
advice why his compassion is sufficient to move him to treat animals benevolently and 
yet not to his people, and following up this advice by asking King Xuan, to which King 
Xuan replies in the negative, whether he favors and enjoys starting wars, antagonizing 
other kings, and putting his people in danger.  
From 1A: 7, 1B: 3, and 1B: 5, we learn that what prevents the king from treating 
his subjects with compassion is his supreme desire (da yu 大欲) to expand his territorial 
rule, as well as his qia  (疾) of being fond of valor, wealth, and women. As Shun argues, 
qia here probably refers to “an intense and extreme form of desire that runs wild in 
                                                 
11 Many commentators have pointed out that Mencian self-cultivation, which affects qi and the heart-mind, 
has a holistic effect on the self, which includes not just personal character, but also physical form. See for 
example, Shun, Mencius and Early Chinese Thought, 158-63; Tu, “The Idea of Human in Mencian 
Thought,” in Confucian thought: Selfhood as Creative Transformation, 93-112 et passim. 
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oneself.”12 In my reading, these desires, which are labeled by Shun as “distortive” as they 
direct and move us contrary to lia yi in Mencius’ view, prevent King Xuan from 
becoming a true king because they are his strongest preferences and desires. In other 
words, they are the major directional and motivational force that drives King Xuan’s 
general pattern of relationality and behavior. The king’s xin of compassion thus has only 
a sporadic responsiveness, such as when he witnessed the frightened expression of the ox. 
In 6A: 9, we see that although King Xuan seems to be influenced by Mencius to some 
extent during their brief encounters, Mencius contends that it will not have any 
significant effect because the king is frequently under corrupting influences.13  
Do not be puzzled by the king’s lack of wisdom (zhi). Even a plant that 
grows readily will not survive if it is placed in the sun for one day (yi ri 
bao zhi 一日暴之) and exposed to the cold for ten (shi ri bao zhi 十日寒之
)…. It is very rarely that I have an opportunity of seeing the King, and as 
soon as I leave, those who expose him to the cold arrive on the scene. 
What can I do with the few new shoots (ming 萌) that come out (6A: 9)? 
Further down in the same passage, Mencius contends that in order for King Xuan 
to get (de 得) to be a true king, he must concentrate his heart-mind to bear its aims (zhuan 
xin zhi zhia 專心致志). Most likely, the king’s association with the wrong people exposes 
him to an environment that accentuates and fortifies his distortive desires, which prevent 
his heart-mind from concentrating on compassionate aims. Said another way, the king’s 
surroundings regularly stirs up and concentrates his blood qi in an excessive manner, thus 
setting and concentrating his heart-mind in the improper zhia—one that focuses on self-
                                                 
12 Shun writes that qia can “mean sickness, an aversion to something, or being eagerly devoted to 
something. It can also refer to some kind of internal disorder.” See Shun, Mencius and Early Chinese 
Thought, 174-75. 
 
13 I follow Chan Wing-Tsit in the interpretation that the king referred to in Mencius 6A: 9 is probably King 
Xuan. See Wing-Tsit Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy (Princeton University Press, 1963), 57. 
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regarding aims. One can even postulate that sooner or later, the non-ethical likes and 
dislikes of King Xuan would be nourished to such an extreme extent that it starts to 
define him as a whole person. To sum up, the reason why King Xuan fails to tui 
compassion towards his subjects is because of his distortive desires, which are preserved 
as the main driving force of his life because of the corruptive influences of his 
environment.  
 For Mencius, one’s surroundings play a significant part in whether we will engage 
with others in terms of the right emotional attitudes and motivation because ultimately, 
they determine what emotions and desires would be evoked in us. Like Xunzi, Mencius 
subscribes to the passive or reactive nature of qing. As Im argues, Mencius does not think 
that we can by mere volitional effort trigger the psychosomatic mechanisms that affect 
the heart-mind to feel compassion for someone.14 This goes for all other emotions or 
affective movements of the heart-mind. Hence, all the various examples that Mencius 
gives to advert the arousal of other-regarding xins share the condition of having a direct 
experience of some aspect of a situation, such as witnessing the frightened expression of 
animals, seeing a child on the verge of falling into a well (2A: 6), perceiving the 
desecrated corpses of our parents (3A: 5) etc. In such situations, we are inclined to relate 
with others in terms of the other-oriented emotional modes of the heart-mind.  
Despite “our affective subjection to the world,”15 it remains for Mencius within 
our comfortable control to actively respond to others using our other-regarding capacities. 
                                                 
14 Im, “Emotional Control and Virtue in the Mencius,” 20.  
 
15 In comparing Immanuel Kant with Mencius, Perkins has also written on Mencius’ views on the reactive 
nature of our emotions and how he develops a model of self-control “in which moral responsibility emerges 




This can be inferred from his admonishment of King Xuan for not making the effort to be 
compassionate to his people, and the ease and immediacy in which he claims King Xuan 
is able to do so. By saying that failure to evince proper emotional responses to others is a 
matter of “bu wei” rather than “bu neng,” Mencius wants to remind us of our 
responsibility for the utilization of our other-regarding xins to engage with others, and our 
responsibility to remove any limitation on their utilization. Following Perkins’ reading, I 
contend that for Mencius, the key to whether we engage in relational patterns directed 
and driven by other-regarding xins is to control (A) the environment that we are exposed 
to, such as people whom we mix with, the activities and places we do and go to etc, and 
(B) how we direct our attention in that environment.16 
Evidence for (A) can be seen in 1A: 7,17 where Mencius states that a junzi 
consciously avoids the slaughterhouse for in seeing animals alive, he would bu ren them 
to die, and having heard their cries, he would bu ren eat their flesh. Hence, if the junzi 
perceives the distress of the sacrificial ox, he might have done what King Xuan did, 
causing a much-lauded ritual ceremony to be devalued, and impairing the relationship 
between him and the masses.18 The sacrificial ox, like animals prepared for meals, is not 
a proper object of compassion (I would come back to this point).  
The implication of this is that one needs to be like the junzi in manipulating his 
environmental influences or exposure to evoke the right emotional attitudes towards 
                                                 
16 Ibid., 210. 
 
17 The examples and the approach that I am using to explicate the Mencian control of affective movements 
are generated from consulting Im, “Emotional Control and Virtue;” Nivison, “Motivation and Moral Action 
in Mencius” in Ways of Confucianism; Perkins, “Mencius, Emotion, and Autonomy;” Craig Ihara, “David 
Wong on Emotions in Mencius,” PEW 41.1 (1994).  
 
18 Mencius writes that the masses were unhappy with King Xuan for his substitute of the sacrifice of the ox 
with a lamb for they misconstrued King Xuan’s act as being miserly.  
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proper others. Although it is beyond the voluntary control of the junzi to prevent himself 
from psychosomatically affected—to feel compassion for others that he ought not to if he 
is within the environmental range of perceiving their suffering, pain, or distress etc., it is 
within his voluntary control to avoid such situations and thus, to avoid stirring and 
concentrating his heart-mind to act benevolently towards them. Conversely, it makes 
sense to say that the junzi and anyone who wishes to follow his path must conscientiously 
seek and move in environments that expose him to experiencing the suffering of proper 
others in order to feel compassion for them.19 
The same method of controlling our emotions and desires is mentioned in 4A: 18. 
Here, Mencius lauds the junzi’s policy of asking others to teach one’s son. Such an 
arrangement will prevent the arousal of anger (nu 怒) towards one’s son, particularly as 
regards situations when one’s son does not follow one’s corrections (zheng 正). In turn, 
this prevents the breeding of animosity between father and son, which will undermine 
their love for each other and damage their relationship. From the two passages, I render 
Mencian moral agency and development is intimately dependent on an active control of 
our environmental exposure so as to control the affective movements of the heart-mind, 
the purpose of which is to evoke other-regarding emotional attitudes in the right context 
so as to direct us towards cultivating patterns of relationality. 
                                                 
19 Hence, insofar as it is King Xuan’s role to see through the sacrificial rites with the designated 
animal, he must avoid seeing the suffering of that animal. And insofar as it is King Xuan’s role to 
practice benevolent government, he must put himself in positions where he will perceive the 




As for (B), it seems that for Mencius, taking an active control of our environment 
entails taking active control of what we direct attention to.20 When the junzi avoids the 
kitchen, he avoids paying attention to the signs of distress and suffering animals prepared 
for food go through. When he avoids teaching his son, he avoids concentrating on 
whether his son follows rectifications. Such manipulation of what he concentrates on 
prevents his emotions and desires to move him into inappropriate actions.  
Consider also the discussions about people who respond to others from their 
other-regarding emotional capacities in the Mencius, such as King Xuan replacing the 
seen ox with an unseen lamb and sons burying the seen, exposed corpses of their parents. 
It appears that what these people were paying attention to induce the occurrence of their 
other-regarding xins in such an overwhelming manner that they reflexively act from the 
xins and their desire-motivations. For King Xuan, attention to the frightened expression 
of the ox leads him to associate it with the image of an innocent man being led to 
execution. For the sons, it is highly probable, given the context of the passage (to be 
discussed further down in the chapter), that observation of the way and degree to which 
their parents’ dead bodies are violated induce awareness of the deep and special nature of 
the love and concern shown by their parents to them. By having our attention directed by 
certain experiential aspects of a situation, our other-regarding xins might be aroused and 
concentrated to such a degree that it moves a person to respond to that situation. 
Thus, Mencius does not think that being merely affected by our environmental 
stimuli is enough to move a person to act in an other-regarding way, as indicated by 
Mencius’ parable of the well. Although Mencius states that the heart-mind would be 
                                                 
20 As Perkins argue, “our environment should not be taken narrowly as our physical environment, but must 
include how we direct attention in that place.” Perkins, “Mencius, Emotion, and Autonomy;” 217. 
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moved into the xin of compassion and a desire for the welfare for the child on the verge 
of falling into the well, as many commentators point out,21 it is significant to note that he 
never says or implies that the desire for that child’s welfare will necessarily drive one to 
save that child.22 In fact, Mencius adverts that self-regarding desires may arise, such as 
the desire to win the praise of one’s fellow villager, which may well be the motivational 
force for saving the child.  
Going back to Mencian agency, what this means is that the desire for the child’s 
welfare could be supplanted by self-regarding desires in terms of being one’s strongest 
desire. To be moved to act from a desire for the welfare of the child, it seems that one 
needs to hold on and not dilute the xin of compassion so that we would seek the 
cultivating objective (to save the child out of a concern for his sake) by keeping the heart-
mind’s focused on the xin-arousing aspect of the situation, i.e. the potential suffering of 
the child. I believe that such a process pertains to Mencius’ concept of “si,” which I shall 
examine more thoroughly in the next few sections. Framing my discussion around 
Nivison’s analysis of the Mencian concept of “tui” and Im’s criticism of Nivison, I shall 
also bring out the relationship between “si” and “tui” in the Mencian framework. 
6.3  More on the Concept of Si  
According to Shun, the Shijing uses “si” to mean “reflecting on something or 
turning an object over in one’s mind, where the object is in many instances something 
towards which one has a favorable attitude.” “Si” can also mean “recalling or 
                                                 
21 See for example, Lau, “Theories of Human Nature in Mencius and Xunzi,” 196. 
 
22 Nivison argues that because our “natural ‘pro-attitude” towards the good in no way guarantees that we 
will seek them,” moral actions depend not on reflexive responses but on a focus on the good so that we 
would voluntary seek it. See Nivison, Ways of Confucianism, 85. 
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remembering something, as opposed to forgetting, and it can also involve pondering on 
or thinking about something” to which one need not have a liking for. Following Arthur 
Waley,23 “Shun states that si” should primarily be construed as the operation of 
concentrating or focusing our attention on something.24 In Van Norden’s view, this is 
Mencius’ technical usage of “si” (see 4A: 1, 6A: 6, 6A: 13, 6A: 15, and 6A: 17), which is 
somehow connected to its non-technical usage, such recalling or reflecting on something 
towards which one is favorably disposed (7B: 37, 5A; 2), or considering how one thing is 
like another (4B: 24, 1B: 5, 2A: 9, 4B: 29, 5A: 7, 5B: 1). 
In chapter 2, I have argued that the function of si is to control the attainment of 
the various likes and dislikes of our organs, and to balance them in such a way that the 
preferences of the heart-mind are always given priority. Through exercising the heart-
mind’s power to si, we bring the four xins into play, focus ourselves on their desire-ends, 
and strengthen these desire-ends over those of our other organs so that we would seek the 
former. What one is doing then through si is to shift oneself away from simply being 
pulled by forces of attraction acting on our organs in engaging with the world. In other 
words, the process of si facilitates the concentration of the proper zhia so that our qi 
would not influence it negatively, but would instead move to support it. In this way, we 
would be nourishing qi into the “haoranzhiqi” and nurturing the “budongxin.” Hence, 
“si” is a necessary activity for attaining the ideal quality of moral reliability and 
constancy. Nevertheless, from Mencius’ perspective, just what do we si or concentrate 
our attention on in a way that would fulfill its function? 
                                                 
23 See Arthur Waley, trans. The Analects of Confucius  (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1938), 44-46. 
 
24 Shun, Mencius and Early Chinese Thought, 150.  For other discussions on si that are not examined in this 
thesis, see Yearly, Mencius and Aquinas, 63; Ivanhoe, Confucian Moral Cultivation 2nd ed. (Indianapolis: 
Hackett Publishing 2000). 
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One thing that I think should be ruled out are principles that dictate specified and 
definite “oughts” tied to different contexts of our lives, much akin to what Gaozi and 
Xunzi propose as our directional guidance for moral action.25 As argued, it seems that the 
purpose of si is to concentrate the heart-mind on certain things in the modes of the four 
xins so that the imperative to what is right in a certain context feels “internal” to us (in the 
sense that it stems from expressing what we prefer to do the most in that context), rather 
than “external” (in the sense that it stems from a mere obligingness to follow some pre-
established standards and norms). In this way, we are not putting rational pressure on 
ourselves to follow some course of behavior that we do not feel inclined to at large, an 
operation that would be detrimental to self-cultivation from Mencius’ perspective.26 
Furthermore, as Waley points out, “si” is “a process more akin to concrete observation 
than to an elaborate process of deliberation.”27  
In line with Perkins’ reading,28 I submit that “si” for Mencius probably pertains to 
directing and focusing the heart-mind’s attention on our concrete, current social 
experiences, where our engagements in this activity is often influenced or facilitated by 
our environmental setting or exposure.29 Thus, as suggested by Perkins, we could say that 
the junzi near the kitchen would si the suffering of the animals there,30 while the junzi 
                                                 
25 I am in agreement with Ames that Mencius does not view moral-cultivation as a process guided by 
“definite and specified goals.” See Ames, “The Mencian Conception of Renxing,” 159. 
 
26 Shun argues that the text does not provide conclusive evidence for this reading even though it fits with 
Mencius’ thinking. See Shun, Mencius and Early Chinese Thought, 157-58. 
 
27 Waley, 44-46. 
 
28 Perkins, “Mencius, Emotion, and Autonomy;” 215-17. 
 
29 As Shun points out, si in the Sijing may be about thinking about or turning over in one’s mind a person to 
whom one is attached, and worrying or being concerned about such a person.  See Shun, Mencius and 




who teaches his son would si his son’s responsiveness to rectification. To suggest further, 
King Xuan’s observation of the expression of the sacrificial ox engages him to 
voluntarily si its similarity to an innocent man being led to execution—i.e. his socialized 
idea of what constitutes innocence, while the sons’ observation of the state of their dead 
parents’ bodies engages them to si the nature and happenings of their relationship.  
Given this, I want to submit that Mencius never really specifies what “si” is about 
because it does not really matter how we concentrate on our social experiences, be it a 
process of considering, recollecting, longing, imagining etc,31 so long as they stir up the 
likes or dislikes of the heart-mind, and activate and intensify our other-regarding xins to 
the extent that we act from their desire-motivations. As I surmise, the non-technical sense 
of “si” is therefore related to its technical usage in that “si” can be by recalling or 
reflecting on certain features of an object (or a situation), and/or considering features of 
that object in relation to other experiences, the result of which would muster the qi that 
constitutes the heart-mind’s taste, and concentrating zhia so that we would be driven to 
respond to that object from within some other-regarding xin or xins. To explain more, 
when one grounds oneself in the reality of proper experiences and “feel” our other-
regarding xins (which are simply qi), qi flows freely within us and is available to us for 
our use in responding and relating to others, which makes our moral responses to others 
as based on discharges of such xins intrinsically invigorating and enjoyable. With this 
way of managing our emotional dispositions, we actively open up ourselves to the 
possibility of growth inherent in all the relationships that constitute us. 
                                                                                                                                                 
30 Perkins, “Mencius, Emotion, and Autonomy,” 217. 
 
31 Thus, si can be about focusing one’s attention on the world and others around us via our sensory 




To sum up my reading, si for Mencius occurs when we make an active choice to 
control what we focus on and how we experience ourselves in the right surroundings, the 
purpose of which is to put ourselves in direct, robust contact with desires to seek 
productive meanings out of one’s current social experience. Hence, even though our 
emotions and desires are spontaneous and reactive in nature, we are able to actively 
control their evocation in a way that would adequately and effectively move one to seek 
ethically cultivating courses.32 As Graham contends for Mencius, “personal development 
can be affected by choice without itself being chosen.”33 By shifting our concentration on 
certain things through exertions at si, there would be spontaneous shifts in what we are 
prefer to seek (i.e. changes in our tastes and aims in life) without such shifts being 
dependent on making deliberative choices, or “deduction from rational principles.”34 
Given these reasons, I submit that the Mencian concept of “si” does not pertain to 
deliberating about rational principles to determine the aims that one seeks. To give more 
support for this interpretation of how “si” works, we have to look at the Mencius’ 
technical conception of “tui.”  
6.4  Nivison on the Concept of “Tui” 
 According to Nivison, Mencius’ technical concept of “tui” is appropriated from 
the Mohist school of thought. Based on the chapter 45 of the Mozi, Nivison states that the 
Mohists use “tui” as argumentative technique of “getting someone to grant what that 
                                                 
32 Nivison and Im also apply this model of controlling our emotions and motivations to Mencius, though 
the latter does not explicitly connect it to the concept of “si.” See Nivison, Ways of Confucianism, 105; Im, 
“Emotional Control and Virtue in the Mencius,” 20-21.  
 
33 Angus Graham, “Reflections and Replies” in Chinese Texts and Philosophical Contexts: Essays 
Dedicated to Angus C. Graham, ed. Henry Rosemont, Jr. (LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court 1991), 290-91.  
 
34 Angus Graham, “Reflections and Replies” in Chinese Texts and Philosophical Contexts: Essays 




person has not accepted when it is the same as something that that person does accept.”35 
Fundamentally, it pertains to the strategy of getting an individual to infer how one case is 
analogous to another so as to apply “aggressive” rational pressure on him to treat both 
cases alike and thus be consistent in his moral judgments.36 Though the terminology is 
borrowed, Nivison notes that Mencius does not view “tui” as a dialectical tactic of 
debate, but as a tactic of emotional and agency management. In brief, such a “‘para-
logical’ extension of [….] motivating feelings”37 concerns the matter of pointing out a 
feature of case A, which evokes an emotional response such as compassion or shame, as 
similar to a feature of case B, so as to infer that that same emotional response should be 
applied to case B. The anticipated effect of this is that one will engage emotionally with 
case B in the same way with case A, wanting to and in fact doing what one previously 
cognizes as what one should do but does not do in case B.  
In Nivison’s view, the Mohist Yizhi uses “tui” in a somewhat similar fashion to 
Mencius.38 In 3A: 5, Mencius criticizes Yizhi for giving lavish burials to his parents, 
which goes contrary to the Mohist tenet that ritual ceremonies should be frugal, and 
                                                 
35 See Nivison, Ways of Confucianism, 96 & 137. Graham has a similar analysis, though he translates “tui” 
as “inferring” rather than “extending.” As he writes, “ “Inferring’ is using what is the same in that which he 
refuses to accept and that which he does accept in order to propose the former.” See also A.C Graham, 
Later Mohist Logic, Ethics and Science (Hong Kong University Press, 1978), 483. 
 
36 According to Nivison, the Mohist logicians distinguish between four types of analogical inference.  Their 
concept of “extending” pertains to the “aggressive” mode of analogical inference—insisting on one’s 
obligation to make a judgment by pointing out its similarities to another judgment that one has made. See 
Nivison, Ways of Confucianism, 97. For a relevant discussion, see Lau, “On Mencius’ Use of Analogy in 
Argument,” in Mencius, 259-62. 
 
37 Ibid., 101.  
 
38 According to Nivison, Mozi originally takes a “strong voluntaristic” approach to moral agency, as he 
seems to think that all that is needed to adopt the proper attitude towards others, whereby what is proper is 
spelled out and justified by a certain doctrine, is a simple act of choice on one’s part. By Mencius’ time 
however, the Mohists subscribed to what can be called “soft voluntarism.” In their view, by appreciating 
the rational justification of a certain doctrine, one can choose to direct and alter certain emotional attitudes 
that are first developed in a familial environment in accordance with the dictates of that doctrine over a 
period of time. See Nivison, 96, & 130-34. 
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which Mencius deems as being inconsistent with their doctrinal fundament of “love 
without gradations (ai wu cha deng 愛無差等),” also known as the doctrine of 
indiscriminate concern.39 Yizhi defends himself with this statement: 
The Confucians praised the ancient rulers for acting “as if they were guarding a 
newborn baby (ruo bao chi zi 若保赤子).” What does this yan (doctrine) mean? In 
my opinion it means that there should be no gradations in love, though the 
practice of it begins with one’s parents (shi you qing shi 施由親始). (3A: 5). 
From my reading of Shun and Nivison’s analysis,40 Yizhi’s cultivation program 
depends on accepting the consequentially justified principle of non-gradational love, 
accepting the fact that there are features to every person (regardless of his relationship to 
us) that would activate our love and concern in the same way and degree, and accepting 
that we should and could be able to practice the same love and concern for everyone. 
Based on these acceptances, we tui our ability to act from love and concern for others via 
an equal transference of love and concern from one particular to another particular which 
is judged to belong to the same category (lei 類) of things. In other words, we extend love 
and concern for family members to all other human beings in an impartial manner, the 
purpose of which is practice and attain the Mohist ethical ideal. 
To explain further, Yizhi’s claim is that our love and concern for others are first 
nurtured and fostered in one’s familial environment. Lavish burial of one’s parents helps 
                                                 
39 These two tenets are justified by some kind of moral consequentialism. As the Mohists believe contra the 
Confucians, ritual ceremonies, especially funereal ones, should be frugal so as not to waste the resources of 
the state, and that taking the stance of impartial love towards all can install order and peace in the state. For 
a discussion on these Mohist tenets, see Burton Watson, Mo Tzu: Basic Writings (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1963), 65-77 & 39-49. 
 
40 See Kwong-Loi Shun, “Mencius’ Criticism of Mohism: An Analysis of Meng Tzu 3A: 5,” PEW 41.2 
(1991). Shun’s discussion, as well as my own, of Mencius 3A: 5 is influenced by Nivison, “Two Roots or 
One” and “Philosophical Voluntarism in Fourth Century-China” in Ways of Confucianism; and Wong, 




facilitate this process.41 This nurturance of our love and concern for others generate one’s 
neng to practice and attain the Mohist ethical ideal, i.e. to have appropriate emotional 
dispositions of adequate strength to move one to practice indiscriminate concern, 
provided one agrees with its justification of profiting both the public (such as bringing 
peace and order) and the individual (such as divine rewards). Giving lavish burials of 
one’s parents is therefore a practice consonant with Mohist thought. It is part of their 
program of cultivating our capacity to feel love and concern for others for empowering us 
to extend such love and concern towards everyone impartially, including those whom we 
have no prior interactions. In this way, there will be a congruity in doctrinal imperatives 
and personal inclinations, i.e. a congruity in external directedness and internal 
directedness reinforced by continuous exertions at indiscriminate extensions of our love 
and concern for others. Turning to his reference to the Confucian yan of “treating 
everyone like an infant,” what Yizhi is contending is that applying such an attitude 
towards everyone implies that one should engage in the same kind and degree of love and 
concern with every person. In short, Confucians implicitly adhere to the doctrine of 
indiscriminate concern. 
In Nivison and Shun’s treatment, Mencius counters Yizhi by pointing out the 
latter’s misunderstanding of the Confucian doctrine of “treating everyone like an infant.” 
According to Nivison, such a saying does not mean that we treat everyone as objects of 
equal familial love and concern, but only as “beings [equally] needing protection from 
undeserved harm.”42 For the Confucians, proper love for others will be differential both 
                                                 
41 According to Shun, it is likely that for Yizhi, giving lavish burials of our parents helps strengthen “our 
sense of attachment to other family members who are still alive and our remembrance of deceased parents.” 




in nature and degree, which depends on how the other is related to oneself. For those who 
stand in special relationships to us, such as our kin and friends, we would have love and 
concern for them that differ both in kind and degree from those who are not. Thus, 
Mencius argues in 3A: 5 that the affection that one has for a brother’s son would differ in 
nature and strength from a neighbor’s son. Also, when one sees one’s parents’ bodies 
being violated, one would be moved in such a way and to such a degree that one would 
bury them. If the bodies belong to people that do not stand in any particular relationship 
to oneself, we need not expect the reaction of being moved to bury the bodies.43  
For Mencius, the kind of relationship that one stands to the other is therefore very 
important, for it is the nature of and experiences constituting that relationship that 
determine whether certain emotional attitudes and strength would be aroused in one’s 
heart-mind to follow certain moral courses for the sake of self-with-other. Our 
connections and experiences with special others, in particular our immediate kin like 
parents and elder brothers, legitimize engagement in certain moral actions in certain 
contexts that need not be extended to non-special others. Nonetheless, it is through such 
connections and experiences that we are able to apprehend the condition of the other, 
even if there is no prior concrete history or encounter between them and us, in a manner 
that impacts positively on our emotional and motivational structure. For Mencius, having 
familial bondings and experiences makes it possible for anyone to be able to feel for and 
                                                                                                                                                 
42 Nivison, Ways of Confucianism, 103. 
 
43 Mencius also writes in 6B: 3 that if one recounts the story of one’s elder brother being shot at, then one 
would recount it in tears because one feels concern for one’s elder brother. However, if such an accident 
involves a person who does not stand in any particular relationship to oneself, then one can recount the 
manner in a light-hearted manner. 
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engage morally with non-special others when one sees them in a certain situation, such as 
responding compassionately to an innocent child crawling towards a well (3A: 5). 
For Mencius, Yizhi is therefore mistaken that the Confucian doctrine implicates 
the Mohist tenet of “love without gradations,” which the Mohists determine as an ethical 
direction through rational justification, without taking into any significant account the 
naturally/socially built-up affective tendencies of the heart-mind.  For Mencius, 
Confucian doctrinal imperatives are always inextricably linked with the actual emotional 
resources of the heart-mind.44 Thus, the obligations of the various social roles formalized 
in Confucian teachings,45 such as sons giving parents lavish funereal ceremonies instead 
of frugal ones,46 rulers treating everyone like an infant, etc. are determined by and/or 
evolved from recognizing two different dispositions of love and concern of the heart-
mind. In directing oneself to treat everyone like an infant, one is directing oneself to 
being concerned for others as beings that need protection from undeserved harm. To “tui” 
such love and concern from one case to another does not involve any difference in kind 
and degree. In directing oneself to comport with providing lavish funerals for one’s 
                                                 
44 In Shun’s reading, Mencius’ view is that both the validity of the moral Dao and the emotional 
dispositions required for following it have their source in the emotional configurations of the heart-mind. 
This stands diametric to Yizhi, who thinks that while the emotional dispositions required for following the 
moral Dao come from the emotional resources of the heart-mind, the source of the validity of such a Dao is 
independent of the emotional resources of the heart-mind. See Shun, “Mencius’ Criticism of Mohism: An 
Analysis of Meng Tzu 3A: 5,” 210. Thus, Mencius writes in 3A: 5 that when Tian produces things, it 
provides them with a single root (yi ben 一本), yet Yizhi tries to give them a dual root (er ben 二本). As 
Nivison contends, Mencius’ point seems to be that Yizhi’s moral program is fundamentally confused and 
unfeasible, as he accepts ethical guidance both from the heart-mind, and a set of doctrines that are 
unconnected with the heart-mind. Nivison, Ways of Confucianism, 103. 
 
45 One must take note that for Mencius, these obligations are contextually defeasible, rather than 
categorical. So for example, in 7A: 39, Mencius excuses a prince who does not abide by the full mourning 
period for his dead mother because certain mitigating circumstances prevent him from being properly 
emotionally engaged with the funereal rites.  
 
46 Mencius concludes in 3A: 5: “If burying them [in this case] is the thing to do, then giving burials to one’s 




parents, one is directing oneself to show due love for familial members, and extensions of 
such love necessarily involve making distinctions between love for one’s family and love 
for others.  
By bringing to Yizhi’s attention that there are features to familial others (such as 
historically built-up bonds and experiences) that activate love and concern of differential 
nature and degree from love and concern for non-familial others, which Yizhi (arguably) 
seems to accept at the end of the passage, Mencius calls into question the practicability of 
the Mohist yan of indiscriminate concern. In my understanding of Mencius, there will 
always be tension between directions set by Mohist doctrines and the directedness of the 
heart-mind.  
To elucidate further Mencius’ views, endeavors at extending familial love and 
concern from those who stand in special relationship to us to those who do not would 
never sustain as standards that one neng conform to affectively, even though we can 
rationally justify that one should, because one would not perceive those who do not stand 
in special relationships to oneself as having features that would arouse love and concern 
of the familial kind. In short, the Mohist “ought” of showing indiscriminate concern as an 
ethical aim would not work because we simply cannot engage with non-special others in 
terms of familial love and concern. Thus, Yizhi’s program of extending a certain 
emotional engagement from one case to another case through analogical reasoning would 
ultimately fail because of the lack of relevant analogous features between the two cases. 
Mencius’ rebuttal of Yizhi therefore exposes Yizhi’s incompetent usage of the strategy of 
“tui,” which ironically comes from his own school of thought.47 The upshot of this is that 
                                                 
47 For Nivison, Mencius seems well acquainted with Mohist thought. His refutation of Yizhi’s rejoinder 
appears to make reference to Chapter 45 of the Mozi, which cautions against misuse of the dialectics of 
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for Mencius, obligations spelled out by Confucian doctrines, rather than those of Mohist 
doctrines, mark the proper way in establishing and sustaining proper social relationships. 
According to Nivison, it is evident from his conversation with King Xuan that 
Mencius’ view of how we “tui” our emotions, motivations, and actions does not suffer 
from a misuse of the Mohist strategy a la Yizhi.48 In bringing up the ox incident, Mencius 
intends the king to become aware of a feature of the ox that is relevantly similar to his 
people49— innocent living beings that need protection from undeserved suffering—in 
order to make an inference that his people, like the ox, are appropriate objects of 
compassion. From a viewpoint of maintaining consistency of judgments to tend to 
appropriate objects of compassion, King Xuan should accept that he has an obligation to 
enact benevolent government as a conclusion of his analogical reasoning. The fact that 
King Xuan actually felt compassion for the ox, and was moved by this compassion to act 
benevolently towards the ox shows that he neng direct himself to bond compassionately 
with his subjects, and can be moved by such a bond to extend his benevolence from the 
ox to his people, since it is easier (in Mencius’ view) to be compassionate to human 
beings than to animals. This means that King Xuan cannot rely on a lack of neng to 
excuse himself from an obligation to practice benevolent government. 
In Im’s understanding of Nivison, the Mencian operation of “tui” proceeds in two 
stages—the “inferential” and the “attitude” stage.50 The “inferential” stage concerns the 
                                                                                                                                                 
“extending”: “When one accepts something, there is a special reason for accepting it.  One may accept the 
same things [in regard to two cases] but one’s reasons for accepting it may be different (推也者以其所不
取之同於其所, 取者予之也).” See Nivison, Ways of Confucianism, 103.  
 
48 Ibid., 98. 
 




use of analogical reasoning to judge that one ought to use a certain emotional capacity to 
relate to certain objects. The “attitude” stage concerns the actual utilization of such a 
capacity to engage with that object upon completion of the inferential stage. For Mencius, 
to fulfill his role as a king, King Xuan should extend his compassionate act from the 
“basic” case of the ox to the case of his people by way of these two stages. According to 
Nivison, Mencius attributes this mode of extension to Boyi’s pattern of thought and 
behavior. 
Bo Yi would serve only the right ruler and befriend (you 友) only the right man. 
He would not take his place at the court of an evil man, nor would be converse 
with him. For him to do so would be like sitting in mud and pitch wearing a court 
cap and gown. He extended (tui) his xin that dislikes evilness ((wu e zhi xin 惡惡
之心) to the extent that, if he si a fellow villager in his company had his cap awry, 
he would walk away without even giving a backward look, as if afraid of being 
defiled. Hence, even when a feudal lord made advances in the politest language, 
he would repel them. He repelled them simply because he would not consider it 
pure (xie 屑) to seek them out.51 
In Nivison’s interpretation, assuming that there is also a “basic” case in which Boyi’s 
xin of disliking evil is active and operative, Boyi’s extension of such a xin depends on 
thinking (si) about how some relevant feature in the basic case is similar to other relevant 
features of other cases. To elucidate Nivison, Boyi extends this xin from the basic case to 
any case that he categorizes as having the quality of evilness (tui lei 推類), such as 
proximity to feudal lords and the fellow villager with his cap awry, and inferring that he 
ought to distance himself from the non-basic case because one ought not to favor its 
influence, thus maintaining consistency in adhering to his principle of avoiding the 
                                                                                                                                                 
50 See Im Manyul, “Action, Emotion, and Inference in Mencius,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 29.2 
(2002): 232-33. For another treatment of Nivison’s analysis, see Kwong Loi-Shun, “Moral Reasons in 
Confucius Ethics,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 16.2 (1989): n. 9, 340. 
 
51 Mencius 2A: 9; cf. 5B: 1.  
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contaminating influence of evil objects.52 For Nivison, we can construct some “logical 
sideshow” to see how extensions of emotionality and agency work in Mencius’ view. 
(1) Basic case (1) in which one actually or will respond to some object (and 
appropriately so) from affective stance, which manifests one’s capacity for 
utilizing that affective stance for powering oneself to respond to another case.  
(2) Case (2) can be put in the same category as the basic case as its object shares 
certain relevantly similar feature as the object of the basic case and is therefore 
also an appropriate object of the same affective response.  
(3) Judging that I should extend my affective stance from the object of case (1) 
towards the object of case (2) by using that affective stance to respond to the 
object of case (2).53  
In asserting that Mencius is indeed applying the Mohist concept of “tui” as a process 
of analogical reasoning to pressurize oneself into consistency of certain emotional 
responses, Nivison points out that such a mode of management raises certain issues for 
the Mencian cultivating program. Based on Mencius’ conversation with King Xuan in 
1A: 7 as well as certain other passages in the Mencius,54 Nivison argues that Mencius 
believes that one can simply act on our analogical inferences to arrive at Mohist-like 
“voluntarist” or “just-do-it” decisions to extend one’s emotional responses from case to 
                                                 
52 In 5B; 1, Mencius calls Boyi the “unsullied (qing 淸) sage.  
 
53 This is my reconstruction of Nivison’s view of how extension for Mencius is a quasi- logical process. 
See Nivison, Ways of Confucianism, 98; David S. Nivison, “ Mencius and Motivation,” Journal of the 
American Academy of Region (Thematic Issue) 47.3 (1979): 420.  
 
54 For example, in Mencius 3B: 8, Mencius says that the Dao of the junzi is such that he will immediately 
stop a certain behavior once he realizes that it is contrary to yi.  
 166
 
case.55 However, Nivison claims that Mencius “makes a commonsense distinction 
between judging something or believing one should do something and actually doing it, 
and given his view of motivation perhaps he must.”56 According to Nivison, even though 
Mencius is aware that he may have gotten King Xuan to recognize that he should use his 
capacity for compassion to engage with his people, he is also aware that he has not gotten 
King Xuan to do so (or anything to facilitate the use of this capacity). 
To explain Nivison’s view of Mencius, shifting from a recognition that one ought 
to respond from some affective stance to one case to a judgment that one should extend 
such a response to another case because of their relevantly similar features does not 
necessarily mean that one actually extends the affective response itself. Hence, reasoning 
out a “ ‘pro-attitude’ constituting of a judgment of obligation” towards others does not 
ipso facto translate into taking the proper affective stance towards them, and being moved 
effectively by that stance into some immediately projected action.57 Succession from the 
inferential stage to the attitude stage is neither automatic nor guaranteed.  
In Nivison’s reading, Mencius’ recognition that judgments of obligation does not 
constitute the generation of emotional responses seems at odds with his view that 
extensions of moral actions are instantaneously and easily applicable so long as one 
decides to do so. As Nivison contends, a person may just fail to effectively maneuver 
himself into wanting to do what he concludes as what he ought to do, and hence fail to 
                                                 
55 Nivison, Ways of Confucianism, 39-40 & 109. 
 
56 Ibid., 99. See also p. 148. 
 
57 Nivison argues that from Mencius’ point of view, even if “the ‘pro-attitude’ constitutive of my judgment-
from-principle, ‘X is right,”…. [is] strong enough to allow me to form and carry out an intention to X, [it] 
is still not the sort of attitude that can lead to my doing X as a genuinely moral act.” This pertains to 
Mencius’ distinction between doing something from the right motivation and doing it because one feels one 
ought to do it since it is regarded as virtuous to do so. Ibid., 42, 99.  
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act morally in the Mencian model. Thus, even though King Xuan knows that instituting 
benevolent government out of a compassion for his people is what he ought to do, he fails 
to utilize his compassion to govern his people because his affective weaknesses (i.e. his 
distortive desires) impede the effective utilization of his capacity for compassion. It 
seems then that in order to institute benevolent government straight off from the 
inferential stage, King Xuan has to make himself meet the demands of what he has 
analogically inferred.  
However, as Nivison argues from Mencius’ perspective, not only would King 
Xuan not be acting morally, but he would also be harming himself (in terms of his 
personal development), and possibly harming his subjects eventually if he continues with 
this Gaozian-like strategy of doing what is right just because it is deemed as right.58 For 
Nivison, what Mencius seems to overlook in urging King Xuan to extend his compassion 
towards his people at once is that even if (which Nivison argues, many would not grant at 
all) one can by mere choice reshape oneself emotionally to produce a behavioral response 
in accordance with what one has analogically inferred, such a reshaping cannot be done 
in a forthwith manner, especially when there are limitations of emotional strength of the 
right kind.59 In view of this, Mencius should have considered that King Xuan needs more 
time before extensions of compassion towards his people, and realization of true kingship 
fall with his range of manageability.60  
                                                 
58 Nivison, Ways of Confucianism, 110. 
 
59 Ibid., 109. 
 
60 In relation to Mencius’ moral demands from King Xuan, Nivison writes that perhaps Mencius would do 
well to consider the idea that moral management sometimes depends on “following a moral obligation to 
make the best of what I recognize to be a (temporally) less than ideal state of my character.” I take Nivison 
to be saying that Mencius should have given time to King Xuan for realizing the Confucian vision of ideal 
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Fortunately, as Nivison argues, it would be an oversimplification to read Mencian 
extensions of emotional responses as simply “voluntaristic” in their nature of execution. 
Many passages, especially 2A: 2 which talks about the nurturance of qi and attainment of 
the budongxin,61 indicate that he offers a more sophisticated, and what seems to be his 
typical strategy of extension. As Nivison contends for Mencius, there are paradigmatic 
situations (i.e. the “basic” cases), most likely those in the familial context that arouse our 
“basic moral making impulses,”62 which effectively move us into paradigmatic 
behavioral responses. However, it would take some period of cultivating (i.e. 
strengthening) these impulses before we are able to adequately and effectively extend 
them to all cases which we recognize as relevantly similar, i.e. that belong to the same 
category.63 Allowing Nivison to describe this process, which he likens to cultivating good 
taste in wine: 
[Mencius] requires a method and program for the cultivation of moral taste. Just 
as I might cultivate a taste for fine wine by some sensible and judicious 
drinking…. so I heighten my moral sensibility and my readiness to act, by doing 
right things, and savoring the satisfaction that follows. The feed-back effect 
strengthens the disposition, so that next time I am able to do something that would 
have been too difficult for me to do before in the right ways—that is, wanting to, 
and not simply ordering myself to.64  
                                                                                                                                                 
government by first doing things that are of lower magnitude than that vision so as to edge his way towards 
substantive attitudinal change and effective moral agency. Ibid., 110. 
 
61 For Nivison’s discussion on 2A: 2, see Ways of Confucianism 108, 125, & 126. 
 
62 Ibid., 41. 
 
63 Nivison thinks that 7A: 17 can be interpreted as a summary of this process. Its literal translation goes like 
this: “Do not do what you do not do; do not want what you do not want. That is all.” According to Nivison, 
what Mencius means by this is this: What you do not do in a paradigmatic or an actual case, do not do them 
in relevantly similar cases by extending one’s behavioral response from the same affective stance (provided 
it is strong enough to motivate oneself into that behavioral response). In this way, what one does not desire 




For Nivison, the Mencian strategy of extension for the project of practicing and 
attaining the Confucian human ideal is therefore a long-term program of strengthening 
our other-regarding xins as effective sources of agency to a gradually expanding range of 
like cases. This long-term overview of Mencius’ cultivating strategy therefore 
distinguishes it from the voluntaristic outlook of the Mohist program. That said, Nivison 
submits that both schools of thought view the management of our emotional capacities 
and moral actions as dependent on the technique of analogical inference and thus, as a 
“quasi-logical” activity. 
6.5  Im on the Concept of “Tui” 
In “Action, Emotion, and Inference in Mencius,” Im argues against Nivison’s 
treatment of the Mencian conception of “tui” as a process of deliberation that is based on 
some “principle of case-to-case analogy or consistency.”65 For Im, “tui” in both Mencian 
and Mohist thought refers to “things other than whole forms of inference, even though it 
refers to things that are involved in the Mohist explication of argument techniques.”66 
Before I present Im’s own interpretation of what constitutes “tui” for Mencius, I shall 
first discuss his arguments against Nivison.  
Firstly, Im states that “tui” is not something that necessarily pertains to applying 
our emotional capacities from case to case.67 He supports this by pointing out that 
Mencius tells King Xuan in 1A: 7 that one must engage in “tui en” if one is to care for 
                                                                                                                                                 
64 David Nivison, “Two Roots or One?” Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical 
Association 53 (1980), 745. See also p. 40 & 107-08 in Ways of Confucianism.  
 
65 Im, “Action, Emotion, and Inference in Mencius,” 231.  
 
66 Ibid., 234.  
 
67 Ibid., 240-41. 
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one’s family.68 As Im argues, the familial context in Mencian thought is the starting point 
for any utilization of the human capacity for compassion. Responding compassionately to 
one’s own family members is therefore, to use Nivison’s term, the “basic case.” It 
follows that there cannot be any case from which one extends compassion from to one’s 
family. As such, Im states, “the simple exercise of one’s compassion itself counts as the 
extending of compassion,”69 which reduces the plausibility that “tui” for Mencius entails 
a stage of analogical inference. 
Secondly, Im writes that if Mencius’ point in reminding King Xuan of the ox 
incident is to make King Xuan undergo analogical deliberation, then he should think that 
King Xuan holds some principle, either tacitly or explicitly, about what kinds of cases or 
beings with a certain feature would appropriately call for his compassionate response, 
and that King Xuan takes the ox to be such a case or being.70 If so, then all Mencius has 
to do to pressurize King Xuan to make an analogical inference and therefore an extension 
of his compassion from the ox to his people is to ask King Xuan whether there are any 
relevant difference between the ox and his people, so as to make him realize that he ought 
to treat his people benevolently. As Im submits, Mencius could have easily posed the said 
question, as suggested in his question (from the perspective of those who interpreted 
King Xuan’s benevolent act of sparing the ox as an act of miserly) to King Xuan 
regarding the relevant difference between the ox and lamb to be the sacrificial animal. 
                                                 
68 In 1A: 7, Mencius writes: “Hence one who extends his compassion can tend those within the Four Seas; 
one who does not cannot tend even his own family (推恩足以保四海，不推恩無以保妻子).”  
 
69 Ibid., 231. 
 
70 Ibid., 237-40. 
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However, as Im points out, Mencius never employs this rhetorical technique, 
which would kick-start King Xuan’s engagement in analogical reasoning and his 
engagement in extending his compassionate response from the ox to his people. Im 
considers that one could argue that the rhetorical void could be due to Mencius’ 
incompetence or unfamiliarity with the Mohist technique of pointing out relevant 
similarities between cases and pressing for consistency in our attitude towards them. 
Nevertheless, he argues that this cannot be the reason.  
According to Im, in Mencius’ attempt to get King Xuan to recognize his neng to 
respond compassionately to his people, he demonstrates his competence in Mohist-style 
analogical reasoning by showing the similarities between mustering the strength to lift 
around seven kilograms but not a feather, mustering the eyesight to see the tip of a fine 
hair but not a cartload of firewood, and mustering a compassionate response towards an 
ox but not towards one’s fellow human beings.71 Indeed, as Im contends, showing King 
                                                 
71 The following is Im’s “logical sideshow” of Mencius’ persuasion of King Xuan that his compassion is 
strong enough to reach his people. Ibid., 239. 
 
Cases A and B: 
A: If one can lift a heavy thing, then one can certainly lift a light thing. 
B: If one can see a tiny thing, then one can certainly see a large thing. 
 
Principle illustrated by A and B: 
P: If one can do a difficult task with a capacity, then one can certainly do an easier thing with that same 
capacity. 
 
Case C: If one can feel compassion for a mere ox, then one can certainly feel compassion for one’s fellow 
humans. 
 
The analogy:  
Case C is like A and B in that in that it is also a case that falls under P: One has demonstrated the ability to 
do a difficult thing with a capacity—feel compassion for a mere ox—and thus has demonstrated that one is 
capable of doing an easier thing with that same capacity—feel compassion for one’s fellow humans. 
 
The Inference: 
If one affirms A and B by virtue of being cases that fall under the principle P, one must also affirm C, 




Xuan the strength of his compassion, and thus his neng to engage compassionately with 
his people seems to be Mencius’ purpose in discussing King Xuan’s encounter with the 
ox, rather than trying to make King Xuan into undergo analogical deliberation.72  
Thirdly, Im argues that for Mencius, the project of extending certain emotional 
responses does not appear to appeal to the maintenance of analogical consistency (be it 
quasi or not) in one’s behavioral decisions. In Im’s reading, Mencius thinks that just as 
animals being prepared for food are not appropriate objects of compassion even though 
they are also innocent beings awaiting suffering, as indicated by Mencius’ positive view 
of the junzi’s strategy of consciously avoiding the kitchen, the sacrificial ox is also not an 
appropriate object of compassion, given its role in an important ritual ceremony (the 
consecration of a new bell) that King Xuan should carry out in its best form as director of 
human and natural affairs. From this, Im argues that Mencius cannot plausibly exhort 
King Xuan to extend his compassion-driven actions through the pressure of analogical 
consistency, as King Xuan would be extending his compassion from inappropriate to 
appropriate objects.73 Im’s contention seems supported by the fact that Mencius himself 
does not rebuke King Xuan for replacing the sacrificial ox with a lamb, i.e. at King 
Xuan’s inconsistency in substituting one innocent suffering being with another. 
To further reinforce Im’s reading, we can look to Mencius’ view of Boyi’s 
extension of his xin of disliking evil as too extreme, which is alluded in his description of 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
72 Ibid., 239. 
 
73 As Perkins points out, Van Norden argues that Mencius is not appealing to King Xuan to maintain 
rational consistency because the ox incident has no universalizable feature. For example, the only 
difference between the ox and the sheep is that the ox was seen, yet sparing the sheep is not permissible in 
King Xuan’s view. See Perkins, “Mencius, Emotion, and Autonomy,” n. 19, 224; Bryan Van Norden, 




Boyi as too straight-laced (ai 隘), even though he is worthy (xian 賢). In my reading, 
Mencius appears to imply that the fellow villager with his cap awry is not an appropriate 
object to be disliked and repelled because his mere appearance and company will not 
taint oneself. Boyi is therefore extending from what he ought to feel and do (dislike and 
avoid evil men) to what he ought not to feel and do (dislike and avoid fellow villagers 
with caps awry). It seems strange that if the management of our emotions and agency for 
the cultivation program depends on analogical consistency, Boyi would fail in this crucial 
respect, yet manage to practice and accord with sageliness. As Im argues, there is no 
indication whatsoever that Mencius’ criticism of Boyi targets his defective inference 
making.74 
Based on these three convincing arguments, Im contends that even though 
Mencius understands and utilizes well the rhetorical technique of analogical reasoning, he 
does not view such techniques as instances or part of the operation of “tui.”75 In other 
words, the Mencian conception of “tui” does not consist of an inferential stage, and 
therefore an attitudinal stage that results from the completion of such a stage. 
According to Im, the problem with Nivison’s treatment is that it fails to see that 
Mencius and the Mohists do not technically conceive “tui” as part of the inferential 
process, but is the part “wherein a person who is ‘being helped’ to make the inference (by 
having a certain similarity pointed out to her) considers the case in a particular way, 
namely, as being of the same lei as the other, analogous one.”76 Im contends that “tui” for 
                                                 
74 Im, “Action, Emotion, and Inference in Mencius,” 242. 
 
75 Ibid., 241.  
 
76 Ibid., 241.  
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the Mohist pertains to some mode of regarding (specified by a certain context) that one 
actively and practically (rather than para-logically) maneuvers oneself into.  
To support his argument, Im turns our attention to the Mohist concept of 
“assisting or pulling (yuan 援),” which is explained in a line preceding the concept of 
“tui” in the Mohist texts.77 As he argues, both “tui” and “yuan” are steps that are in play 
in two dialectical techniques of persuasion using analogical inference-making, rather than 
whole modes of inference, in Mohist thought.78 In one dialectical technique, one yuan or 
pulls into one’s dialectics some principle or aspect of a case that one’s targeted 
opposition accepts, and by analogy, argues that he should allow the use of this aspect or 
principle in his own similar case. The “pulled” object is the principle or aspect of a case 
that the opposition already accepts, rather than the entirety of the analogical inferential-
making itself. In another, one tui or pushes the opponent’s judgment from one case he 
already accepts to an acceptance of another case based on recognizing their relevant 
similar features. The “pushed” object, as Im contends, is a practical mode of regarding 
something from a certain stance, which for Mohists pertains to regarding a certain 
proposition or categorization from a stance of acceptability. Accordingly, to extend a pro-
attitude of acceptability for the Mohists is an act of regarding something as belonging to 
the category of acceptability, where analogical reasoning might provide some impetus for 
regarding that something in that stance, but would not be a necessary condition.  
                                                 
77 Graham translates the application of “yuan” as such: “Abducing is saying: ‘If it is so in your case, why 
may it not be so in mine too (援也者日子然我系獨不可以然). See Graham, Later Mohist Logic, Ethics 
and Science, 483.  Im is against Graham’s definition of “yuan” as a specific mode of argument known as 
“abducing.” His reason will be evident shortly in the main text. Ibid., 234. 
 
78 Im contends that Nivison mistakenly attributes to the Mohist school only form of argument by analogical 
inference, which he takes to be “tui.” Rather, there are two forms of such dialectical strategies, and the 
Mohist explication of “tui” and “yuan” is meant as an explication of certain maneuvers involved in such 
strategies, rather than referring to the whole of such strategies themselves. Ibid., 234. 
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With this treatment, Im states that Mencius probably understands and uses “tui” 
as a mode of regarding something from an affective stance, such as compassion, shame 
etc. To tui compassion therefore refers to an act of regarding an object compassionately. 
Likewise, based on Im’s reading, to tui the xin of disliking evil in Boyi’s case is to regard 
something unfavorably as an evil influence. Mencius’ criticism of Boyi is therefore a 
criticism of the excessive things that Boyi tui this mode of regarding to, which is 
generated from what he voluntarily si about, such as proximity to people with caps awry. 
Hence, following Im’s reductive account of “tui,” we need not postulate some basic case 
that provides the source of inferential making for concluding what cases or objects Boyi 
should apply his xin of disliking to. This reinforces the interpretation that si is not an 
activity that revolves around thinking about principles or propositions.  
In Im’s treatment, “tui” therefore consists only of an “attitude stage,” which one 
reaches not by making an analogical inference but simply by one’s voluntary control. For 
Im, this implies that we need not attribute to Mencius that responding to a being or thing 
from a certain affective regard is something that one can simply and immediately do after 
analogical deliberations, or can occur only after a long process of strengthening our 
compassionate impulses so that they can effectively move us in concert with our 
analogical inferences. As Im claims, this reading is in line with Mencius’ purpose of 
bringing up the ox incident, which as mentioned earlier, is to bring to King Xuan’s 
attention that his xin of compassion is strong enough to move him to practice benevolent 
government. King Xuan’s moral failure with respect to his role as king is therefore not 
because his capacity for compassion is too weak for meeting his inferential judgments, 
but because he chooses not to extend his compassion, i.e. to put in the effort to utilize his 
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capacity for compassion to engage with his people. In view of this, Im thinks that we 
should not follow Nivison’s reading of Mencian moral agency as reliant on a feedback 
process of cultivating certain emotional capacities and our enjoyment in ritual activities 
through habitual usage and training in such activities.79 
But how can one have such voluntaristic control over having a certain affective 
regard for someone or something? Im’s answer seems to appear in his paper “Emotional 
Control and Virtue in the Mencius,” where he argues that the Mencian model of 
managing our emotional responses relies on directing our attention to proper things or 
relevant aspects of a situation. 
….If one is capable of feeling compassion and has a tendency to feel so, then it 
makes sense to think that if one thinks one ought to feel so toward an object, one 
need only attend to that object, in particular to the features of the object for which 
compassion is apt and to which it responds: the object’s obvious needs, signs of 
distress…. We are familiar, I think, with this kind of control only we tend not to 
emphasize it the way Mencius does. There are ordinary situations, like averting 
one’s eyes from a homeless person, in which those of us who tend toward 
compassion willingly refuse to feel it towards a particular object. If we think, 
along with Mencius, that we all have certain emotional tendencies built into us as 
human beings, then there may be quite a plausible sense in which we can be held 
accountable for failing to have the right feelings, and not just for having failed to 
cultivate ourselves to feel so.80 
Extrapolating from Im’s claim, we can surmise that King Xuan does not regard 
his people compassionately because he does not concentrate his attention on the concrete 
                                                 
79 Im rejects what he calls a “cultivation model” in interpreting the Mencian practice of the ethical ideal. 
This cultivation model, which Im analogizes to the Aristotelian-like “Perfectibility” model, implies that 
moral development and agency depends on habituating and practicing our emotional capacities from an 
undeveloped to a mature state whereby they can effectively motivate a person to feel and act in the 
appropriate and best ways. Im proposes instead a “Natural Development” model, in which our emotional 
capacities do not require strengthening by practice so long as certain conditions (economic needs and a 
stable social environment) are met. If these conditions are met, one can be expected naturally to be able to 
feel and act in accordance with the Mencian ethical ideal. For Im’s objections to Nivison, see “Action, 
Emotion, and Inference in Mencius,” 244-45. For other reasons proposed by Im for rejecting a “cultivation” 
reading of Mencius not mentioned in this article, see Im, “Emotional Control and Virtue in the Mencius.” 
 
80 Ibid., 20-21. 
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suffering of his people.81 I believe that this is for Mencius how King Xuan can quan his 
taste for and the strength of compassion. And it is probably through such a process of 
increasing our experiential focus on others’ concrete suffering and pain that Mencius 
thinks that King Xuan’s distortive desires will be reduced to facilitate the nurturance of 
the heart-mind.82 
With this in mind, it is my contention here that the right kind of environmental 
setting, influence, or exposure, for example, to see for oneself the distress and pain that 
one’s people go through, would facilitate King Xuan to voluntarily and actively si the 
concrete experience of his people’s suffering. It is in this way that King Xuan’s xin of 
compassion would be extended to his subjects. In the words of Kohn, “an encounter with 
another person offers something that can never be equaled to solitary reflection.”83 Such 
an affective shift may occur because of an analogical resonance between this experience 
and other previous unbearable experiences of observing other beings suffer, as in the case 
of King Xuan regarding the sacrificial ox compassionately because he links the 
experience of seeing the frightened expression of the ox to his prior social experiences 
regarding innocence and suffering.84 In keeping his heart-mind focused on a 
compassionate regard for people, King Xuan will then be moved to tend to their welfare 
as his desire to alleviate their suffering will be stronger than his “distortive” desires. 
                                                 
 
81 Perkins points out that in passages such as 1A: 3, 1A: 4, and 1B: 4, Mencius gives kings like King Xuan 
and Hui graphic accounts of their people’s suffering in an attempt to direct their attention to it. See Perkins,   
“Mencius, Emotion, and Autonomy,” 215, and 224  n.15.  
 
82 I agree with Shun’s reading of 7B: 35 that Mencius’ advocacy of a reduction in our desires for the 
nurturance of our heart-mind concern those of a distortive kind, such as King Xuan’s desire to expand his 
territory, women etc. See Shun, Mencius and Early Chinese Thought, 175.  
 
83 Kohn, The Brighter Side of Human Nature, 100. 
 
84 For this reading, I have consulted Perkins,  “Mencius, Emotion, and Autonomy,” 215; Philip Ivanhoe, 
Ethics in the Confucian Tradition (Atlanta, GA; Scholars Press, 1990).  
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Engagements in the activities of si and tui therefore allow our moral motivations to trump 
our non-moral ones (as well as preventing them from “distorting” our behavioral 
dispositions) so as to become effective forces of agency. 
Sadly, King Xuan continues to expose himself to the wrong environment (the 
“cold” of distancing himself from the problems and suffering of his people, rather than 
the “warmth” of connecting with his people), and therefore fails to concentrate on the 
right things in practicing true kingship. At any rate, this shows that for Mencius, 
responding to others from a certain affective mode of regarding is a voluntary operation, 
not of choosing to feel and act in a certain way by sheer choice or deliberative reasoning, 
but of choosing to put ourselves in the right surroundings, which influences or facilitates 
what we si or concentrate on in terms of our social experiences, so that the right emotions 
(i.e. our other-regarding xins) will be sufficiently aroused to move us into action. This 
implies that si for Mencius is a controlled activity, unlike Xunzi as stated earlier.  
 Interestingly though, when not juxtaposing Mencius’ usage of tui with the Mohist 
usage for comparison and explication purposes, Nivison has an interpretation of the 
Mencian conception of tui and agency that is similar to what is being proposed here. In 
this treatment, we can think of “tui” as “orienting oneself toward role-filling” by 
“dwelling on emotion-arousing aspects of the situation in which one acts one’s role” so as 
to fulfill what one knows what one should do.85 Likening this process to an actor’s 
preparations for his performance,86 Nivison writes that it seems plausible to suggest that 
we could, and should, approach the filling of our ritualistic roles, say as the kin or friend 
                                                 
85 Nivison, Ways of Confucianism, 105. 
 
86 Nivison writes that difference between an actor’s emotional preparations for engaging with his role and 
the Mencians is that the former’s activated emotion might be unrelated to what he is engaged in, while the 
latter’s activated emotion, as I presume, must always bear on or connect with the case at hand. Ibid. 
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of the deceased in a funeral, by “recalling the personality of the deceased and one’s 
relationship with this person, reflecting sympathetically on the sadness of the survivors, 
etc, so that as one takes one’s part in the ritual, one does what one does from genuine and 
appropriate feelings such as sadness, respect, sense of doing a last service for an 
acquaintance, perhaps.”87 The same goes for every ritually regulated social role that 
constitutes a particular person. Thus, King Xuan, as king of a state who ought to tend to 
his people’s needs and govern benevolently, should undertake this voluntary operation to 
feel and act from compassion for his people and really occupy his role (i.e. become a true 
king), by choosing to attend to experiences pertaining to the suffering of his people. 
Based on this analysis, I suspect Nivison will not object to my reading of his 
attribution to Mencius that we need to voluntarily and actively think in various ways 
about our experiences with certain others in a situation in order to evoke and be moved to 
act from emotions proper to that situation as the tandem activities of “si”88 and “tui.” It 
follows then that Nivison’s reading might not be that far apart from my reading as based 
on Im. What then does one make of Im’s differing view from Nivison on whether we 
should ascribe to Mencius a long-term program of cultivating certain emotional 
dispositions in terms of their fortification for effective agency? 
On the one hand, I agree with Im in reading Mencius as claiming that our other-
regarding capacities or dispositions are both present and potent for driving us towards the 
proper occupation of the roles that constitute us, which involves the enjoyment of such 
occupation for its own sake because we are moved into doing what we want to do the 
                                                 
87 Ibid. 
 
88 In Nivison’s view, Mencius’ idea of “si” is the heart-mind’s voluntary seeking as well as a reflective 
attending to its inner dispositions. See Nivison, Ways of Confucianism, 87 & 114. 
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most.  Nevertheless, this claim, being a claim about dispositions, is conditional in nature. 
As mentioned, it entails the proviso of the satisfaction of our biologic needs and wants to 
a certain level for the nourishment of our qi. It is with this nourishment that qi can 
provide the motivational strength to support the execution of the proper zhia.   
In addition, since these reactive emotional capacities are utilized as effective 
directional and motivational forces for responding to the obligations of one’s role by the 
impact of proper environmental influences on what we si and concentrate on, we must 
read Mencius’ claim as also being conditional on having morally moving experiences 
induced by the right environment. It is only through having familial experiences and 
controlling our environmental setting and exposure89 day by day to elicit and expand 
living connections with concrete others,90 and to voluntarily and actively si these 
                                                 
89 Perkins has argued that for Mencius, one’s responsibility for choosing the right environmental exposure 
depends on a certain level of development in a certain environment for which we are not responsible. It is 
obvious that one such environment for Mencius is a familial surroundings that fall within a certain range of 
functionality for giving us positive social experiences. See Perkins, “Mencius, Emotion, and Autonomy,” 
221-23. 
 
90 Munro has argued that Mencian thought does not deal with our innate dispositions to divide people into 
in-group/out-group categories, which limit the scope of our empathy. As I see it, the solution is not, as 
Munro claims, to detect from the Mencius a strategy for narrowing the in-group and out-group gap that is 
based on developing perspectives and attitudes concerning the “possible survival value of enlarging group 
cooperation.” Donald J. Munro, “Mencius and an Ethics of the New Century” in Mencius: Contexts and 
Interpretations, 313-14. For one thing, I believe that this does not sit well with Mencian thought, for such a 
strategy may translate into developing a practical concern with self-profit.  
 In my view, the Mencian solution to this is to seek concrete, productive experiences with those 
considered as belonging to one’s out-group so as to reduce our empathetic bias. By thinking about (si) these 
experiences, one can break down one’s emotional stratification and imperviousness to their concerns and 
interests and come to regard them as part of one’s in-group. As Kohn argues, broadening the range of one’s 
experiences to maximize our understanding and identification with others increases the probability of 
managing something close to an empathic connection with others. He writes: “Compassion and connection 
are most efficiently promoted by giving people a chance to experience the life-circumstances of others. To 
spend time talking street people—to learn how they fear falling asleep in the wrong places lest someone 
steal what little they have, how they drink to blot out the hopelessness…. - this is to turn an abstract 
problem (homelessness) into real human beings…. anyone who has directly known distress cannot look at a 
similar event again in quite the same way and cannot easily pass by someone’s else in similar trouble 
again.” See Kohn, The Brighter Side of Human Nature, 134 & 267. I will not provide a stronger case for 
my reading for it falls out the scope of my thesis.  
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connections that our other-regarding emotional capacities would be extended to move us 
into following the proper course of a son, a king etc. 
On the other hand, like Nivison, I think we should attribute to Mencius a long-
term program of cultivating our emotional dispositions. However, we must understand 
such a program in this way: our capacity for compassion, shame, reverence etc. is a 
function not only of whether one can respond to others in particular situations, but also 
whether one can continue and persist to respond to others in these other-oriented 
emotional attitudes irregardless of our environmental circumstances. Earlier, we have 
discussed how si facilitates the concentration of the proper zhia for the proper 
management of qi so as to accumulate genuinely cultivating actions. This allows the 
gradual nurturance of qi and the heart-mind in terms of its zhia to develop the haoranzhiqi 
and the budongxin respectively, the purpose of which is to ensure that the leadership of 
the heart-mind in terms of its liking for liayi is never imperiled by the negative influences 
of qi, but is always positively and spontaneously supported by its movement.  
Thus, as I see it, the Mencian cultivation model pertains not so much as to build 
up qi for strength of agency, but to strength of moral commitment. As Mencius writes in 
1A: 7, only the junzi can maintain constancy of heart-mind (hengxin 恆心) despite lacking 
material and economic support, while the common man will fail to preserve it because of 
this adverse environmental condition. What I take Mencius to mean here is that only 
someone who has attained an adequate nurturance of qi and zhia can maintain and execute 
other-regarding choices and behavior, and prevent himself from drifting into egoistic 
preoccupations despite his affective subjection to morally defeasible circumstances.91 In 
                                                 
91 In line with his Natural Development reading of Mencius (see this chapter, n. 77), Im interprets 
“hengxin” as constancy in executing the skill of expressing our emotions in proper and timely forms even 
 182
 
short, the junzi attains the emotional stamina for following the Dao that is not availed to 
the common person. Hence, we must read Mencius as not just being concerned with 
managing our emotions and desires for proper agency, but also its inter-relationship with 
cultivating the elevating quality of moral steadfastness. 
6.6  Xunzi and Mencius:  A Brief Comparative Discussion on Active Emotional Control 
and Management of Agency 
Contra what Xunzi thinks, Mencius does not construe moral agency and 
development as dependent on following whatever emotions and desires passively formed 
in us by virtue of the stimulative impact of our environment. Both Confucian 
philosophers, however, have differing views on how to manage our affective subjection 
to the world and concomitantly our agency. While Xunzi valorizes understanding and 
deliberating on proper rational principles for such a management, Mencius emphasizes 
the control of our environment exposure and what we direct our attention to. Why then 
the difference? 
I believe that the divergence in their methodologies of emotional and agency 
management has its roots in their different conceptions of the purpose of liayi. For Xunzi, 
it seems that the purpose of liayi is to allow our emotions and desires to be satisfied in 
                                                                                                                                                 
in hard times, which results from repeated performances of ritual activities. For Im, steadfastness  in 
virtuous conduct in Mencian thought is therefore about forming the right habits in expressing our emotions. 
Im analogizes such habituation to the habituation of flossing one’s teeth (“One desires to form the habit [of 
flossing teeth] because one already sees value in it regardless of whether one will enjoy it”)—the goal is 
not to appreciate the value of the activity, or come to enjoy the activity. Whatever feelings and attitudes 
essential to the activity are therefore already present prior to the formation of the habit. 
  I think Im, in pushing his Natural Development reading of Mencius, may be confusing the idea of 
forming regular forms of behavior through frequent repetitions due to one’s favorable feelings and attitudes 
towards them, and the idea of becoming emotionally/cognitively bound to a way of life in all environmental 
circumstances by nurturing one’s favorable feelings and attitudes for this way of life over all other ways of 
life which we favor. Though I think that the two ideas are both goals of Mencian moral education, if we 
take “hengxin,” “haoranzhiqi,” and “budongxin” as interrelated concepts, I think we should render 
“hengxin” as indicating a stronger sense of commitment to virtuous conduct than what Im’s interpretation 




good ways, where what is good or shan is spelled out as zhenglipingzhi—the various 
aspects of rectifying social and personal disorder and disharmony. This leads Xunzi to 
emphasize the need to understand and deliberate on ritual rationale for guiding the 
management of our emotionality and agency, for such a rationale embodies the totality of 
human wisdom for how we should satisfy all our desires and emotions in all areas of our 
life, and time-proven reasons of why we should approve of such means and forms of 
satisfaction. Without a reflective pressure to accord with such a rationale, every person 
would indulge in whatever desire arises in him, the result of which is social cum personal 
disorder and disharmony.  
On the other hand, Mencius seems to connote the purpose of liayi with the 
fortification of our intrinsic and constitutive connectedness with others. Because of this, 
shan for Mencius concerns engaging with others primarily via other-regarding xins, 
particularly the siduan, which are deep-seated affective modes of regarding that human 
beings in general enter in from time to time and in varying degrees, and which can 
possibly provide strong enough motivational impetus to override our self-directed 
concerns to seek productive forms of relationships with particular others. By controlling 
the impact of what we are aware of on what we actively si about, especially the full rich 
details of one’s condition in interdependent relation to the condition of particular others 
and what they personally mean for us, we allow the heart-mind to be vigorously moved 
by these xins on a regular basis, and shift it in a directedness (zhia) consistent with that 
meaning, i.e. the reciprocal negotiation of our own concrete needs and wants with the 
concrete needs and wants of others. In other words, in the concentrated mesh of one’s 





good son, a good ruler etc, i.e. a genuine and positive striving to rise about our egoistic 














     
 
Conclusion: The Mencian Concept of Neng 
 
 
7.1  Introduction   
In the last chapter, we have discussed that for Mencius, insofar as the heart-mind 
finds its nutrition from a steady supply of basic material and economic goods and a 
continuous stimulus of experiences that signal contextual proto-recognitions of our 
shared humanity and integrative relationality, it is always within our voluntary control to 
“si” and “tui” via certain affective modes of regard that aim at contributing to the shan 
servicing of a locus of constitutive roles and bonds. By having the capacity to actively 
muster up the energy and emotional interest to open up oneself to a ceaseless, moment-
to-moment process of establishing oneself through establishing particular others, and 
experiencing our richest form of fulfillment as grounded in such interactions,1 one 
possesses the neng to follow the ethical ideal, in the performative sense of living a 
developmental pattern that is directionally similar to the sage.  
Nevertheless, we should not take Mencius to be claiming that having such a neng 
is sufficient by itself to explain the full extent of moral competency, particularly as 
regards the appropriate evocation and formal manifestation of our emotional responses 
for the efficient promotion of harmony in human and natural affairs in all situations. As 
we can recall, one major reason why Xunzi makes a distinction between keyi and neng to 
be or act as a sage is to emphasize that we attain this particular moral skill essentially 
                                                 
1 I find this respect of Mencian thought rather similar to Dewey, who “conceive[s] the individual mind as a 
function of social life,” in this respect. In Campbell’s explication of Deweyan thinking, “Among the 
various types of association that can be explored, however, ‘the social, in its human sense, is the richest, 
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through extensive training in the rites. Consistent and persistent ritual study and practice 
produces the definitive goal of achieving comprehensive understanding of the optimal 
rationale (liayi) excogitated by former sage kings for guiding, structuralizing, and refining 
our emotional responses. Assimilating then the totality of accumulated and ultimate 
human wisdom into our thought pattern generates a reflective grasp of the nature of every 
act of fulfilling our emotions and desires and its consequences. In this way, one acquires 
the deliberative power and motivation to accord with liayi in every situation.2 In Xunzi’s 
view, Mencian moral education is an education of emancipation from all bonds of 
dependence on the teachings of sage. Through the introduction of the distinction between 
keyi and neng, which points out the disparity between the common man and the sage in 
terms of their penetrative knowledge for establishing and preserving a harmonious 
equilibration in relationships, Xunzi criticizes Mencius for failing to acknowledge the 
necessary and authoritative guidance provided by the sage in this aspect of our moral 
education.  
In the finale of this thesis, I shall defend Mencius from Xunzi’s charge by 
showing that the worth of our neng to be shan is not in the completion that it represents, 
but is in the leverage it affords for deferring to the sage to learn the efficient advancement 
of relational order and harmony. Put differently, being neng to follow the path of the sage 
does not deny the importance and indispensability of acculturating ourselves in the 
                                                                                                                                                 
fullest and most delicately subtle of any mode actually experienced.’” See Campbell, Understanding John 
Dewey, 38-39. 
 
2 Shun writes that unlike Dai Zhen and Xunzi, both of whom emphasize understanding of lia and yi to guide 
one’s action, Mencius does not think that “one’s action should always be guided by, and not just be 
accompanied by, the awareness that one is acting in accordance with yi.” See Shun, “Mencius, Xunzi and 
Dai Zhen,” 237. 
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strategies and ways of historical, authoritative figures to execute and survey our doings, 
and secure the proper utilization of our emotional capacities.  
7.2  The Importance of the Sage  
In 7A: 41, Kung-sun Chou tells Mencius that the sublimity (gao 高) and beauty 
(mei 美) of the Dao make people think that it is beyond their capacity (bu ke) to reach it. 
As such, people are discouraged from investing effort to practice and follow the Dao. To 
remedy this, he suggests lowering the standards of the Dao. Mencius replies: 
“A great craftsman does not put aside the plumb-line for the benefit of the 
clumsy carpenter. Yi did not compromise on his standards of drawing the 
bow for the sake of the clumsy archer. A gentleman is full of eagerness 
when he has drawn his bow, but before he lets fly the arrow, he stands in 
the middle of the path, and those who are able to do so follow him (中道而
立，能者從之).” 
Here, we see again that unlike Xunzi, Mencius does not differentiate between keyi 
and neng. The important point to gain from this passage is that it shows for Mencius that 
having the neng to practice and attain the ethical ideal still requires us to follow the 
norms and ways of those who have reached the acme of self-cultivation. Just as the 
compasses and squares of the carpenter are the culmination of squares and circles, the 
sage, as the ideal human character, is the culmination of human relationships (renlun 人
倫).3 Shuna (舜) the sage-king for example, did everything to serve his parents and 
succeeded in pleasing his father (who is constantly plotting to kill him)4 in the end.5 
Through this achievement, he set the pattern for harmonizing the relationship between 
father and son. Thus, for Mencius, whether we aspire to have achievements in the art of 
                                                 
3 See Mencius 4A: 2. 
 




carpentry, archery or renlun, we have to follow the ways and strategies of concrete 
personalities who have reached the apex of these fields to guide our own moral practice 
and development. Having the ability to regard others in certain affective modes, and 
being driven by such modes to act does not suffice for one to excel in the art of 
harmonizing relationships. 
Consider also 4A: 1, where Mencius writes in the context of his moral-political 
views that having a benevolent heart (ren xin 仁心) and reputation (ren wen 仁 闻) does 
not mean that one will benefit the people, or set exemplary patterns for present and future 
generations to emulate, if one does not follow and continue the Way of Former kings. For 
Mencius, being shan alone, i.e. being a person who simply executes his compassionate 
aims into action is not enough for government.  
Hence, even though only a benevolent man is fit to assume the role of a king, 
Mencius thinks that he would be deemed most unwise not to rely on the Way of Former 
kings for effectuating orderliness and harmony in society. As he says in the same 
passage, no one has ever erred through following and continuing the patterns of the sage, 
which are transmitted to us through ritual practices and classical texts. In order to 
accomplish a balanced equilibrium in the dynamics of our constitutive relations, it is vital 
then that one enculturates oneself in the framework of policies and strategies set by sages 
for guiding the proper application of one’s affective regard for things. More specifically, 
we have to follow the sage in terms of the opportune circumstances in which we allow 
our emotions and desires to be extended and manifested in proper forms of expressions 
and activities. This will instill in us the wisdom to manage the problematics and 
                                                                                                                                                 
5 See Mencius 4A: 28.  
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harmonization of renlun for and by ourselves. With primary reference to 1A: 7 and 6B: 2, 
I shall flesh out the general idea here for the rest of the chapter.  
7.3  Sage as Guide to Control of Environmental Influences  
From the previous chapter, we have discussed that in Mencius’ view, our 
emotions and desires, as the source of our moral direction and motivation, are passive and 
reactive in nature. What kind of emotions and desires arise in us, which indicates how our 
zhia is set, depends on our environmental stimulation. There is thus a need to control our 
environmental influences or exposure, so as to voluntarily and actively si about the right 
things to evoke our other-regarding xins and their desire-motivations as our strongest 
motivation, thereby concentrating the proper zhia to direct our actions and behavior in the 
right contexts. Otherwise, given Mencius’ picture of agency, we would seek courses that 
do not aim at meliorating and harmonizing our relations with others. My view here 
follows Im’s reading. As he writes, Mencius’ view is that we need to carry out strategies 
that “involve manipulation of situations in order to either engage or to prevent [certain] 
emotion”, “for the same kind and intensity of emotional engagement might be fine for 
some situations and disastrous for others.”6 As I submit for Mencius, we learn these 
strategies and policies from the sages. This is evident in his discussion with Xuan.  
In 1A: 7, Mencius tells Xuan that his substitution of the sacrificial ox with a lamb, 
which is generated by Xuan’s compassionate regard for the ox due to the likeness of its 
expression to an innocent man undergoing capital punishment, corresponds to the way of 
a benevolent person and the attitude of a junzi. Nevertheless, Xuan’s extension of 
compassion to the ox caused his people to be discontented, though their discontentment 
was based on the misconception that the substitution of the lamb with the ox was 
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motivated by penuriousness on Xuan’s part. After all, from their point of view, the lamb 
suffered just as the ox would have, and if Xuan really acted out of benevolence, he would 
not have used the lamb for the sacrifice.7 Of course, what they did not know, in Mencius’ 
illuminative explanation, is that Xuan did not see the lamb, and hence did not regard it 
compassionately. 
 In view of this, Mencius advises Xuan to follow the way of the junzi in future. 
Though a junzi loves all living creatures, and hence all animals, he does not adopt a 
benevolent stance towards them, especially when considering the fact that some species 
of animals must be slaughtered in order to allow certain ritual ceremonies, be it a 
sacrifice or a banquet, to be carried out in its best form.8 As such, the junzi deliberately 
avoid situations and places where he will experience directly and actively si the suffering 
of certain animals, thus preventing himself from extending his compassion towards 
them.9 In this way, he avoids disrupting or depreciating ritual ceremonies that are 
important to everyone, and avoids causing discord and trouble. 
The point that Mencius implicitly makes is that our compassionate engagements 
with others can disharmonize one’s relationships if not properly reined in. Though the 
humanizing affirmation of acting out of a compassionate regard is an end in itself, it is 
properly utilized only if it attains the concrete consequence of attaining or increasing 
                                                                                                                                                 
6 Im, “Emotional Control and Virtue in the Mencius,” 8. 
 
7 Perkins argues that by witnessing the suffering of the ox first-hand and not the lamb, the king is moved to 
regard not just that ox, but also other oxen compassionately. There is thus a shift of a mode of regarding 
from a particular to a certain category through some kind of non-deliberate associative thinking. See 
Perkins, “Mencius, Emotion, and Autonomy,” 714. 
 
8 Consider Analects 3: 7: Zigong wished to do away with the offering of a sheep connected with the 





harmony between self and others. This applies to all other kinds of emotional 
engagement, such as how we apply our capacity for anger. Though engaging with others 
in the mode of anger can strengthen and harmonize our relational bonds in some 
contexts,10 it is not so in others. As mentioned before, Mencius writes that a junzi avoids 
teaching his son, as father and son might constantly react to each other in rage and strain 
their relationship. It is therefore best to leave the role of a teacher, which requires one to 
think about exacting goodness (ze shan责善) from one’s students, to others. Following 
the Way of moral exemplars is thus an essential aspect of our moral education if one is to 
learn how to avoid emotional extensions that unbalance one’s field of relations. 
Strategies for rectifying our lack of proper emotional engagement with particular 
others is also something that we learn from the sages. As proposed, Xuan’s inactive or 
insufficient compassionate regard for his people can be remedied if he constantly puts 
himself in circumstances that would focus his attention on the concrete suffering of his 
people. To know how to select the right environmental stimuli day by day, he must come 
under the guidance and influence of Mencius, and ditch the company of those who direct 
his attention to activities and matters concerning his egoistic pursuits. In this way, Xuan 
will come to have an active and strong compassionate regard for his people, and thus 
would act to alleviate their lack of material support and their sufferings. As Mencius 
writes, it is only then will Xuan drive his people to goodness, and gain their goodwill and 
support. In other words, if Xuan applies his neng to be directed towards goodness by 
                                                                                                                                                 
9 In Mencius 7A: 45, Mencius says that a junzi is sparing with living creatures, but shows no benevolence 
towards them (君子之於物也， 愛之而弗親).  
 




following Mencius’ advice and tactics, he would move towards his goal of becoming a 
true king, and harmonize his relations with his people in the process.  
Underlying Mencius’ cultivating program is, I think, a psychologically realistic 
picture of human beings, where each of us has other-regarding xins of varying degrees of 
strength. There may be some individuals like Shun who may be naturally drawn to the 
good more than the average person under the right environmental circumstances. 
According to Mencius, Shuna acted like an uncultivated person (ye ren 野人) when he 
lived among the mountains, but when he heard a single good word (wen yi shan yan聞一
善言), and witnessed a single good deed (jian yi shan xing 見一善 行), nothing could stop 
him from incorporating it into his own behavior.11 Thus, Mencius describes Shuna as 
practicing benevolence because of his nature (xing zhi ye 性 之 也).12 The rest of us, like 
King Wen and Tang, must put in more effort to gain a tighter control of the affective 
movements of the qi-constituted heart-mind through a tighter control of our 
environmental exposure and what we si in order to tui benevolence on a regular basis.  
Also, each of us may well have dispositions that potentially create unproductive 
bonds and conflicts between self and other. As Mencius writes, for those who know that 
they have tendencies to be covetous, approximating how Boyi controls his environmental 
influences would facilitate the curbing of such tendencies from cutting us off from moral 
growth. And if an individual is aware of his petty or bigoted tendencies, approximating 
the pattern of Liu Xiahui would allow him to broaden his horizon of experiences, 
especially with those that he is previously prejudiced against, so as to increase his 
                                                 
11 See Mencius: 7A: 16.  
 
12 See Mencius 7A: 30; cf. 7B: 33.  
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tolerance and generosity in the process.13 Self-knowledge, in terms of being aware of our 
own emotional profile and strength of response, therefore plays a large role in whether 
one will become morally achieved. 
From the above, it is evident that having the neng in Mencian thought requires us 
to follow time-proven patterns and strategies blazed by ethical paragons for manipulating 
our environmental influences and what we voluntarily si, so as to tui feelings and 
associated motivations that seek consonance in our interdependent web of concerns and 
interests, and to avoid the evocation of the otherwise. As shall be shown in the next 
section, this is not enough however to practice the Mencian ethical ideal. 
7.4  Sage as Guide to Forms of Expressions and Activities 
In 6B: 2, Mencius tells Cao Jiao that everyone neng becomes a sage, provided that 
they make the effort to emulate the sage in terms of the forms, as such their behavioral 
motions, appearance, speech, etc. in which they express their emotions and desires. For 
example, one follows Yao and Shun by walking slowly behind one’s elders. In this way, 
one expresses one’s respect for elders in proper deferential forms. Cao Jiao then asks 
Mencius whether he can become his disciple, presumably so that he can acquire the 
proper structuralization of his neng to be a sage. Mencius’ reply is that there are many 
other available teachers, and one must make the effort to seek their tutelage so as to learn 
as widely as possible. For Mencius, having the neng to become a sage requires us to 
familiarize and habituate ourselves in the formal culture of the ethically achieved. 
As we can see, having the right emotions to respond to the right situations is not 
the only emphasis or the end-all of the Mencian program. What must be highlighted is 




that Confucianism is not a school of thought that advocates free and casual expressions of 
our emotional responses. As Im writes, “the Ruists were in the business of teaching the 
proper forms of behavior that express the attitudes essential to being a good person.”14 
These forms refer mainly to the Confucian rites, which embound fairly structural 
elements that govern our general behavior, speech, and activities, as well as ceremonial 
occasions. But why in Mencius’ view is there a need to follow the sage in adhering to 
ritual forms for structuring the expression of our emotional responses? 
In my understanding, the reason is that the rites are stable social practices that 
reveal a shared breadth and depth of meaning when we follow them in responding to 
others. Walking slowly behind elders, massaging their joints (1A: 7), giving food to 
beggars properly (6B: 2), etc. are forms of expression worked out and transmitted by 
sages (by paying attention to concrete, generalizable details and nuances of living as a 
hierarchical yet harmonious community) that allow us to communicate adequately the 
                                                                                                                                                 
13 See Mencius 5B: 1; cf. 2A: 9. 
 
14 According to Im, the relationship between our emotional capacities and the performance of the rites for 
their formal expressions is this: The development of these capacities, for example development of the 
ability to feel respect for one’s elders, is necessary prior to performing the rituals and the socially 
appropriate actions. Performance of these actives is not the training ground for cultivating the natural 
motivational capacities. Rather, it is a part of learning to engage properly in these activities, so that one 
actually engages those capacities that are already present and potent.  See Im, “Emotional Control and 
Virtue in the Mencius,” 13 & 15.  
 In other words, what Im is suggesting here is that for Mencius, the rites are not the educative 
medium for shaping our emotional capacities as capacities of ethical aims and motivations. Rather, as I 
suggest, they are shaped within regular patterns of human social experiences, in particular the experiences 
produced and communicated within and out of our familial interactions. Thus, in 7A: 15, Mencius writes 
that young children carried in the arms of their parents will have the neng to love their parents, which can 
be extended to others. Love for others therefore arises out of the common experience of unconditional 
affection and nurturance shown by our family members. In the same passage, Mencius writes that human 
beings in general will the neng to feel respect for elder brothers, which can be extended to others who are 
elder. It seems that feeling and acting out of respect for any elder in Mencius' view is within our voluntary 
control because we are brought up in familial contexts that typically have plays of superiority and 




meaning behind our emotional engagements with others.15 Hence, in learning and 
applying ritual forms upheld and transmitted to us by sages, we internalize the means to 
convey our emotions and desires to others in a familiar and aesthetic fashion,16 and attain 
attunement in our intersubjective psyche during the course of their performances. 
In addition, following ritual protocols and the insights of the sage conduce to the 
effective translation of our emotional engagements pro bono publico. Consider 4B: 2, 
where Mencius writes that Zi Chan is kind and charitable to the people that he governs by 
occasionally lending them a carriage to take them across a certain river. However, he 
should have followed the policy of a junzi in building foot and carriage bridges across 
that river. In this way, not only would Zi Chan alleviate every person’s hardship in 
fording, he would also please them and find time to attend to other governmental 
concerns. Emotional impulses of charity and kindness thus need to be organized towards 
proper forms of activities in Mencian thought. Similarly, in passages like 1A: 7, and     
4A: 1, Mencius states that the practice of benevolent government involves following the 
Way of Former Kings in the creation, maintenance, and distribution of state resources. It 
is through following the policies and plans enacted and transmitted by ethically 
authoritative figures that one bring together what the people want and what they like, and 
win their heart-minds and the Empire as a result.17  
From what has been said, practicing and according with the ethical ideal depends 
on learning from the sage not just control of the stimuli that surround our emotional 
                                                 
15 In Analects 8: 2, The Master said, “Respectfulness, without following li, becomes laborious activity; 
carefulness, without following li, becomes timidity; courage, without following li, becomes unruliness; 
forthrightness, without following li, becomes intolerance.” 
 
16 Mencius writes that the core (shi 實) of ritual practices is the regulation and adornment (jie wen 節文) of 




sensitivities, but also the formal material and activities upon which we exercise their 
manifestations. In Mencian thought, it appears that the sage acts as a teacher of the 
community to select the influences that shall affect the proper concentration of zhia, and 
through the medium of the rites and other appropriate forms, assist us in responding 
properly to these influences. In short, they set parameters for us to transform sporadic and 
causal emotion responses into regular and reliably effective policies that will meliorate 
and harmonize one’s relations with concrete others. In this way, in striving for the good, 
we will attain irrepressible, enriching, and dependable sources of inner enjoyment, and 
will not be perturbed by “unexpected vexations (wu yi zhao zhi huan ye 無一朝之患也).”18 
This permits us to nourish our qi and the heart-mind in terms of its zhia for gradually 
increasing our steadfastness to the moral path.  
7.5  The Development of Wisdom 
It has been observed that Mencian moral education is a continuous development 
and management of familial and socially qualitative experiences that will facilitate the 
timely functioning of our emotional capacities. It is through such a functioning of our 
emotional capacities that will allow us to join freely and fully in formal and effective (i.e. 
ritualistic) patterns of expressivity and activity created by virtuosos in renlun for attaining 
a sense of balance and order in a concrete domain of relationships. Thus, so long as we 
follow the sages for the management of our experiential focus and strength of emotional 
responses, and so long as we choreograph our emotional engagements in proximity to 
                                                                                                                                                 
17 See Mencius 4A: 9. 
 
 
18 In 4B: 28, Mencius writes that a person will not be vexed by others’ negative responses if he finds 
himself doing his best in responding to them from benevolence and the rites, i.e. from appropriately 
expressed emotions.  
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their way of expression and enterprise, we have the capability to regard and respond to 
proper others with proper forms of love, compassion, and respect etc. For Mencius, 
insofar as we possess a fund of familial and social experiences, and insofar as such a 
guided management of our emotional responses avails to anyone who makes the effort, 
we have the neng to practice and partake in sageliness, regardless of whether we 
understand comprehensively the rationale that underlies what we practice. 
However, it must be emphasized that Mencius expects us to break away from 
dependency on the sage during some time of our development, to go in the right way by 
ourselves and become successful, authoritative figures of renlun in our own right. The 
starting point for this is when we develop a sufficient degree of wisdom to take charge of 
our own personal growth. As Perkins argues, the goal of the sage in teaching others is not 
to “produce a perfectly virtuous person, but rather to produce a person who can take 
responsibility for his or her own cultivation and the cultivation of others.”19 In 5B: 1, 
with regards to the operations of archery, Mencius compares sageliness to the strength (pi 
ze li ye 譬則力也) required to hit a target, and wisdom as the skill to hit its center (pi ze 
qiao ye 譬則巧也). 20  Concentrating our zhia to do the right thing in the right form is 
therefore not enough. We must also endeavor to adjust our aims and actions according to 
conditions so as to attain a consummatory “timely equilibrium (shizhong 時中)”21 in ever-
                                                 
19 See Perkins, “Mencius, Emotion, and Autonomy;” 223. 
 
20 With reference to the passage, Shun interprets that just as archery requires the development of a skill to 
adapt and adjust oneself according to circumstances so as to hit the center, such as wind direction, moral 
actions requires the development of a sensitivity of adaptation and adjustment to circumstances so as to 
achieve one’s aim. Shun, Mencius and Early Chinese Thought, 68.  
 
21 Quoted from Cua’s analysis of quan in “Xin and Moral Failure,” 146-47, n. 14.  Shun interprets 
Mencius’ idea of zhong as “hitting the center” of a particular ethical situation to accord with Dao and lia. 
But because situations are complex and varying, zhong depends on quan. According to Shun, Mencius 
opposes Zi Mo’s conception and practice of zhong, which pertains simply to holding on to a middle 
 198
 
shifting fields of interrelationships. As Mencius implies in the passage, we must endeavor 
to be like Confucius, who gathers and completes all that is orderly by knowing what is 
the right way to do something by processing clues and cues of his circumstances,22 in 
addition to having the motivational strength to carry it through.23 In Mencius’ view, not 
only must we take an active control of our emotions, desires, and agency to hit the target 
of sageliness, we must also learn how to read the complexities of our concrete 
circumstances to hit the mark of wisdom. 
It is fitting to suggest here that for Mencius, wisdom is acquired in large part 
through frequent association with the sages, and the influence of their culture on our 
shifeizhixin.24 In other words, our capacity to evaluate, i.e. to affirm or deny things that 
we face, and the concomitant motivation to act on what we evaluate, is substantively 
shaped by regular interactions between oneself and the sage, particularly as regards what 
he brings us to experience and think about, the facets of which can never be adequately 
captured by any yan. The quality of this interaction develops and modifies the range and 
accuracy of our shifeizhixin, so that we can develop the initiative to analyze clearly and 
correctly what is to be affirmed or denied in more and more situations for ourselves. But 
                                                                                                                                                 
position between Yangzi and Mozi’s doctrines. For though Zi Mo’s idea of according with Dao is moderate 
and far better than the extreme positions of Yangzi and Mozi, Zi Mo still does violence to Dao because he 
holds on to zhong without quan. See Shun, Mencius and Early Chinese Thought, 69-70. 
 
22 Mencius writes in 5B: 1 (cf. 2A: 2) that Confucius is the sort of man who would hasten his departure or 
delay it, would remain in a state, or would take office, all according to circumstances.  
 
23 In Shun’s analysis of 5B: 1, Boyi, Yi Yin, and Liu Xiahui, have sageliness like Confucius in the sense 
that they have sufficient motivation to pursue ethical policies in the political realm. However, in 
comparison to Confucius, they lack wisdom, as they are rigid in the policies they pursue and hence, are not 
sufficiently sensitive to the circumstances. See Shun, Mencius and Early Chinese Thought, 201.  
 
24 In talking about extent of the influence of the sage such Poyi and Liu Xiahui, Mencius says that their 
Way would have more inspiring effects on those who know them personally than those do not.  See 
Mencius 7B: 15. 
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what sort of evaluative power is supposed to be enhanced in processing what we learn 
from the sages?  
Firstly, following Perkins’ analysis, regular exposure to the company or culture of 
the sage allows us to evaluate what external influences are good or bad and to follow 
them accordingly.25 What is thus being developed here is the wisdom to affirm or deny 
the circumstances and experiences, such as the people we associate with or the places we 
dwell in, that are detrimental or favorable to one’s moral practice and growth. In 2A: 2, 
Mencius writes that Zai Wo, Zigong, and You Ruo, who each practices or excels in 
different aspects of sageliness, have sufficient wisdom to recognize and appreciate the 
greatness of Confucius (zhi zhu yi zhic sheng ren 智 足 以 知 聖 人). In 2A: 7, he states 
that one cannot be said to have attained wisdom if one does not choose to live in a 
benevolent neighborhood (擇 不 處 仁， 焉 得 智).  In structuring and enriching our 
experiences under the influence of the sage, we acquire the right evaluative attitude 
concerning the proper stimuli for our endeavors and growth.  
So for example, in 6A: 9, Mencius describes Xuan as lacking wisdom due to 
insufficient exposure to Mencius’ influence and the right environment for stimulating the 
operation of his xin of compassion. This deficiency in wisdom leads him to choose to 
follow the influences of corrupted people, which in turn lead to his failure to practice 
benevolent government and attain the status of a true king. We may even go so far as 
saying that Xuan, in lacking sufficient nourishment of his qi and heart-mind through 
proper compassionate engagement with his people, lacks the wisdom to know yan, i.e. 
the wisdom to evaluate and reject the advice that the corrupted brings to him, which is 
why he persists in his bad governmental policies. As Chan argues, it appears that 
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knowing yan is something that comes after one’s heart-mind attains a certain extent of 
proper command of qi and its affective movements in Mencian thought.26 If Xuan is more 
regularly guided by Mencius in terms of the environmental circumstances that stimulate 
his emotional capacities, and comes to tui his compassion to his people and engage in the 
activities of benevolent government, then he would acquire the wisdom to reject the 
company and advice of corrupted people, and the motivation to embrace the right 
surroundings and activities instead to achieve his aim of becoming a true king. Hence, in 
learning from Mencius and responding to the right stimuli on a constant basis, and 
nourishing his shifeizhixin in the right conditions, Xuan’s wisdom will be increased to the 
extent that he has the skill to judge, learn, and manipulate on his own the circumstances 
that will sustain or augment his moral practice and growth. In short, he would learn how 
to hold fast to benevolence and propriety.27 
Secondly, by following the sage in nourishing our heart-mind with the 
accumulation of the right environmental influences and proper emotional engagements, 
what is enhanced is our evaluative power of whether we should observe, vary, or depart 
from ritual or other forms of expression or activity established by sages, or to create new 
forms, in reaction to exigent or unusual circumstances to achieve our ethical aims (e.g. 
4A: 17, 5B: 1, 4B: 9).28 In other words, we gain sufficient experiential learnings in 
                                                                                                                                                 
25 See Perkins, “Mencius, Emotion, and Autonomy;” 218-22 et passim.   
 
26 See Chan, 60. Moral understanding for Mencius therefore grows out of properly motivated actions. 
Compare this with Xunzi, who thinks that properly motivated actions grow from moral understanding 
instead. 
 
27 In 4A: 27, Mencius says: “The content of wisdom is to know these two {benevolence and propriety) and 
to hold fast to them.” 
 




knowing how to select and “play” with formal options set by sages for the outward 
expressions of feelings in particular situations so as to fully realize what we want to do in 
those situations. Through an increasing variety of social experiences, especially those 
problematic ones, and assessing others’ attitudes in reaction to our emotionally driven 
behavior and the mistakes we make (4A: 4, 4B: 28),29 we learn how to process the details 
and nuances of ever-changing concrete situations, and how to respond to them quickly 
enough to tailor our behavioral responses. Said another way, we build up a “situational” 
flexibility and adroitness of mind, to address or redress our concrete situations in timely, 
appropriate forms of action or expression. It is no wonder then that Mencius writes that 
individuals who create normative patterns for others to follow are people who have 
exhausted what the heart-mind si to the utmost (ji jie xin si yan 既 竭心思 焉) in trying 
conditions of interrelationships (4A: 1; 6B: 16), and acquire wisdom in the process (7B: 
18). 
We can look to 2B: 9 to lend support to this reading. Here, we learn from Chen 
Jia that the former sage king, the Duke of Zhou, sent Guan Shu (the Duke of Zhou’s 
brother) to be the overlord of Yin. However, Guan Shu used Yin as his base to stage a 
rebellion.30 In view of this, Chen Jia argues that the Duke of Zhou was deficient either in 
the way of benevolence or wisdom: If the Duke had made Guan Shu the overlord of Yin 
knowing that he would stage a rebellion, the Duke’s decision would have contravened the 
                                                 
 
29 Mencius also writes in 2A: 8 that Zilu feels delight whenever someone points out his mistakes.  
 
30 In 2B: 9, King of Qi tells his counselor Chen Jia that he feels ashamed to meet Mencius because he 
allows men of Yan to rebel against him. Chen Jia then refers to the episode of the Duke of Zhou making 




way of benevolence; if he did not for lack of foresight, then he did not show wisdom in 
his decision.  
Subsequently, Chen Jia quizzes Mencius on the benevolence and wisdom of the 
Duke of Zhou. In reply, Mencius implies that the Duke’s action constitutes benevolence, 
as what propelled him to make the mistake of making Guan Shu overlord of Yin is 
brotherly love. By acknowledging that the Duke made a mistake, it is highly likely that 
Mencius agrees with Chen Jia that that particular decision of the Duke lacked foresight.31 
Nevertheless, what make the Duke a sage of antiquity are his efforts to rectify his 
mistakes32—a sign of his openness to learn and grow from experiences of disharmony 
and disequilibrium in his interrelationships. Growth as a continuous reconstructive 
process of concrete experiences to generate proper relational habits, and to prevent 
improper ones, is there an important aspect of practicing the ethical ideal. As I submit 
from Mencius’ perspective, by taxing and testing his emotional engagements with others 
on a regular basis, together with a reflectiveness33 towards his experiences to learn what 
is of avail to remedy or fine-tune his actions, this is how the Duke enhanced his 
shifeizhixin to gain the wisdom to adjust his compassionate responses according to his 
relationship with all parties involved in a certain context to the point of excellence. In 
                                                 
31 Compare the Duke’s treatment of his brother with Shun. Despite his brother’s wickedness, Shun subjects 
his brother Xiang to enfeoffment instead of punishiment. The arrangement of the enfeoffment is such that it 
puts Xiang in a position of wealth and status, but prevents him from having power to administer the fief 
and thus from abusing the community there. In this way, Shun reacts benevolently and wisely in response 
to the problematic matter concerning his brother and his people, and achieves equilibrium in the 
relationships that constitute him. See Mencius 5A: 3. 
 
32 In alliance with his nephew King Cheng, the Duke of Zhou managed to put down the rebellion staged by 
Guan Shu. 
 
33 See Mencius 4B: 20 
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Mencius’ final analysis, the Duke of Zhou was proficient in both the Way of benevolence 
and wisdom, which is why he is so admired and emulated by generations.34  
In my reading, the whole process of taxing, testing, and examining our emotional 
engagements with others under the right environmental influences and active exertions at 
si and tui corresponds to Mencius’ idea of quan, the weighing of the heart-mind’s 
affective capacities and their behavioral responses. It is with respect to this sense that 
Mencius asks Xuan to quan his compassionate engagement with his people. Through 
such a process, we would acquire a certain degree of wisdom to quan (權)—the derivative 
power to weigh our circumstances, and deal appropriately with exigent or novel 
situations by affirming or denying, for example, the formal means transmitted by the 
moral exemplars to attain our ethical aims, as implied in 4A: 17.  
Chunyu Kun said, “Is it required by the rites that, in giving and receiving, 
men and women hand should not touch each other (男女授受不親，禮
與)?” 
 Mencius: “It is.” 
 “When your one’s sister-in-law is drowning, does one stretch out a hand 
to help her?” 
“Not to help a sister-in-law who is drowning is to be a brute (chai lang豺
狼). It is required by the rites that, in giving and receiving, man and 
woman should not touch each other, but to stretch out a hand to help the 
drowning sister-in-law is to use one’ quan. 
“Now the Empire is drowning, why do you not help it?” 
“When the Empire is drowning, one helps it with the Way; when a sister-
in-law is drowning one helps her with one’s hand. Would you have me 
help the Empire with my hand (天下溺，援之以道， 嫂溺，援之以手，子
欲手援天下乎)?” 
 
The background knowledge of this particular passage is very important to 
understanding the point that it is trying to convey. According to D.C Lau and Shun’s 
                                                 
 
34 For tokens of the Duke of Zhou’s wisdom, see Mencius 4B: 20; The Analects XVIII: 10.  
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commentaries,35 Chunyu Kun is criticizing Mencius for his insistence on the necessity of 
observing the rites as a means for saving the “drowning” Empire, even though Mencius is 
willing to breach ritual observation (breaking the taboo of physical contact between men 
and women in the everyday activities of giving and receiving objects) in the case of 
saving one’s drowning sister-in-law. The observance of the rites in the case of saving the 
Empire refers to going through the proper people and activities so as to give guidance to 
the king. In asking Mencius to violate the rites for the noble end of the Empire’s salvation, 
Chunyu Kun is therefore asking Mencius to gain political access to the king by improper 
means, such as gaining the favors of disreputable but powerful and influential officials. 
 Based on Lau and Shun’s reading, Mencius does not disapprove the use of one’s 
hand to save one’s sister-in-law because it does not impair or undermine the Way. Let us 
suppose for Mencius that a person who saves his sister-in-law is acting out of the concern 
or desire for her welfare or good. Even though it breaches the rites, using his hand to 
rescue her would allow him to realize the desired-aim of her welfare, and would not 
compromise the excellence of the Way. The hand as a means in this particular situation is 
a device that has a “neutral” influence on the Way. Unless there is some object like a 
stick (or something akin to a buoy) that he can use to save his drowning sister-in-law, 
there is no way that he can rigorously observe the stated rite and save her at the same 
time. That is why Mencius emphasizes that quan is required for deciding whether one 
should stick to or transgress formal activities established by the sages to hit one’s moral 
aim and accord with their Way. By using physical contact to save a relative of an 
opposite sex so as to attain the goal of saving someone’s life and accord with the Way, a 
person is not impacting for better or for worse the Way but maintaining its advancement. 
                                                 
35 See Lau, “Introduction” in Mencius,” 244-50; Shun, Mencius and Early Chinese Thought, 172-73. 
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 In contradistinction, Mencius’ insistence on using the ritualized policies and 
activities to save the Empire is because such means affect the Way positively. In asking 
Mencius to fraternize with unsavory officials, Chunyu Kun is, from Mencius’ perspective, 
asking Mencius to degrade his character. As Mencius asserts at the end of 3B: 1, “there 
has never been a man who could straighten others by bending himself (枉己者，未有能直
人者也).”36 This brings to mind the idea that the Way proceeds and is maintained by the 
design of reciprocal establishment of self and other. Furthermore, compromising one’s 
character to bring about political rectification would only come to naught. Not only 
would one set a bad precedent of endorsing impropriety in gaining political advantage,37 
one would also never change the corrupted and incompetent political apparatus which 
one has become a part of. Corruption and incompetence thrives only if the Way is not 
properly installed. In other words, the bad officials will never allow Mencius to gain a 
foothold in court, or to have a significant influence on the ruler, if Mencius’ aim is to 
rectify the ruler and restore the Way.38 By violating certain procedures and activities 
transmitted by the sages to save the Empire, one would not be continuing but damaging 
the Way instead; in degrading oneself so as to rectify the ruling office, one is not 
following the Way but is deviating from it and making it more deviant. In short, bending 
and corrupting oneself for the aim of preserving the Way would only result in the 
counterproductive effect of corrupting the Way. Quan in this political context would tell 
                                                 
36 Cf. 5A: 7.  
 
37 This is part of Shun’s argument for why bending oneself would not attain the aim of righting others. See 
Shun, Mencius and Early Chinese Thought, 172. 
 
38  In Lau’s words, “such people will never permit the Way to prevail for should such a thing happen they 
would be the first to suffer.” Lau, “Introduction” in Mencius, 249. 
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us not to violate the rites and go against its repository of insight and experience for saving 
the Empire. 
 The upshot of Mencius’ emphasis on quan is not that ritually structured policies, 
activities, expressions etc are indispensable,39 “but only that one should not hold on to 
them rigidly.”40 The requisite practical experiences and ability to quan can be acquired 
only in the context of the daily ritual institutions and behavioral practices established by 
sages that shape our shifeizhixin. For Mencius, quan pertains to a contextual sensitivity to 
the nature and significance of the factors and problematics of situations we find ourselves 
in, and which facilitates the attainment of timely equilibrium in the locus of relationships 
that constitute us in those situations. Arriving at the wisdom to quan and using quan to 
enhance our wisdom allows us to adjust and adapt the rites properly to ever-changing 
environments,41 and sustain the ethos and culture of the morally achieved. In this way, we 
become upholders and trailblazers of the Way—beacons in the art of negotiating 
relationships.  
7.6  Respect for the Way and Authority of the Sage 
Based on what has been examined so far, it is fair to say that Xunzi mistakenly 
interprets the Mencian locution of neng as implying a native emotional equipment of the 
first order for human relationships, to be taken just as it stands, which implies the 
dispensability of former and present sages and their culture for practicing and attaining 
                                                 
39 Ultimately, moral responses are response to living concrete situations and the details of the rites may not 
cover all situations. They should not be thought of as all-encompassing norms, but rather as rules of thumbs 
that require experience and common sense in their application, which are built up the more we perform 
moral actions. 
 
40 Quoted from Shun, Mencius and Early Chinese Thought, 70. 
 
41 See Mencius 4B: 20 
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the ethical ideal. Contra what Xunzi seems to think, neng for Mencius is a hortatory term 
to follow the sages and their culture in giving proper direction and shape to our lives, to 
emulate their patterns so as to make sense of our lives in a holistically flourishing way. 
Put differently, it is an appeal to learn from the sage strategies and ways for controlling 
the affective movements of the heart-mind so as to facile responsiveness to our social 
needs and desires to the strongest level, and which facilitates ease of participation in a 
learning curve to structure emergent actions in socially agreeable and integrative forms. 
Hence, in Mencius’ writings, we find rather direct urgings to become great by retaining 
“child-likeness” of heart-mind—an unbiased and open responsiveness to connect and 
engage with others through certain emotional channels,42 while at the same time, more 
subtle yet undeniable encouragements to form maturity of knowledge and skill to cope 
with issues and problems of such engagements.43 For Mencius, such a process depends 
fundamentally on cultivation of the heart-mind and its tastes in the nutrient medium 
transmitted by sages. Seen in this way, guidance by the sages for Mencius is not an 
artificial imposition of changes to our dispositions, but a freeing of natural impulsions in 
                                                 
42 In Xing e 23.5, in what seems to be making some reference to Mencius 4B: 12, Xunzi reads Mencius’ 
thesis, “Xing shan,” as predicated on the contention that human beings become evil as a result of losing 
their “original simplicity and child-like naiveté.” As Knoblock points out, to deflate Mencius’ view, Xunzi 
argues that it is part of our life-process to depart from our original simplicity and child-like naiveté; we 
necessarily lose or destroy them. See Knoblock, Xunzi: A Translation and Study of the Complete Works 
v.3, 141. We should take note of the following points to see why Xunzi’s criticism of Mencius is 
misguided.  Firstly, Mencius’ idea of original simplicity and child-like naiveté pertains to the idea of 
having a native mechanism that tends to facile an emotional responsiveness to concrete social happenings 
and conditions of self in relation to others. Secondly, preserving these qualities does not mean preserving 
natural dispositions to effectuate the Xunzian conception of goodness—the power to attain zhenglipingzhi 
in states of the world. Thirdly, given the first point, recovery of our original simplicity and child-like 
naiveté is possible, at least for most people, with the aid of the right environmental stimuli.  
 
 
43 My interpretation and words are inspired by John Dewey, “Education as Growth” in Pragmatism: A 
Contemporary Reader, ed. Russell B. Goodman (New York: Routledge, 1995), 95-101 et passim. See also 
Dewey, The Child and the Curriculum, and The School and Society with Intro. by Leonard Carmichael 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956). 
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response to natively nurturing circumstances and activities to find the utmost fulfillment 
and expression of our life as a process of growth.  
Respect for the Way and authority of the sage is therefore vital to Mencian 
cultivation, though not in the same way as Xunzi. I shall sum up their differences in this 
respect by way of conclusion. On the one hand, Xunzi believes that the sages transmit to 
us the ultimate rationale in the form of ritual principles for optimizing human satisfaction 
and minimizing inter-personal and intra-personal conflicts and afflictions. Constant study 
and implementation of these principles will instill in us an approval (ke) of the courses of 
action that they spell out. “Approval,” as a mechanism of moral agency for Xunzi, runs 
on a form of motivation that inextricably combines a highly self-aware calculation of 
what will reliably and best satisfy us over the long run, and some succession of 
experiences confirming the more profound and refined pleasures of aiming at and 
comporting with goodness. To accumulate acts based on such a motivation will gradually 
put yield to our inherent drive to satisfy every momentary desire, and strengthen the 
heart-mind in terms of its zhia to be set on deliberations premised on ritual principles for 
translating our emotions and desires into forms of conduct that achieve relational 
harmony and order in all circumstances.  
On the other hand, Mencius believes that the sages transmit to us strategies for 
controlling our environmental influences and exposure, which will substantively shape 
what we si and affect what we desire most (Mencius’ idea of moral agency), and hence 
whether we extend (tui) our other-regarding xins to others in opportune contexts. 
Engagement in such a guided process of si and tui facilitates the concentration of the 





nourishing all our inherent tastes. Also, the sages provide us with socially constructive 
behavioral parameters, mainly in the form of ritual practices, which we must learn over 
time to be creative with (in the way we emotionally respond to others) to deal cogently 
with for and by ourselves the complexities of human problematics. In such a way, a 
person follows the sage in realizing a gradually building steadfastness of purpose and 














The translations here act as rough guides to the meaning of some recurring terms to help 
in identifying them.   
 
 
ai wu cha deng  (love without gradations)  愛無差等 
 
budongxin  (unmoved heart-mind)  不動心 
bu neng  (not able to)  不能 
bu ke  (lack of capacity)  不可  
bu ren  (cannot bear)  不忍 
bu ren ren zhi xin  (the heart-mind that cannot bear the suffering of others)  不忍人之心 
bu wei  (not do)  不爲 
 
ce yin zhi xin   (heart-mind of compassion)  惻隱之心 
chong  (fill)  充 
cong  (follow)  從 
cong suo ke  (follow what one approves)  從所可 
 
dao (path, the Way)  道 
da  (great, vast)  大 
de  (to get, do well)  得 
 
duan  (sprout)  端 
 
en  (compassionate)  恩 
 
fu wei er  (refuse to make the effort)  弗爲耳 
 
gong jing zhi  (heart-mind of respectfulness and reverence)  恭敬之心 
ge gui  (unexpected change)  愅詭 
 
hao (like, likings)  好  
haoranzhiqi  (flood-like energy)  浩然之氣  
haowuzhiqing  (disposition of liking and disliking)  好惡之情 
hengxin  (constancy of heart-mind)  恆心 
jen  (human)  人 
ji  (accumulate)  積  
 
ke  (permissible, possible)  可 
keyi  (have the capacity to)  可以  
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kuo  (expand)  擴  
 
li  (rites, observance of rites)  禮 
lia  (pattern, principle)  理 
lei  (category)  類 
luan  (disorder)  亂 
lü   (deliberate)  慮 
 
mei  (beautiful)  美 
 
neng   (having the ability to)  能 
nei  (internal)  内 
 
qi  (vital energy)  氣  
qia   (sickness, disorderly desire)  疾 
qian  (dissatisfying)  慊 
qing  (what is genuinely so about something, emotions)  情 
quan   (weighing our circumstances)  權 
 
ren  (benevolence)  仁 
renlun  (human relationships)  人倫 
 
si  (think, reflect)  思 
siduan  (four sprouts)  四端 
shen ming  (spiritual clarity)  神明 
sheng  (sage)  聖 
shi   (application)  事 
shi fei zhi xin  (heart-mind of affirming and denying)  是非之心 
shizhong  (timely equilibrium)  時中 
 
tui  (extend)  推 
 
wai  (external)  外 
wei  (human artifice)  僞 
wen  (refined forms, cultured)  文  
wu  (dislike, disliking)  惡 
 
xiaoren  (petty man)  小人 
xian ze  (worthy person, virtuous person)  賢者 
xie wu zhi qi  (base qi)  邪污之氣 
xue  (learn)  學 
Xing e  (Human nature is evil)  性 
Xing shan  (Human nature is good)  性善 
xin  (heart-mind)  心 
xiu wu zhi xin  (heart-mind of shame and self-loathing)  羞惡 之心 
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yang  (nurture, cultivate)  養 
yi  (propriety)  義 
ying  (response)  應 
yong  (courage)  勇 
you  (have, possess)  有 
yuan  (pull)  援 
yu  (desire)  欲 
yue  (joy)  悦 
 
zhi  (wisdom)   智 
zhia  (directedness)  志 
zhib  (to record, remember, bear in mind)  誌 
zhic  (know, understand)  知 
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